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No. 12

23 AUGUST 1974

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

1 August 1974

AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT LIMITING CIA INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES

HON. MICHAEL HARRINGTON

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 31, 1974

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, I am offering amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act limiting CIA covert operations which manipulate and intervene in the internal affairs of foreign countries.

I consider the Foreign Assistance Act the natural piece of legislation for attaching these amendments. For there can be no doubt that when the CIA intervenes in the internal affairs of foreign countries, the CIA is usurping Congress' role and responsibility for formulating foreign policy. Such executive abuses of power must now be ended.

In the last couple of months, particular attention has been given to unlawful CIA intervention into this country's domestic affairs. CIA intervention into the domestic affairs of foreign countries is simply the other side of the coin and deserves equal congressional attention. Such intervention is equally illegal and is a manifestation of the same drive for unchecked power on the part of the executive branch of Government.

This committee should feel a particular obligation to limit CIA activities which intervene in the internal affairs of foreign countries. As reported in the Washington Post on October 21, 1973, CIA Director Colby in hearings on the Chilean coup told me that he would not testify before this committee to specific CIA operations. Yet, it is this committee which formulates foreign policy. If the CIA will not tell us exactly how and in what respects the CIA is influencing foreign policy, this committee's only choice is to prevent the CIA to the extent possible from anyway affecting foreign policy determinations. The CIA now enjoys the best of both worlds. It tells of its intervention in foreign policy only to those Members of Congress either not interested or experienced in formulating foreign policy; on the other hand, it tells those Members interested and experienced in formulating foreign policy that CIA meddling into foreign affairs is none of their business. This clearly cannot continue.

I envision these amendments as only a first step in regaining for the Foreign Affairs Committee power over the CIA's direction of foreign policy. Certainly, full support should be given to that part of the Bolling committee reforms which give the Foreign Affairs Committee some oversight powers in regard to the CIA. Independently, it is also necessary to

work for reform which will create a CIA oversight committee which would include members of Foreign Affairs and would have the necessary powers to prevent CIA abuses of its charter.

According to President Truman, whose administration created the CIA, the agency was intended to gather, centralize and analyze intelligence and was never intended to be a "peacetime cloak-and-dagger operation." The National Security Act of 1947 authorizing the CIA gave it permission to engage only in those activities "related to intelligence." Yet, the evidence is clear that the CIA in conjunction with the National Security Council has taken upon itself the role of directing a secret foreign policy distinct from the one authorized by Congress.

Almost from its inception, the CIA has arrogated to itself the power to secretly intervene in the internal affairs of foreign countries. According to a series of articles written collectively by the New York Times correspondents Tom Wicker, Max Frankel, Bud Kenworthy, and John Finney and published in the Times from April 25-28, 1966, in the early 1950's, the CIA funded defeated Chinese Nationalists and encouraged them to raid Communist China. In Guatemala, the article noted that the CIA has admitted that it funded and engineered the revolution against the Communist-oriented President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. As is well documented, the Bay of Pigs operation was planned by the CIA.

According to the Times, it is now documented that the CIA operated the Philippine campaign against Huk guerillas. The CIA organized an unsuccessful coup against President Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958. According to Vincent Marchetti's book, "The CIA, the Cult of Intelligence," the CIA spent an excessive amount of energy in hunting down Che Guevara in 1966-67. All of these operations clearly affected this country's foreign policy.

In Chile, according to an April 6, 1973, Washington Post article by Laurence Stern quoting knowledgeable official sources, major intervention by the CIA helped to defeat Allende in the 1964 election for President. The CIA funded trade unions, farmer organizations, student groups, and the media in order to defeat and discredit Allende. According to testimony given before a Senate subcommittee and printed in the October 21, 1973, Washington Post, the CIA earmarked \$400,000 to support anti-Allende news media shortly before the election. In testimony given before this committee and printed in the Washington Post, Director Colby refused to say that this money was not spent. The latest CIA manipulative attempt exposed by the press and admitted by the Government was the faking of a letter to Bangkok government by

a CIA agent. The agent accredited the letter to a guerilla leader in order to discredit him.

CIA interference in other countries' internal affairs through military assistance has also been egregious and documented. The CIA has now admitted that it armed, trained, and operated an army of Miao tribesmen in Laos during the 1960's. The Times articles on April 25-23, 1966, documented that the CIA supplied pilots, mechanics, and aircraft to the government of Moise Tshombe in the Congo.

CIA involvement in training the military and police forces of other countries has also recently come to light. In Jack Anderson's column of October 8, 1973, he exposed the existence of papers possessed by Senator ABOWREK which documented that the CIA was training foreign policemen under the auspices of AID in a remote desert camp in Texas. Foreign countries being trained included Chile, Brazil, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, and Uruguay. The CIA taught these policemen the use of explosives, electric priming, electric firing devices, explosive charges, and booby traps.

That the CIA is still involved in these operations today is evident. A pattern of intervention in the internal affairs of foreign countries has been clear since the creation of the CIA. There is no reason to believe that the CIA has suddenly stopped these activities. Moreover, according to Marchetti, 1,800 CIA agents are still working in the covert activities unit of the CIA—engaged in financing youth, labor, cultural groups, operating clandestine radio propaganda outlets, and conducting large-scale efforts to influence foreign elections. Andrew Hamilton, former program analyst for the National Security Council, reported in the September 1973 edition of the Progressive that according to informed sources the

1971 CIA budget continued at about \$100 million for covert operations in 1971.

Finally, it should be briefly noted that not only is there the abundance of evidence mentioned previously tying the CIA to the formulation of foreign policy, but there is also evidence that some CIA funding comes directly from FAA money. First, there are the police training programs already mentioned. Marchetti reports in his book that AID's Public Safety Division regularly provides cover for CIA operatives all over the world. In addition, the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee revealed that the Loatian war was financed from the budgets of AID and DOD.

These amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act limiting CIA activities offer Congress an opportunity to reassert those powers, which through neglect, have been usurped by the CIA.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, AUGUST 15, 1974

Excerpts From the Draft of House Judiciary Panel's Final Report on Impeachment

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 14—Following are excerpts from the draft of the final report by the House Judiciary Committee that contains facts supporting Articles I, II and III of impeachment of former President Nixon:

ARTICLE I Conclusion

After the Committee on the Judiciary had debated whether or not it should recommend Article I to the House of Representatives, 26 of the 38 members of the committee found that the evidence before it could only lead to one conclusion: That Richard M. Nixon, using the powers of his high office, engaged, personally and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede, and obstruct the investigation of the unlawful entry, on June 17, 1972, into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee: To cover up, conceal and protect those responsible; and to conceal the existence and scope of other unlawful covert activities.

This finding is the only one that can explain the President's involvement in a pattern of undisputed acts that occurred after the break-in and that cannot otherwise be rationally explained.

[1]

The President's decision on June 20, 1972, not to meet with his Attorney General, his chief of staff, his counsel, his campaign director, and his assistant, John Ehrlichman, whom he had put in charge of the investigation—when the subject of their meeting was the Watergate matter.

[2]

The erasure of that portion of the recording of the President's conversation with Haldeman, on June 20, 1972, which dealt with Watergate—when the President stated that the tapes had been under his "sole and personal control."

[3]

The President's public denial on June 22, 1972, of the involvement of members of the Committee for the Re-election of the President or of the White House staff in the Watergate burglary, in spite of having discussed Watergate, on or before June 22, 1972, with Haldeman, Colson and Mitchell—all persons aware of that involvement.

[4]

The President's refusal, on July 6, 1972, to inquire and inform himself what Patrick Gray, acting director of the F.B.I., meant by his warning that some of the President's

aides were "trying to mortally wound" him.

[5]

The President's discussion with Ehrlichman on July 8, 1972, of clemency for the Watergate burglars, more than two months before the return of any indictments.

[6]

The President's public statement on August 29, 1972, a statement later shown to be untrue, that an investigation by John Dean "indicates that no one in the White House staff, no one in the Administration, presently employed, was involved in this very Bizarre incident."

[7]

The President's statement to Dean on September 15, 1972, the day that the Watergate indictments were returned without naming high C.R.P. and White House officials, that Dean had handled his work skillfully, "putting your fingers in the dike every time that leaks have sprung here and sprung there," and that "you just try to button it up as well as you can and hope for the best."

[8]

The President's discussion with Colson in January, 1973, of clemency for Hunt.

[9]

The President's discussion with Dean on Feb. 28, 1973, of Kalmbach's upcoming testimony before the Senate select committee, in which the President said that it would be hard for Kalmbach because "it'll get out about Hunt," and the deletion of that phrase from the edited White House transcript.

[10]

The President's appointment in March, 1973, of Jeb Stuart Magruder to a high Government position when Magruder had previously perjured himself before the Watergate grand jury in order to conceal C.R.P. involvement.

[11]

The President's refusal to act on Dean's statements of March 13, 1973, that Mitchell and Haldeman knew about Liddy's operation at C.R.P., that Sloan has a compulsion to "cleanse his soul by confession," that Stans and Kalmbach are trying to get him to "settle down," and that Strachan had lied about his prior knowledge of Watergate out of personal loyalty; and the President's reply to Dean that Strachan was the problem "in Bob's case."

[12]

The President's discussion on March 13, 1973, of a plan

to limit future Watergate investigations by making Colson, a White House "consultant without doing any consulting," in order to bring him under the doctrine of executive privilege.

[13]

The omission of the discussion related to Watergate from the White House edited transcript, submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary, of the President's March 17, 1973, conversation with Dean, especially in light of the fact that the President had listened to the conversation on June 4, 1973.

[14]

The President's instruction to Dean on the evening of March 20, 1973, to make his report on Watergate "very incomplete," and his subsequent public statements misrepresenting the nature of that instruction.

[15]

The President's instruction to Haldeman on the morning of March 21, 1973, that Hunt's price was pretty high, but we should buy the time on that.

[16]

The President's March 21 statement to Dean that he had "handled it just right," and contained it," and the deletion of the above comments from the edited White House transcripts.

[17]

The President's instruction to Dean on March 21, 1973, to state falsely that payments to the Watergate defendants had been made through a Cuban committee.

[18]

The President's refusal to inform officials of the Department of Justice that on March 21, 1973, Dean had confessed to obstruction of justice and had said that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell were also involved in the crime.

[19]

The President's approval on March 22, 1973, of a shift in his position on executive privilege "in order to get on with the cover-up plan," and the discrepancy, in that phrase, in the edited White House transcript.

[20]

The President's instruction to Ronald Ziegler on March 26, 1973, to state publicly that the President has "absolute and total confidence" in Dean.

[21]

The President's actions, in April, 1973, in conveying to Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson and Kalmbach information furnished to the President by Assistant Attorney General

Petersen after the President had assured Petersen that he would not do so.

[22]

The President's discussion, in April, 1973, of the manner in which witnesses should give false and misleading statements.

[23]

The President's lack of clemency to Mitchell, Magruder and Dean.

[24]

The President's lack of full disclosure to Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen between April 15 and April 27, 1973, when Petersen reported directly to the President about the Watergate investigation.

[25]

The President's instruction to Ehrlichman on April 17, 1973, to give false testimony concerning Kalmbach's knowledge of the purpose of the payments to the Watergate defendants.

[26]

The President's decision to give Haldeman on April 25 and 26, 1973, access to tape recordings of Presidential conversations, after Assistant Attorney General Petersen had repeatedly warned the President that Haldeman was a suspect in the Watergate investigation.

[27]

The President's refusal to disclose the existence of the White House taping system.

[28]

The President's statement on May 25, 1973, that his waiver of executive privilege, announced publicly on May 22, 1973, did not extend to documents.

[29]

The refusal of the President to cooperate with Special Prosecutor Cox: The President's instruction to Special Prosecutor Cox not to seek additional evidence in the courts and his firing of Cox when Cox refused to comply with that directive.

[30]

The submission by the President to the committee on April 30, 1974, and the simultaneous release to the public of transcripts of 43 Presidential conversations and statements which are characterized by omissions of words and passages, misattributions of statements, additions, paraphrases, distortions, non-sequiturs, deletions of sections as "material unrelated to Presidential action," and other signs of editorial intervention: the President's authorization of his counsel to characterize these transcripts as "accu-

rate," and the President's public statement that the transcripts contained "the whole story" of the Watergate matter.

In addition to this evidence there was before the committee the following additional evidence.

[1]

Beginning immediately after June 17, 1972, the involvement of each of the President's top aides and political associates, Haldeman, Mitchell, Ehrlichman, Colson, Dean, LaRue, Mardian, Magruder, in the Watergate cover-up.

[2]

The clandestine payment by Kalmbach and LaRue of more than \$400,000 to the Watergate defendants.

[3]

The attempt by Ehrlichman and Dean to interfere with the F.B.I. investigation.

[4]

The perjury of Magruder, Porter, Mitchell, Krogh, Strachan, Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

In addition to this evidence, there was before the committee a record of public statements by the President between June 22, 1972, and June 9, 1974, deliberately contrived continually to deceive the courts, the Department of Justice, the Congress and the American people.

On August 5, 1974, the President submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary three additional edited White House transcripts of Presidential conversations on June 23, 1972, which confirm the finding that from shortly after the break-in on June 17, 1972, President Nixon personally directed his subordinates to take action designed to delay, impede and obstruct the investigation of the Watergate break-in: to cover-up, conceal, and protect those responsible; and to conceal the existence and scope of other unlawful covert activities.

In violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, contrary to his trust as President and unmindful of the duties of his high office, the President adopted a course of conduct, which caused illegal surveillance for political purposes; and the concealment of responsibility for that surveillance; obstruction of justice; perjury, destruction of evidence—all crimes. For more than two years, the President engaged in a course of conduct which involved deliberate, repeated and continued deception of the American people.

The committee finds the President's course of conduct to be to the great prejudice of the cause of law and justice and subversive of our Constitution; and the committee recommends that the House of Representatives exercise its constitutional power

power to impeach Richard M. Nixon.

ARTICLE II

Article II charges that Richard M. Nixon has violated his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed and the obligations he assumed when he took the constitutional oath of office as President. The article is based upon the constitutional standards governing the President's conduct of his office, and charges that he has misused powers that only a President possesses.

Using the powers of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in disregard of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has repeatedly engaged in conduct violating the constitutional rights of citizens, impairing the due and proper administration of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, or contravening the laws of Government agencies of the executive branch and the purposes of these agencies.

Five areas of misconduct are included within the article, each of them sufficiently substantial to warrant impeachment. Each involves repeated misuse of the powers of the office of President, over a continued period. Each focuses on improprieties by the President that served no national policy objective and cannot be justified under the most expansive view of the discretionary or inherent powers of a President. Each

Central to Article II is the charge that the President misused the power of the Presidency. He misused these powers by directing or authorizing his subordinates to seek to interfere with the administration and enforcement of the Internal Revenue laws in order to advance his political interests, contrary to the constitutional rights of citizens. He misused his powers by authorizing the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service, as well as agents of his own office, to undertake and continue electronic surveillance and investigation of citizens for which there was no lawful purpose: by permitting or authorizing the use of information obtained from this surveillance for purposes that were beyond the authority of his office; and by permitting a secret investigative unit within the office of the President to engage in unlawful and covert activities, in violation of the constitutional rights of citizens. He failed to perform his duty to see that the laws were applied to his close subordinates when he knew or had sub-

stantial reason to suspect that they were interfering with the proper administration of the law. He knowingly misused the executive power to interfere with the proper and lawful functioning of agencies of the executive branch, including the Department of Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency.

In some of these instances his attempts to misuse executive agencies proved unsuccessful. The impeachment process is designed to determine whether the President is fit to remain in office, not whether he should be punished for past misdeeds. In this connection, a violation of the President's duties the objective is no less serious because the improper objective is not achieved. [footnote: the applicable principle was stated by Supreme Court Justice William Johnson in *Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston*, 10 F. Cas. 355 365 (No. 5, 420) (C.C.Z. S.C. 1808):

If an officer attempt an act inconsistent with the duties of his station, it is presumed that the failure of the attempt would not exempt him from liability to impeachment. Should a President head a conspiracy for the usurpation of absolute

power, it is hoped that no one will contend that defeating his machinations would restore him to innocence.]

ARTICLE III

Conclusion

The undisputed facts, historical precedent, and applicable legal principles support the committee's recommendation of Article III. There can be no question that in refusing to comply with limited, narrowly drawn subpoenas—issued only after the committee was satisfied that there was other evidence pointing to the existence of impeachable offenses—the President has interfered with the exercise of the House's function as the "grand inquest of the nation." Unless the defiance of the committee's subpoenas under these circumstances is considered grounds for impeachment—it is difficult to conceive any relevant evidence necessary for Congress to exercise its constitutional responsibility in an impeachment proceeding. If this were to occur, the impeachment power would be drained of its vitality. Article III, therefore, seeks to preserve the integrity of the impeachment process itself and the ability on Congress to act as the ultimate check on improper presidential conduct.

WASHINGTON POST
17 August 1974

Claim Made By McCord Against U.S.

United Press International

James W. McCord Jr., convicted Watergate burglar and former security chief for the Committee for the Re-election of the President, has claimed damages of \$1 million from the White House and \$1 million from the Justice Department.

In a 13-page memo addressed to the President and the Attorney General and entitled "Federal Tort Claims Against the Government," McCord claimed that his civil

rights had been violated. The claim was contained in the memo, but was not filed as a court action.

It was dated Aug. 14 and mailed to the White House.

"By deliberately withholding" Watergate evidence, McCord said, "President Richard Nixon committed extreme prejudice against McCord, denying him a fair trial, due process and equal protection of the law, and denying other constitutional and civil rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed him under the Constitution."

McCord was the electronics expert on the team that broke into Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate complex June 17, 1972. He was convicted in the original Watergate trial in January, 1973.

The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence

By Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks.

434 pp. New York:

Alfred A. Knopf, \$8.95.

By WILLIAM MILLER

Victor Marchetti and John Marks took as the frontispiece of their book the motto inscribed on the wall of the C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va.: "And Ye Shall Know the Truth; And the Truth Shall Make You Free." Ironical, since their book "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence" is the first book censored with court sanction before publication in the Republic's 198 years. This edition includes blank spaces, where 168 passages, 27 derived from identifiably classified sources, have been deleted by court order. An additional 177 passages, printed in bold face type, were reinstated by the courts.

The court applied no test of the merits of classification, accepting only the fact of it. The reader has no way of knowing whether deleted material would, in truth, "cause grave and irreparable injury to the United States." The book's legal history and actual merits raise separate but related questions. There have been many other exposés of the C.I.A., and

there is considerable scholarly literature on intelligence services available. With the exception of some details and what may be in the deleted portions, there is little new information in the Marchetti-Marks book.

Effective bureaucracies that require operational secrecy are uneasy partners with egalitarian democratic government and ideas of individual liberty. Marchetti and Marks agree there is no alternative to their precarious coexistence. This book represents a serious breakdown in the internal discipline of the agencies so dependent upon discipline and secrecy. The authors accept responsibility for the contents of their book and argue that failure to publish would itself adversely affect national security, as the failure of the press to publish information about the Bay of Pigs was, in the end, against the national interest. Thus they come, indirectly, to the larger questions of conflict of institutional issues.

Both authors held sensitive intelligence positions, and had, indeed, signed agreements pledging not to disclose confidential information learned in the employ of the Government. (Justice Department lawyers, arguing for the C.I.A., claimed the issue was not censorship and the First Amendment, but a simple breach of contract suit.)

In the context of Watergate Washington there have been repeated examples of unquestioned loyalty to the Executive personally or to organizations such as the C.I.A. specifically, that were in violation of the Constitution and other laws of the land. As a political gesture based on their understanding of constitutional responsibilities Marchetti and Marks deliberately violated bureaucratic loyalties.

The claim of "national security,"

William Miller is staff director of the Senate Special Committee on national emergencies and delegated emergency powers.

Best Seller List

General

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1 ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN, by Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward. (Simon & Schuster, \$8.95.) Here's how it all began.

2 THE MEMORY BOOK, by Harry Lorayne and Jerry Lucas. (Stein & Day, \$7.95.) Ingenious exercises for jogging your memory.

3 THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO, by Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn. (Harper & Row, \$12.50; also available in paper, \$1.95.) Raw, impassioned attempt to wrench the secrets of Soviet prison life into the light of history.

4 ALIVE: The Story of the Andes Survivors, by Piers Paul Read. (Lippincott, \$10.) A moving, true story of young men pushed to their limits.

5 YOU CAN PROFIT FROM A MONETARY CRISIS, by Harry Browne. (Macmillan, \$8.95.) Mr. Browne has.

6 PLAIN SPEAKING, by Merle Miller. (Putnam's, \$8.95.) Candid, taped reminiscences by Harry Truman on his life and contemporaries.

7 THE WALL STREET GANG, by Richard Ney. (Praeger, \$8.95.) Advice for the small investor on beating the stock-market insiders at their own game.

8 THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE, by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. (Knopf, \$8.95.) Revealing insights into the world of intelligence and clandestine activities.

9 TIMES TO REMEMBER, by Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy. (Doubleday, \$12.50.) Mama Rose has her turn and supplies the Fitzgerald side of the story.

10 THE WOMAN HE LOVED, by Ralph G. Martin. (Simon & Schuster, \$9.95.) Gossipy but balanced story of the romance of the Windsors.

clude that technological collection such as satellite reconnaissance, while most expensive, seems necessary and worthwhile. But, most money goes to the service intelligence agencies and to the National Security Agency.

They concentrate on the clandestine activities of the C.I.A., repeatedly pointing out that the agency's problems are the result of disproportionate emphasis on clandestine activities, to the detriment of the analytic sections. Beyond counterespionage, "the dirty struggle in the back alleys of the world" Dean Rusk said, Marchetti and Marks find minimal benefits from the agency's dirty trick operations, with the least yield coming from behind the Iron Curtain, where the need for information is greatest. The recital of clandestine activities, despite the deletions, is an interesting historical record of the range of American efforts to influence affairs of other nations. The list of operations in Cuba, in Chile, Iran, Vietnam and Bolivia (the last the melodramatic hunt for Che Guevara), won't surprise regular newspaper readers, though the details could have come from spy novels.

The best parts of the book are the analysis of intelligence activities by purpose, organization and cost. The critique of the oversight committees in Congress will not reassure those who believed there were adequate safeguards and institutional checks on the intelligence community. The committees met rarely and were regularly diverted from systematic budget and program reviews by the gimmicks and showmanship of the agency directors.

Despite the 168 deletions there is enough information to give thoughtful citizens and Congressmen enough facts and reasons to press for new statutory guidelines to control American intelligence.

The New York Times Book Review/August 18, 1974

Without Cloak Or Dagger

The Truth About the New Espionage.

By Miles Copeland.

351 pp. New York:

Simon & Schuster. \$8.95.

By MICHAEL BURKE

The C.I.A. seems to have concluded that stonewalling it simply won't wash any longer—not after Watergate. They must now drop a veil a little to quell mounting public apprehension. To that end "Without Cloak or Dagger" is a virtual manual of intelligence technique. It tells all you always wanted to know about spying but didn't know whom to ask. Secret writing is effective. Clandestine radio is safer than commonly supposed. Clandestine penetration of Russia and China is now accomplished with ease. C.I.A. officers engage in a considerable amount of adultery but never pad expense accounts. C.I.A. is now out of the brothel business.

Less definitively but clearly there emerges from Copeland's book the shadow group of elitists who control the C.I.A.—"the old boy net," powerful enough to chew up and spit out an unwanted Director of Central Intelligence, as they did James Schlesinger.

C.I.A. is the devil we don't know. Copeland's aim is to convey a "fundamental understanding" of the Central Intelligence Agency and to correct popular misconceptions. In the process he surfaces the Agency's deepest dilemma, reveals the ominous reach of an operation called Octopus and discloses the C.I.A.'s ambition to become a body as untouchable as the Supreme Court.

The author's credentials are well established. He has been a senior C.I.A. officer and remains an old boy in good standing. His book, then, tells "the truth about intelligence" as a member of the old-boy net sees it. Espionage is but a small part of intelligence, the clandestine dirty tricks part, but apparently it is as ineradicable as the world's oldest profession.

The C.I.A.'s relationships with the F.B.I. are uneasy; civility at the top drops off sharply to hostility. They are combative with Defense, cool with State. But the pure professional camaraderie shared by the C.I.A., the Russian K.G.B. and the British S.I.S. is warm, even cozy. A diplomatic gathering in Beirut, Vienna or La Paz will find senior intelligence officers gravi-

tating toward one another, drawn by some mutual chemistry, chatting easily and ignored by regular diplomats. These are the management types—senior enough to "come out," to operate without the pretense of cover.

If it isn't already, the C.I.A. may soon become the world's most powerful Government agency. Operation Octopus, designed to deal with terrorist groups, is the world's largest repository of personality data. To the C.I.A.'s information, foreign intelligence services have added their own; they fear that, in their own countries, public outcry against this massive invasion of privacy might force destruction of such information.

"As the Agency's power increases, so does the public's fear of us," one Agency official said. This is the C.I.A.'s dilemma: How to remain powerful, anonymous, secret and at the same time win public confidence. Through Miles Copeland, the old-boy net is saying: We know the enemy; we know how to deal with him; we are incorruptible. Though you don't know us, you can trust us implicitly.

The Agency maintains its demonstrated incorruptibility by rejecting White House efforts to misuse it in connection with Watergate. It has also demonstrated its fierce sense of autonomy by quickly disposing of Schlesinger.

Although Faith and Trust are usually placed in people, Copeland tells us nothing of the men and women who populate the C.I.A. They are, in truth, just like you and me—except that they live in a strange, private world sealed off from the rest of us by the covert nature of their work. They play by their own rules, hence develop a perspective that tends to distort their view of the overt world. They are at unending war with an enemy—Communism.

Copeland gingerly mentions idealism. In fact there is little room at the C.I.A. for idealism, only pragmatism. And technique.

The old-boy net, the C.I.A.'s first generation, has lived its whole life in a clandestine world. Its defense is impregnable; its instinct for self-preservation tenacious. For its members to tell anyone anything is an unnatural act. To reveal something of themselves and their activities, as the public temper seems to demand, will be a wrenching experience.

Intelligence is a serious piece of the nation's business—too important to be left exclusively to the spooks. ■

Michael Burke, now president of Madison Square Garden, lived the life in wartime O.S.S., filmed as "Cloak and Dagger."

gence operations, to assure that whether overt or concealed such operations serve the nation's real security needs within constitutional processes.

As the Bicentennial celebrations approach we can only hope the ceremonies will celebrate the continued existence of a strong, open, constitutional government rather than the continuation of growing practices of rule by secret cabal, so much a part of the Watergate era, and so well documented in "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence." ■

WASHINGTON POST
17 August 1974

'Disinformation' on CIA, or the Unintentional Indictment

Book World

WITHOUT CLOAK OR DAGGER: The Truth About the New Espionage. By Miles Copeland
(Simon & Schuster, 351 pp., \$8.95)

Reviewed by
Thomas B. Ross

The reviewer is Washington bureau chief of The Chicago Sun-Times and the co-author of "The U-2 Affair," "The Invisible Government" and "The Espionage Establishment."

Miles Copeland, an old CIA hand, has E. Howard Hunt's penchant for adventure, intrigue, conservative geopolitics and the games grown boys play. But Hunt, when not living out his fantasies at the Watergate or Dr. Fielding's office, was turning them into fiction, so labeled. Copeland, on the other hand, has subtitled his second book "The Truth About the New Espionage."

The problem is that Copeland concedes he has changed names and situations to protect the agency and his comrades in arms. The reader is thus left with the problem of guessing when the author is presenting fact and when he is presenting fiction or, on a more subtle level, when the old CIA operative is practicing the fine, professional art of "disinformation" to deceive the "opposition" and, incidentally, the reader.

The problem is compounded by the fact that Copeland assertedly did not submit his manuscript to the CIA for clearance, yet the agency has not challenged its publication. By contrast, the agency took another important CIA man, Victor Marchetti, on a long ride through the courts to stop or censor his recent book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence."

Why such permissiveness toward Copeland when he purports to be dealing with the innermost secrets of the CIA? Perhaps it is because he is loyal and uncritical and Marchetti is not. Copeland takes the orthodox line that those who run the CIA are "incorruptible," that much of what they do should be taken on faith, and that there is more than enough control of the agency by Congress and the White House.

But there is an inner contradiction in the argument. Copeland contends, on the one hand, that the House and Senate subcommittees on the CIA are kept fully informed of the agency's activities. On the other hand, he concedes that no one in the CIA hierarchy will "tell even those Congressmen on the 'watchdog' committee more than they 'need to know.'" It's like President Nixon judging what evidence the House Judiciary Committee needed to pass judgment on him.

Copeland takes an insider's pleasure in the cute practices of John M. Maury, until recently the CIA officer in charge of congressional relations. "Maury, a Southern gentleman of great charm, has a simple formula," Copeland writes. "When appearing before committees, he provides a carefully worked-out story that contains no untruths, yet reveals no information that would damage the Agency should it leak out to the public. With demagogues, he takes them aside and tells them 'nothing, and lots of it, and with an air of great secrecy.' Finally, with the most respected Congressmen, he tells them the whole truth, thereby passing on to them the responsibility for deciding whether or not what he confides should go any further."

But even when "the most respected Congressmen"—I assume he means respected by the CIA for their unwavering support—take exception, Copeland concedes they do not necessarily prevail. He complains bitterly, at one point, about "some smart-ass kid in 'Support' who complied with a congressional demand that the CIA obey official policy on chemical warfare by destroying the agency's supply of chemical agents. The proper procedure, Copeland explains, is to "lose the papers" or "concoct an excuse plausible enough" for not carrying out a "stupid order" from Congress or the White House.

Copeland suggests that in

a similar way the "old boy net" dealt with a new boy, James R. Schlesinger, during his brief tenure as director of the CIA. Schlesinger sought to make the CIA "responsive to the needs of the White House," Copeland explains, but "The only result of his firings and attempts at reorganization was to force most of the espionage branch to go underground where he couldn't find it, thus crippling his ability to govern."

Copeland speculates that the CIA took even more drastic action against the former President's men when they repeatedly sought to use the CIA for political purposes. He theorizes that James McCord was

a double agent for the CIA and that he purposely botched the Watergate job to expose the illegal activities of the White House plumbers.

It does not appear to have crossed Copeland's mind—or Richard Helms' for that matter—that it might have been simpler and more efficient, not to mention more democratic, for the agency to have gone to one of its "respected Congressmen" and exposed the dirty tricks.

Copeland's blind spot on Watergate is reflective of a general myopia about the problem of running a secret intelligence organization in a free society. He tried to write an apologia but produced an indictment.

PLAYBOY
AUGUST 1974

BOOKS

If the CIA could kill men and movements as well as it can kill books—such as *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (Knopf), by Victor Marchetti and John Marks—the Cold War long ago would have turned into a rout and we would have been able to dismantle our conventional military organizations and go back to raising families, crops, hell and other natural things. Trouble is, we Americans never really had much aptitude for the kind of dirty work that comes pretty much as second nature to the Russians. Instead of steely-eyed K.G.B. operatives who do their work without remorse or romance, we hired buffoons like E. Howard Hunt, with his feverish imagination and his taste for good living. So we got the Bay of Pigs, Operation Phoenix and various other disasters as part of the deal. In short, we got an organization (insiders call it The Agency or The Firm or even Mother, and they usually whisper the words in tones of grave awe) that can kill a lot of people without improving anything. A very bad bargain.

But when word of this book reached CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, the sleuths went right to work. (Incidentally, the lavish CIA headquarters was at one time "secret" and the highway exits leading to it either were not marked at all or were marked by signs that were intended to mislead. This, in spite of the fact that everybody in Washington who was above school age knew what that building was and what went on there. But the agency has never been deterred by ridicule over its obsession with secrecy. When the building was under construction, the contractor who was installing the air conditioning needed to know how many people his machinery would have to cool. Sorry,

buddy, he was told, but that's classified. He did the best he could, but the system never worked properly. The agency took him to court and lost—as usual. Anyway, nobody in the CIA was happy about it when it was learned that Marchetti, a CIA veteran, had a book in mind. Since he'd signed some oaths about not revealing classified intelligence material, they slapped an injunction on him. Marchetti, his publisher and the A.C.L.U. argued that this was prior restraint and in violation of the First Amendment. Not so, said the

judge. It's a contractual matter, just like bank loans and alimony. After several complicated appeals, Marchetti won—sort of.

You wouldn't know it to read this book. It looks as if it was put together by a printer stumbling down the road to dipsomania: The pages are a blinding mixture of plain type, boldface and large areas of white space with DELETED stamped over them. Those are the parts that are still under litigation. The bold-faced portions represent deletions originally insisted upon by the CIA that the courts have allowed to be published. If the stuff that belongs on the white parts

is as "damaging" as the stuff that appears in boldface, then these ruthless minions of sabotage and espionage are more chary of their virtue and reputation than the average spinster from Mobile. Which is to say that though this is a good book—what there is of it (perhaps ten percent of the original was deleted and will be restored in later editions)—it's not one that adds in any considerable way to our fund of knowledge about the CIA. The deletions themselves are probably the most dramatic message in this book.

DAILY WORLD, New York
Communist daily
3 August 1974

The CIA and AFL-CIO: corruption at the top

Will the Central Intelligence Agency succeed in blocking publication in the United States of a book exposing its worldwide network of operations? Philip B.F. Agee, who wrote the book Penguin Publishers is putting out in England where he now lives, was with the CIA for 14 years, holding responsible positions in Latin America until 1969. Recent investigations into the role of the CIA in the Watergate affair have "blown" that agency's "cover" in much of Latin America as a result of disclosures that have necessitated a change in the entire structure of its operations.

The Agee defection is especially significant for the labor movement because, according to reports of a telephone press interview with him, he used as his cover the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). This organization, set up in 1962 for the professed purpose of combatting "Communism" in Latin America, is supported jointly by the AFL-CIO bureaucracy and top executives of scores of corporations whose names read like a Who's Who in Multinationals.

The AIFLD receives at least \$3 million annually, almost all of it from the U.S. government, piped through the Agency for International Development (AID). (In 1965, a similar agency for operations in Africa was set up — the Afro-American Labor Council — and in 1963 the Asian-American Institute for Free Labor Development was established. George Meany is chairman of each.)

Concerning the AIFLD, J. Peter Grace, head man of the huge Grace & Co. conglomerate, is chairman of the board and Joseph Beirne, until recently the president of the Communications Workers of America, is secretary-treasurer. Business executives and top union heads are on the board of directors.

Much evidence has been uncovered and has been published in the mass media showing that, in effect, all three of the outfits are CIA covers and that their hundreds of labor operatives were directed by Jay Lovestone, until July 1 the director of the AFL-CIO's International Affairs Department.

Meany's appearance as a witness before Senator J.W. Fulbright's Foreign Affairs Committee in August 1969 led to the introduction of some of these data, and some two dozen published documents were gathered by a Senate Sub-committee even earlier. But with the backing of President Richard Nixon and the continuing flow of AID funds, the Meany-Lovestone-Beirne clique ignored the exposures and charges, claiming that they were functioning in accordance with the government's anti-communism policy.

Agee, however, is the first important CIA insider to talk and, as he told news services in his telephone interview, he is in a position to reveal "what we did in Latin America, why we did it, why I quit and why I decided to write about it." Also, indicating the course his exposure will follow, Agee added, "What we did in Latin America, and what we do in so many other countries in the third world, is similar to what the United States did in Vietnam. . . . The agency's job is to keep the level of insurgent activity below the point which requires sending in troops as we did in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic." The U.S. policy, he added, "has the effect of strengthening minority governments which perpetuate great wealth for the few and widespread poverty for the rest. It has the result of strengthening injustice."

Thomas Braden, a top CIA official in the early 50s, revealed how, soon after it was established in 1947, the CIA had need of a "labor cover" and how that problem was solved by the quartet then running the AFL's affairs — Meany, Matthew Woll, David Dubinsky and director Jay Lovestone. Of course Braden approved that role of the labor bureaucracy and defended also the CIA and its disruptive role of splitting European unions; the CIA phony "foundations" through which it piped millions to the labor, student, cultural and other covers for CIA operations; and the eventual CIA-induced split in the World Federation of Trade Unions which resulted in CIA-sponsored and financed splinter "anti-Communist" unions in France, Italy, Greece and other countries.

Agee has much to tell about the CIA's role in Chile

By George Morris

major developments in which the AIFLD played a role during his years with the CIA. In 1964, trainees of AIFLD, as its director boasted, had an important hand in the military overthrow of the liberal Jao Boulart regime in Brazil. The dictatorship that took control then is still in power and is the major base for fascism in Latin America today.

Simultaneously in 1964, the CIA-led operation in Chile successfully prevented Salvadore Allende from winning the presidency then. The Washington Post, in a story that also appeared in the April 7, 1973, Los Angeles Times, noted that that 1964 operation was under the direction of Cord Meyer, who directed the CIA policy of setting up labor, student and cultural fronts since the early CIA years.

In the 1966-67 CIA scandal, Cord Meyer figured prominently. And last February, during the long coal miners' strike and the general labor upsurge in Great Britain, Cord Meyer was headlined when he was found, as the Guardian noted, in a "plush pad" in swank Eaton Place directing the operations of CIA men "studying" the situation there. The entire British press raised a cry against the CIA invasion. The London Times observed, "From Washington, Britain must now be beginning to look like a Central American banana republic."

And also in the mid 60s, let no one forget, the U.S. troops entered the Dominican Republic to protect a fascist military clique.

A spokesman for Agee in the United States (trying to arrange for a U.S. publisher) also hinted that Agee will tell of CIA assassinations of agents, referring to a specific case "involving the use of a truck to run over a recently utilized local CIA operative whose mission had been completed." In its July 8, 1974 issue, The New York Times said "such allegations were widely rumored for years." E.g., its own correspondent, Terence Smith, wrote from Saigon in August 1969 that "according to reliable sources, more than 150 double agents have been caught and executed" by the CIA's Green Berets. Other observers have written like reports.

Agee should be able to tell about the abortive CIA-led Bay of Pigs invasion in which E. Howard Hunt (of Watergate and Ellsberg break-in fame) had a leading part — he has made three trips to Cuba since 1969 in connection with research for his book. And undoubtedly he will also be able to shed some light on the CIA's role in Chile last September when Allende was mur-

dered and his Popular Unity government overthrown by the fascist junta.

The CIA will surely try every trick in its book to stop publication of Agee's book in the United States. It tried to prevent the issuance of a book by Victor Marchetti, a former agent, and succeeded in holding up publication for a long time by legal actions. Finally it forced many deletions and watering down before it was printed. And Marchetti's aim was only some liberal reforms in the CIA!

It is an interesting coincidence that, the very week the U.S. public heard about the Agee defection and his forthcoming book, the AFLFD was the subject of a meeting in San Jose, California, of the Santa Clara County Central Labor Council (SCCCLC). Last December an Emergency Committee to Defend Democracy in Chile was set up at a conference in San Jose, and material subsequently compiled by the committee's chairman, Fred Hirsch (member of the Steamfitters and Plumbers Local 393), was widely distributed. This report was titled "An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America, or Under the Covers with the CIA."

At its July 1 meeting, on the basis of the Hirsch pamphlet the SCCCLC adopted a resolution declaring AFLFD "against the best interests of the labor movement in Latin America and the United States," and called on Meany, chairman of AFLFD, "to reaffirm the integrity and high purpose of the AFL-CIO."

Meany, disturbed by the publicity for the Hirsch pamphlet and the resolution, sent William C. Doherty, Jr., director of AFLFD, and his assistant Jesse Friedman to Santa Clara to "straighten out" the Council members. Doherty and Friedman,

armed with an 11-page answer to the Hirsch pamphlet, evaded the real charges. "AFLFD is a front for the U.S. State Department," Doherty argued. He fumed and blustered, an observer told me, but "he was 20 years late in his rhetoric." He still used the old red herring — labor's "obligation to fight Communism" and "Cuba is just 90 miles from our shores." He also used invectives against the Daily World and George Morris, apparently still disturbed by my 1967 book "CIA and American Labor" (International Publishers). He asked the Council to reconsider the resolution, but the delegates refused and instead, according to my informant, they "tore the pants off Doherty," asking questions which he ducked and evaded.

Delegates were particularly interested in the fact that some 95 multinationals support AFLFD and its indicated CIA connections. "We'll take money from the devil himself if it will help us organize unions for the workers of Latin America," Doherty said.

To which a delegate from Service Employees Local 715 responded, "The one thing I have learned in the labor movement is never to take money from the bosses. This really blows my mind." And asked why AFLFD-supported unions were permitted to operate in Chile since the outlawing of Chile's main trade union movement (CUT), Doherty admitted the AFLFD will stay there as long as there is a chance to "help our trade union brothers." To which Council delegates observed that the AFL-CIO is much involved in military dictatorships in Latin America "but does little organizing work in the United States," pointing out that the AFL-CIO's domestic organizing staff has dwindled from 420 to about 80.

At the conclusion of the conference, an embarrassed Doherty disclosed, in answer to a blunt question, that his salary is \$37,000 a year plus expenses — which he didn't estimate.

The significance of the Santa Clara confrontation is that it was labor's first challenge to the use of a labor cover for the CIA. In a basic sense, it is a challenge to those, like Meany and associates in the AFL-CIO bureaucracy, who oppose the policy of détente. How stable can détente be if there is an "invisible government" financed by billions — not just millions; with a network of secret operation centers circling the globe; with manpower, airplanes, space techniques sufficient to overthrow and set up governments; with the ability to create incidents and undermine and blast treaties for peaceful relationships? There are even accusations of assassinations at the instigation of secret plotters, and widespread belief persists that President John Kennedy was assassinated in retaliation for his agreement on Cuba following the Bay of Pigs incident.

President Lyndon Johnson, according to an article in the Atlantic Monthly (June 1973), based on an interview with Leo Janos said, "I never believed Oswald acted alone, though I can accept that he pulled the trigger." Johnson said that when he took office, he found "We had been operating a damned Murder, Inc. in the Caribbean." Johnson observed Janos, apparently referred to the fact that a year earlier "a CIA-backed assassination team had been picked up in Havana."

Agee may throw some light on that, too.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Monday August 19, 1974

CIA Admits Using Foreign Police

By Jack Anderson

The Central Intelligence Agency has admitted in an extraordinary private letter to Sen. J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) that the agency has penetrated the police forces of friendly foreign countries.

The remarkable confession by CIA Director William Colby came in the course of a discreet but intensive lobbying effort to keep alive U.S. support for foreign police programs.

Colby told Fulbright that the "relationships" built up with policemen through these programs had been highly useful in "obtaining foreign intelligence" from foreign constabularies.

The friendly foreign cops, like national police everywhere, are privy to their nation's darkest secrets. And while Colby does not say so, our government sources tell us the foreigners are not above trading a national secret or two for a little CIA cash.

Colby, in his message to Fulbright, delicately skirts the matter of corrupting foreign police,

conceding only that the liaisons bring the CIA vital information on "illicit narcotics traffic, international terrorism and hijacking."

Colby's covert lobbying was directed against a bill by Sen. James Abourezk (D-S.D.) that would kill U.S. aid to foreign police and prison operations. The measure was drafted after shocking abuses were disclosed in South Vietnamese prisons constructed with the U.S. taxpayers' funds.

The CIA director, who as a top U.S. hand in Vietnam saw the abuses first hand, said, nevertheless, that the Abourezk measure would "appear to restrict activities . . . by the CIA." The main cutback would be in "obtaining foreign intelligence information" from friendly espionage services and agents "within national police forces . . ." Colby went on.

Some of the agents in foreign police forces, Colby indicated, had been developed during "specialized training and other support" given by the CIA.

Colby's lobbying proved effective.

In secret session, the committee permitted the CIA to go on supporting foreign police operations.

Insiders suspect that Colby's effort to defeat the Abourezk provision was actually aimed at preserving the International Police Academy, an institution dear to the hearts of the spooks.

According to Victor Marchetti and John Marks, authors of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," the agency has funded training of foreign police at the academy and recruited spies there.

Colby himself wrote to Abourezk last January that the academy, ostensibly run by the State

Department, had "called on us in the past for some support for their program. But," he added, "all such support has been terminated."

We also reported last September that the CIA was involved in a Texas bomb school where the academy trained foreign policemen on explosive devices. A State Department official later admitted the CIA provided "guest lecturers" for the course, which has now been moved to Edgewood Arsenal, Md.

Footnote: Both the CIA and the academy say no CIA funds are now going into the school. Colby has also personally said support by the CIA for the school has been terminated.

WASHINGTON STAR
5 AUG 1974

Meet the Author (That's Him There,

By Tom Dowling
Star-News Staff Writer

FENWICK ISLAND, Del. — The bathers wander in from the beach to buy a morning paper, to grab some suntan lotion, to purchase a rubber swan for junior. They come to the Fenwick Beach Shop in flip-flops, the brown cleavage fading into white inside women's bathing tops, the men's illies as red as lobster inside their unbuttoned beach shirts.

A red rubber ball rolls down the Fenwick Beach Shop's middle aisle, apparently chucked by the brown-as-a-berry 5-year-old in the rear of the store. A reporter, who has more important matters at hand, flicks the ball back, soccer style.

"I've followed the Watergate case as close as anyone but Nixon," says James McCord, standing in front of the folding bridge table that displays 40 copies of his book, "A Piece of Tape. The Watergate Story: Fact and Fiction."

A FATHER and his son approach in curiosity. At first the man's face says: Hey, aren't you . . . ? Then it registers recognition. His five-year-old son stares up dumbly, wearing a denim beach hat on which is printed: "State Prison 04U2."

"What will happen?" a woman asks McCord breathlessly.

"He'll be impeached and removed."

"What about Gerald Ford?"

"I don't know him," McCord allows.

Well, so it goes. Jeb Stuart Magruder had the unprecedented distinction, through video-tape, of being the first behind-bars jailbird to appear on the Cavett and Today shows. Whatever happens to Nixon, a \$1 million advance on his book is assured, along with an hour-long book-plugging shot on the Today, Tonight, Tomorrow, Yesterday and the Happy Days to Come shows.

And so here is McCord, the Watergate bugger himself, standing in the near empty aisle of a beach shop, flogging his book surrounded by Budweiser and Strawberry Hill towels, beach balls, plastic hair curlers, beer coolers, comic book racks and sunglasses stand.

Not that there's any anomaly here. The little guy always has it toughest. That is one of Watergate's apt lessons. The Cubans are sent to rot in the can by Sirica. McCord gets a longer sentence and a lousier book deal than Magruder. Kleindienst gets a lecture. Nixon is being urged to resign so he can still keep his six-figure-a-year-government pension and benefits. Even a constitutional republic has its hierarchical prerogatives.

MCCORD, WHO is currently out of the stir on appeal, seems sanguine about his judicial fate, positively bullish about his book. Perhaps men accept their lot according to their station — as in a monarchy. McCord says he is the author-publisher-distributor-publicist of "A Piece of Tape." He has been to 15 cities so far in his "autograph party" tour, appearing largely, it seems, in drug stores and out-of-the-way knick-knack shops. He says the first edition of 15,000 paperbacks at \$3.95 is sold, necessitating a second printing of 25,000 copies.

"What are you doing tonight?" the local news agent in charge of the book-signing

tour asks McCord in a voice that shudders with promise, as if bearing an invitation to dinner chez Agnew in some by-gone Ocean City era.

"Nothing," says James McCord.

"Do you think you could do Welch's from 7 to 9 tonight?" breathes the news agent. "They're dying for you." Welch's is a drug store in Ocean City, where McCord admits to having sold 50 books a few weeks ago.

A handful of tourists drifts up tentatively. "How did you get involved?" asks a bald man in a bathing suit.

"Through Liddy," says McCord. "He talked me into it."

"Were you actually in the Watergate itself?" the man continues, the quaver at meeting a celebrity blending in his voice with an indefinite recollection of the events of June 17, 1972.

"Yes."

"HOW DO YOU feel about impeachment? I'm highly confused," says an older woman in a one-piece.

"I'm for it," says McCord.

"What do you think of the Mitchell-Stans trial?" says a man, holding an infant who stares bug-eyed at a box of Chiclets he's rattling.

"As far as the Mitchell-Stans case goes," James McCord says, "I don't know the details well enough to know what the evidence was."

"One final question," says the man, hungry for insider's knowledge. "Will the Senate convict?"

"I think the Senate will be affected by the House," says James McCord, just as smoothly as Joseph Alsop.

"Can I listen to what you're saying?" says a fat man with a moustache, sidling over.

"Is there a question on any subject I can answer?" asks McCord affably.

James McCord stands there, amid the suntan lotion and styrofoam beer

Looking Lonely)

coasters. The assured, stolid author. In two hours of conversation with a reporter, he is unfailingly prudent, meticulously polite, fundamentally remote in the style of a man obsessed by caution and a fine regard for detail.

LIDDY, THE pathologically loyal soldier, makes sense. Hunt, the ineptly romantic CIA second-story man, is a plausible Watergate burglar. But McCord — the finicky dotter of bureaucratic I's and crosser of T's, the shrewd legalistic master of options and self interest — is an enigma. Even his book — a singularly impenetrable 327-page volume of massive details and passionless grudges — sheds no

light. His prose is so stiff and correct that H. R. (Bob) Haldeman is referred to throughout as Robert Haldeman.

Just the same, McCord has books to sell. "Here, take a look at it," he urges a man, who will, if all goes well, become the 10th customer in two hours of work.

A buxom, freckled woman bustled into the beach shop. "Oh, Mr. McCloud," she sighs. "Mr. McCloud, my daughter said you were here and I had to come and meet you."

James McCord smiles and hands her over a book. It's not the Today Show, but even the little guys in Watergate have to get by, somehow.

NEW YORK TIMES

19 AUG 1974

Hunt Says Seven Cartons Had No Rockefeller Data

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

MIAMI, Aug. 18—E. Howard Hunt Jr. said today that, as far as he knew, the seven mysterious cartons stored in his White House office after the Watergate break-in in June, 1972, contained hundreds of copies of a book-length criticism of television news reporting but no information concerning former Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York.

Mr. Hunt, one of the seven men who pleaded guilty or were convicted in the original Watergate break-in case and who is now a Miami resident, termed a "total absurdity" recent reports that the boxes had contained evidence that Mr. Rockefeller, who is under consideration for the Vice-Presidential nomination, had financed demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention here in 1972.

The White House charged yesterday that the "tip" concerning the apparently non-existent documents, which reportedly came to its attention a week ago, was a hoax designed "to discredit Mr. Rockefeller and thereby attempt to remove him from consideration" for the Vice-Presidency.

J. F. terHorst, the White House press secretary, added that President Ford considered the affair "deplorable."

In an interview, Mr. Hunt, who is free pending an appeal of his conviction in the Watergate matter, recalled that in the fall of 1971 he was approached by a woman assistant to Charles W. Colson, then a special counsel to former President Richard M. Nixon.

He said the woman had asked Mr. Hunt, then a member of the White House's special investigations unit known as the "plumbers," whether she might store seven bulky cartons in his quarters in the Executive Office Building, next door to the White House.

Mr. Hunt said that he had agreed, and that the cartons were moved into his office, which contained only a desk and a small, two-drawer safe.

Five of the seven cartons, all bearing the name of a book-publishing house, were sealed. Mr. Hunt said, but the two others contained copies of a book by Edith Efron, a television critic, entitled "The News Twisters."

Mr. Hunt said that he had left the cartons untouched, and that they were still in place when he made his last visit to the office on June 19, 1972, two days after the unsuccessful break-in attempt at the Democratic party's Watergate offices. He said he had no idea

THE ECONOMIST AUGUST 10, 1974

*Watergate in Russia***ИМИНЧМЕНТ**

The Russians have started to be told about Watergate at last: Mr Nixon's confession on Monday that he knew about the cover-up all along got five paragraphs in Pravda on Wednesday. But the men who run the Soviet press are not going to find it easy to explain the fall of Mr Nixon. So far they have dribbled out the story in tiny fragments, spattered with strange foreign terms, and there has been no attempt to explain the origins of the business or how the American constitution works. The ordinary reader would have to be a genius to guess what it was all about. On Monday, for instance, the reader of Pravda could learn in a snippet on the third page of his paper that Vice-

President Ford, while believing in the innocence of President Nixon, expressed his preference for a procedure of censure (the word translated into Russian) rather than that of "impeachment" (the English word simply transliterated, as in the title of this article, into Cyrillic characters).

It is true that, for some time now, Soviet propaganda has dropped its original line, which suggested that any attack against Nixon was an attack against the policy of detente. The Soviet government realised that the matter was serious, and that such an identification of relations between the two countries with relations between their respective leaders was getting dangerous. A series of articles this week in Pravda and Izvestia about detente did not mention Mr Nixon's name once. But conditioned reflexes die hard, and other reports appearing elsewhere have continued to show a strong bias against the critics of Richard Nixon. On July 29th Moscow radio, broadcasting in English, gave the impressions of a Russian who had just visited the United States. He was puzzled by the fuss about Watergate, since "according to the recent Gallup poll 53 per cent of the American people . . . find the Watergate coverage excessive, unfair and misleading". But then, he explained, he saw the offices of the Washington Post, and in one of them was a poster saying: "Watergate, the gift that keeps on giving." "Keeps on giving what and to whom?" he asked, and meant it to sting.

No doubt, even with the best of coverages, it would not have been easy to explain to the Soviet people the operation of the American constitution, or the role performed by a hard-hitting press. But Soviet commentators will now want to show that Watergate was not merely a wicked plot against coexistence. After their contorted and mysterious references to it so far, they will find that difficult.

whatever became of them.

The former Central Intelligence Agency operative conceded that the five closed cartons, which he said appear to have been sealed by the publisher of Miss Efron's book, might have, unbeknownst to him, contained some other materials of which "I was an innocent holder."

But he dismissed the possibility as "ridiculous," in view of his close association with Mr. Colson, a fellow Brown University alumnus, and also the sensitive nature of his tasks as a member of the White House plumbers.

Information made available last summer to the Senate Watergate committee about campaign "dirty tricks" included testimony that Mr. Colson had appropriated \$3,000 in funds belonging to the Committee for the Re-election of the President to purchase quantities of the Efron book. The book contended that television news reporting was sometimes distorted, a public position then favored by the White House, with the intention of putting the volume onto the best-seller lists. The Colson effort was unsuccessful.

Roy Sheppard, a member of Mr. Nixon's 1972 campaign staff, reportedly told the Watergate committee earlier this year that, a few days after the June 17 break-in, he had been directed by Mr. Hunt's wife, Dorothy, to go to the Executive Office Building and take away several cartons of documents.

Conflicting Versions

Committee sources recalled today, however, that they had been told at least two conflicting versions about what occurred thereafter, first that Mr. materials, and then that he had shipped them out of Washington by way of the Railway Express Agency.

One Senate investigator said that Mr. Sheppard's account had never been corroborated by the committee staff, which, among other things, determined that the sign-in book from the Executive Office Building for the period in question did not bear any indication that Mr. Sheppard had ever been a visitor there.

The source said that Mr. Hunt, when queried about the matter, gave the committee staff the account about the Efron book that he repeated in the interview today. The source

added that the Watergate committee, which conducted an extensive inquiry into campaign sabotage and plans for demonstrations at the Democratic convention, had never come across Mr. Rockefeller's name in any context.

Mr. Hunt said that the only materials in his office when he left it for the last time on June 19, 1972, had been the seven cartons, some old newspapers, and a small safe. He added that he had never heard of Mr. Sheppard, who could not be reached for comment today.

The safe did contain sensitive documents, Mr. Hunt said, but nothing relating even indirectly to Mr. Rockefeller. Those items, which included reports on an investigation of Senator Edward M. Kennedy and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, falsified "diplomatic cables" and two personal telephone registers, were removed later in the week after the Watergate break-in by John W. Dean 3d, then the White House counsel.

Some of the documents were given to L. Patrick Gray 3d, at the time the acting director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who later destroyed them. Mr. Dean reportedly disposed of two notebooks.

The apparently erroneous tip regarding the "Rockefeller papers" was provided last Sunday to Philip W. Buchen, the new White House counsel, by Hamilton A. Long, a retired Wall Street lawyer who formerly headed a conservative Philadelphia publishing company, the American Heritage Education Corporation.

Mr. Long, who was described by Mr. Buchen today as about 70 years of age, has written a number of conservative tracts, including one, published in the nineteen-fifties, entitled, "Permit Communist-Conspirators to be Teachers?"

Mr. Buchen said that Mr. Long told him that he had also been in touch with the staffs of two Senators about the information purported to have been in Mr. Hunt's office, Robert P. Griffin of Michigan, the Republican whip, and Lowell P. Weicker Jr. of Connecticut, a member of the Watergate committee.

Mr. Long was described by several sources close to the Hunt affair today as an acquaintance of H. J. O'Brien, the owner of a Washington, D.C., photo copy company and also a close friend of Mr. Sheppard.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
17 July 1974

Should All CIA Data Be Stamped 'Top Secret'?

BY HARRY ROSITZKE

Many recent events highlight the dilemma that confronts the government in dealing with secret and sensitive information. Among these events is the publication of a new book about the Central Intelligence Agency which contains 168 blank spaces marked "Deleted."

Written by Victor Marchetti and John Marks, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" is an expose of the CIA's covert operations abroad and, as such, has been the subject of prior restraint in the courts. In effect, it has been censored by the very agency whose activities it portrays.

The government action was based on Marchetti's violation of his CIA contract to keep secret what he learned during his career with the agency. But, of course, the broader issue is the right of free speech and free press—and the related concept of "openness" in government.

There are two and, so far as I can see, only two categories where absolute limits are essential on what can be openly divulged about American intelligence operations. These involve certain activities that cannot be carried out if they are not kept secret. In such cases, therefore, the issue is not secrecy but whether these activities should be pursued at all.

One category is the code-breaking work of the National Security Agency, a separate organization in the Defense Department. The restriction against even a faint hint that a particular code has been broken must be absolute. If the NSA breaks a foreign government's code, we can read its most secret military or diplomatic communications, as we were able to do after breaking the Japanese code before Pearl Harbor. But if it leaks out that a certain code has been broken, that code will be discarded and a source of vital information closed off.

The second category involves our actual espionage work abroad. The CIA's foreign intelligence agents have been recruited over the years to provide the government with essential information that cannot be procured by legitimate means. These agents are operating in foreign countries under conditions requiring utmost security, and knowledge of their identities is narrowly restricted even within the CIA. Such safeguards are mandatory if there is to be an American espionage service.

Even the faintest implication that the American intelligence service cannot be

depended on to keep its agents' names secret would cause the CIA to lose the services of many of its present agents and make the recruitment of new ones next to impossible. Only fools and frauds would venture their well-being for an intelligence service that cannot protect them.

The alternatives are simply these: a secret foreign intelligence service, or no intelligence service at all. Both in breaking codes and recruiting agents, secrecy is a practical imperative, not something vaguely desirable in the name of "national security."

However, after the information has been gathered, I see no reason, as a ground rule, not to encourage openness. Most classified material, once screened for accuracy, could be made public without imperiling the nation's security.

It is often argued, of course, that even the most general revelations concerning our intelligence-gathering capabilities are

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not in the public interest. In fact, many contend it is actually *desirable* to cultivate uncertainty about how complete or precise our intelligence is.

But within the world intelligence community, all the major countries have a pretty good idea of other nations' capabilities. What is missing are the specific or unique facts that tell who, how and where.

The amount of detail that might go into public reports remains to be determined; indeed, it could only be made on an individual case basis. The real point is that *no* information is being disseminated at present, and that is *not* in the public interest.

Here are three types of now-secret information gathered by intelligence organizations that could be publicly revealed with some degree of usefulness:

—*Satellite photographs.* Our orbiting satellites are making superb photographs of the earth's surface. I see little reason why they should not be published. Yet, oddly, these pictures are treated like top-level secrets, apparently to keep the Russians from knowing how good they are.

However, it is precisely in the field of science and technology, from photography to guidance systems, that more and more American scientists are urging complete openness. Perhaps it is time for America to take the lead in global freedom for all scientific knowledge.

—*National intelligence estimates.* The major task of the CIA is to make objective estimates of strategic trends or situations in the world to assist policymakers in reaching decisions. These estimates are the top of the intelligence iceberg—the final distillation of weighted facts from the vast amount of raw data flowing into Washington.

A few estimates have been leaked over the years, most recently in the Pentagon Papers, and their official release would be a sensible and desirable step toward openness in government. Whether the topic is the number of Soviet missiles, or trade prospects with China, or trends in world oil, objective estimates would be of distinct value to Congress, the media and the public in broadening their knowledgeable participation in discussions of foreign affairs.

There is one danger—that the White House would release only estimates that support its policies and would suppress those that do not. The politicization of intelligence is a running hazard that cannot be totally avoided.

—*Current intelligence reports.* Another useful device for keeping Congress and the public better informed would be the publication of occasional "situation reports" on significant events abroad. These would be balanced, factual statements on what is going on: the developments that led the White House to declare a global military alert, for example, or the facts behind a looming crisis in the Near East, or the meaning of China's new Cultural Revolution.

In regard to this kind of now-secret data, there are no built-in limits on openness. All we really need to do is to make sure that published material does not lead to identifying a broken code or unmasking an agent abroad. Any limits beyond these are likely to be motivated by the desire to avoid "embarrassment," to cover up the clash of bureaucratic opinion, or to preserve an aura of omniscience for the executive. Since any such limits are man-made, they can be unmade by pressure from Congress and from the people—and the sooner the better.

PARADE • JULY 21, 1974

William Colby, New Director of the CIA: He's Changing the Agency's Image

by Lloyd Shearer

WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Central Intelligence Agency is suffering from a badly tarnished image, and its new director, William Egan Colby, 54, is charged with bur-nishing it.

This is no easy job, since over the years the CIA has generated on the domestic front a closed, mysterious, excessively secretive and sinister image. It has also violated the legislation of its origin.

Created in 1947 specifically to gather "Foreign Intelligence," it has inter-vened in American student organiza-tions. It has trained about 50 police of-ficers from a dozen American cities in intelligence theory and technique.

And worse yet, from a public rela-tions viewpoint, it has stupidly involved itself in the domestic scandals of the Nixon Administration by furnishing equipment to E. Howard Hunt Jr. to help break into and burglarize the Be-verly Hills office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, psychiatrist of Daniel Ellsberg of Pen-tagon Papers notoriety.

The CIA also provided Hunt with false identity equipment so that he could fly to Denver and try to talk Dita Beard into denying that she ever wrote the infamous ITT memo, coupling a favorable anti-trust Justice Department ruling with the promise of a \$400,000 contribution to the Republican cam-paign fund of 1972. Moreover, it al-lowed its personnel to prepare a psy-chological profile on Ellsberg for the White House.

Leading participants

And two of its former employees, E. Howard Hunt and James McCord, were leading characters in the Watergate fiasco, to say nothing of the four Cu-ban-Americans who were hired to do the actual dirty work.

Overseas, of course, where most of its clandestine as well as overt activities take place, the CIA has hired merce-naries in Southeast Asia, overflew the Soviet Union, dropped agents into Red China, structured its own airline out of Taiwan, conspired to overthrow various regimes in various parts of the world from Iran to Cambodia to Cuba, and in

general, has consistently intervened in the domestic affairs of foreign nations.

With that agency background of con-troversial hits and misses, Director Colby has his image-changing work cut out for him. He is approaching it with care and vigor. He is inviting newsmen to lunch with him, to ask questions, to visit CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., where the access road now bears a sign, plainly lettered CIA. It used to say Bu-reau of Public Roads. He even allowed PARADE to interview his wife, the former Barbara Heinzen, a delightful woman with printer's ink in her blood who helped put him through Columbia University Law School by working as a department store copywriter and editor of a New York State labor publication. Soft-speaking and low-key, Colby, a 24-year unpretentious veteran of the spy business, believes in opening up the CIA without disclosing its secrets.

He is allowing the TV networks to take a guided tour of the agency. He is permitting his men to identify them-selves over the telephone instead of switching the caller to an extension number. He is preparing succinct in-telligence summaries instead of pon-derous, bulky reports and forwarding them to interested parties with a phone number to call in case they need more detailed information.

Conscious of public opinion

He is aware of the mounting public criticism which holds that his 16,000-man agency is spending approximately \$750 million of the taxpayers' money each year without enough public ac-countability through the various Con-gressional subcommittees charged with tracking the CIA. And he is mindful of inadequacies in the agency's recruiting program, especially of minorities.

"What we're looking for," he ex-plains, "are young men and women who are interested in intellectual and technical pursuits. Intelligence is tech-nical these days. We're in the market for something like 130 specialist disci-plines, running all the way from nuclear physicists to financial economists. We need every kind of specialty to help in our total intelligence process.

"We especially need women and blacks. We don't have enough of them as professional intelligence officers. A few months ago I gathered together all the middle managers in the agency and I gave them a very direct talk. I told them I wanted to see the number of blacks and the number of women in responsible jobs rise sharply.

Opportunity and challenge

"We also need," Colby concedes, "some fellows who will run some clan-destine operations for us. They have to be fellows with a little bit of adventure in their spirit and frequently quite a lot of courage. But I'm not going around saying, 'Join the CIA instead of the Fish and Wildlife Service.' And I'm not go-ing around saying, 'Join the CIA and save the world.' People who want an interesting, fascinating challenging ca-reer can find it in the CIA, and that in-cludes those who are more student than activist, those who are more ac-tivist than student, those who are more the engineer than liberal art buff. We're wide open for the person who believes we have an essential function to perform."

According to Colby, the primary function of the CIA is apple-pie simple: "We gather information from all over the world in order to learn as much as we can about foreign problems so that we can decide what to do about them.

"We have various ways of gathering information—reading newspapers, tak-ing photographs, listening to electronic noises in the atmosphere, and employ-ing clandestine activity where it's essen-tial. We gather the information, analyze it, think about it, come to some judg-ment or estimate the situation and relay it to the national leadership, executive, legislative, and indirectly, even to the public so that the U.S. can make in-formed judgments and decisions."

Colby, who will finish his first year as director of the CIA on Sept. 4 this year, believes the agency is indispensable, "because I do not think the U.S. today can afford the luxury of being blind in the world or of hoping to learn enough of what's going on through the public

press and other media."

He knows, he says, that the U.S. has no intention of invading the Soviet Union and is sure the Soviet Union has no intention of invading us. "But I think the Soviet Union has a philosophy which holds that America is run by an imperialist conspiracy, a class society and that there must be, according to their doctrine, a revolution, a change in our society.

"It's a religious belief, and from time to time the Soviets have engaged in the process of trying to encourage it along.

"America has gotten into several wars in this century, started by people who thought we either would not or could not stand up to them. Kaiser Wilhelm thought we would not join World War I. Adolf Hitler was quite certain that we would stay out of World War II. Josef Stalin thought we would not fight in Korea and Ho Chi Minh certainly felt we could not stop his effort to take over South Vietnam. Where people realized we not only could but would fight—for example, in the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis—we have had no war. Having a CIA is like having insurance. You pay for it, but hopefully it's worth it."

Head of 'black operations'

Bill Colby, 5 feet 11, thin, trim, with pale blue myopic eyes helped by glasses, is a lawyer by training. He looks like a lawyer, also like a teacher, a minister, a banker, a doctor, anything except what he is—the nation's chief spooksmen who for years was deputy director of the CIA's clandestine or "black operations" directorate.

He was born in St. Paul, Minn., in 1920, the only child of Elbridge Colby, an Army officer. He was reared at various Army posts, spent three years of his youth (1929-32) in Tientsin, China, entered Princeton in 1936 and was graduated four years later. He entered Columbia University Law School but left after his first year to join the parachute corps.

"He had to memorize the eye chart in order to get in," his wife reveals. "But he memorized one line backwards. When he took the eye test, he cited the letters incorrectly. He wanted so badly to get in, however, that they looked the other way and the examining officer said, 'So long as you can see the ground we'll take you.'"

Colby served as a staff lieutenant in the 462nd Parachute Artillery Battalion (he had attended the ROTC at Princeton) and was fired when a new commander joined the 462nd and replaced the old staff with a new one. Lieutenant Colby found himself in a replacement pool, which he didn't like. When an officer came through, looking for volunteers for an overseas operation, code-named JEDBURGH, he quickly volunteered,

thus becoming a member of Gen. William Donovan's intelligence service, the Office of Strategic Services. As a member of the JED's, Colby parachuted in uniform to help resistance groups in France during the weeks following the Allied landing.

He was so cool and outstanding in action that he was chosen despite his young age, 24, to command a group of Norwegian-American paratroopers charged with sabotaging German railway operations in Norway. According to Harris Smith, an historian of the OSS: "The drop was finally made from American aircraft staffed by inexperienced crews in late March, 1945. Two of the planes crashed and ten OSS men were killed. Colby and those OSS men who did reach their destination were forced to operate with a minimum of supplies; the American planes had dropped their equipment a bit off target—in Sweden."

College sweetheart

Discharged from the Army as a major, young Colby married Barbara Heinzen whom he'd dated in 1941 when she was a junior at Barnard College and he a first-year law student at Columbia.

They were married in St. Patrick's Cathedral on Fifth Avenue, and then Colby reentered Columbia Law. Before he was graduated he went to work for Maj. Gen. Bill Donovan's prestigious New York law firm, Donovan, Leisure, Newton, Lombard and Irvine, many of whose members had served with him in the OSS.

In 1949 after a two-year stint with the Donovan firm, Colby joined the National Labor Relations Board in Washington. He wasn't particularly happy or fulfilled as a lawyer, and one evening he remarked to his wife, "I don't know. I just don't want to go through life saving \$100,000 a year for American Can—or some other corporation."

Call of the CIA

When the Korean War broke out, Bill Colby, an adventurer by heart, joined the Central Intelligence Agency. Under one guise or another he has been with the agency ever since, generally fighting communism.

In Stockholm from 1951 to 1953 he was listed as a foreign service attaché. In Rome from 1953 to 1958, where he was unofficially known as "one of Clare Boothe Luce's boys," he was officially carried as "first secretary and special assistant to the ambassador." In Rome where his wife recalls, "we lived five of our loveliest years," Colby worked underground to prevent the Italian Communist Party from winning a majority in Parliament.

Came next his first three-year stint in Vietnam, ostensibly as first secretary of the American Embassy in Saigon, his first assignment in Asia. Colby was, of

course, much more than that. He was probably the shining light of the intelligence community, performing so well in his situational assignments and various cloak-and-dagger assignments that he was brought back to CIA headquarters in Washington and appointed chief of its Far Eastern Division.

The most controversial segment of William Colby's intelligence career concerns his involvement in the Vietnamese pacification program known as "CORDS," an acronym for "Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support." One part of this program was the operation code-named Phoenix.

Just as he was about to become chief of the CIA's Soviet operations in 1968, Colby was sent back to Vietnam on the request of Robert Komer, a former CIA man, and given ambassadorial rank. He was placed in charge of South Vietnam's overall pacification program, supposedly designed "to win the hearts and minds of the people."

Abuses during Phoenix

The Phoenix portion of the program, which aimed to neutralize the Vietcong infrastructure, involved the capture, imprisonment, defection, and murder of the Vietcong. There were abuses in its execution, and as Colby conceded in February, 1970, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "I would not want to testify that nobody was killed wrongly or executed in this kind of a program. I think it has probably happened, unfortunately." But there are excesses in all wars, and it seems manifestly unfair to brand Colby a "mass murderer and war criminal" which was done by those in the intelligence community who last year opposed his appointment as CIA director. No one ever called him such names in World War II when he was killing Germans. And few people realize how chaotic "Phoenix" was until he took it over.

Colby does not look or act like an exquisitely sensitive man, but during the period of his Senatorial confirmation, when posters bearing his photo with the legend, "mass murderer and war criminal," were tacked to posts and walls in Washington, D.C., he was deeply hurt. One night he drove home to the unpretentious house he owns in Springfield, Va., a capital suburb, plaintively asked his wife, "How does it feel being married to a war criminal?"

"My heart went out to him," Barbara Colby recalls, "because if ever there was a good, decent man who has served his country and his family—Bill has served every President from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Nixon—well, it's Bill."

Although Colby is a Nixon appointee, he, unlike so many others, is not about to follow orders blindly or to traffic with White House types like Ehrlichman and Dean who sought to compromise the CIA in the Watergate coverup.

"I will do the proper and legitimate

20 August 1974

Foreign-Policy Advice

By Ronald Steel

SARATOGA SPRINGS, N.Y.—President Ford tells us that he will remain true to the foreign policy of Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger. The media applauds and Congress sighs with relief. This is one area, perhaps the only one, where continuity is hailed as a good thing.

So it would seem, at any rate. The Nixon-Kissinger team restored the broken dialogue with Peking, hammered out a military disengagement in the Middle East, negotiated an accord for waging the Vietnam war with local proxies instead of G.I.'s, and established a new coziness with Moscow. For this it has won, and deserved, high points.

Mr. Kissinger, having emerged slightly tarnished, but intact, from the Watergate debacle, is the superstar of the new Administration. It is not surprising that President Ford has affirmed his confidence in his predecessor's Secretary of State. Having never shown any particular interest in foreign affairs, and eager to assuage as many anxieties as possible, Mr. Ford will be almost irresistibly tempted to leave that side of the ledger to Henry.

It is an understandable temptation, but it should be avoided. The problem is not Mr. Kissinger's abilities but the message he has used and the values that underlie them. Like the President he so lately served, Mr. Kissinger is indifferent to ideology, obsessed with secrecy, and mesmerized by the game of power politics.

This has led him into a number of curious adventures in *realpolitik*, most lately revealed in the Cyprus war. Unwilling to antagonize the military junta in Athens, and detesting President Makarios, he refused to condemn the gangster regime under Nikos Giorgiades Sampson. When democracy was restored in Greece, he winked at the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, preferring part of the island "safely" under Ankara's control to an undependable neutralist Government. Defended as "realism" this policy of expediency has involved terrible suffering in Cyprus and has weakened Greece's fragile democratic Government.

Support for the brutal Pakistani repression of the Bengalis; financial and military aid to the dictatorships in South Korea, South Vietnam and, until recently, Greece; indifference to the repression of minorities and dissidents

in the Soviet Union—all of this has been carried on in the name of a higher realism, as though a nation's values could be detached from the foreign policy it pursues. The notion that the end justifies the means was, after all, the essence of Watergate.

Mr. Ford is President today because the stench of that mentality became too great. In trying to leave behind Watergate's corruption, we will have learned little if we dismiss from foreign affairs the moral values that have been receiving such heady reaffirmation these last days. Foreign policy is not merely a method of manipulation. Nor is it the waging of war by other means. It is the expression of a nation's values.

Domestic problems are urgent, but foreign affairs cannot be put on the back burner. Nor can they be left to Henry to orchestrate as he sees fit. His successes, while impressive, are nonetheless tenuous.

The link with China depends on Peking's quarrel with Moscow. The détente with the Kremlin, while desirable, so far involves mostly American money for Russian promises. And in Vietnam, of course, the war goes on.

President Ford has an opportunity to take a fresh look at a foreign policy apparatus that has been shrouded in secrecy, to seek other views on issues raised or left unrelayed.

Relations with Japan, compounded by neglect and even contempt, are at a critical point. The time for a less domineering role toward Western Europe, and for the withdrawal of American troops, is long overdue. The specter of famine and the intensifying misery of much of the Third World are pressing closer to home. Overhanging all is the persistent commitment to a policy of global intervention that has never been seriously re-examined since the onset of the cold war.

Perhaps Mr. Kissinger, who has shown little interest in these matters, has a secret bundle of answers. But his skill has always been as a negotiator—not as an innovator. With Mr. Nixon gone, his game of *realpolitik*, with its emphasis on expediency and flashy deals, may prove to be neither very realistic nor long-lived. Mr. Ford would be mistaken if he assumed that the present foreign policy consensus will hold up and that everything will be all right if he just leaves it to Henry.

Ronald Steel is author of several books on foreign policy.

things under the statute that CIA has been charged to do," he says. "And if I'm asked to do something beyond that legal authority, then I won't do it. I'll resign."

In line with that, Colby recently supported an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 which originally authorized the founding of the CIA. The amendment was introduced by Sen. William Proxmire (D., Wis.) to protect the CIA from abuses emanating from the political system. It limits the CIA to its basic mission of collecting foreign intelligence and closes a loophole in the 1947 act which permitted the agency to get itself so disastrously involved in domestic intelligence.

Under Colby's regime the CIA is not only projecting a more open and candid image, it is undergoing a structural transformation. Colby has abolished the 10-man Board of National Estimates founded in 1950 and replaced it with a group of national intelligence officers, each charged with preparing a series of short-term intelligence assessments of their special areas. He has reduced the number of covert, so-called "black operations" largely because satellite equipment is so sophisticated today that it can photograph and relay far more reliable information than that provided by an agent dropped by plane or landed by submarine on foreign land.

A practicing Roman Catholic, a pillar in community affairs, a hard-working (Saturdays until 3 p.m.) civil servant who earns \$42,000 a year, a good and understanding father to his four surviving children—a fifth died early this year of epilepsy—a loving and dutiful husband, William Colby has been a professional intelligence officer for half his adult years.

No flag lapel pin

The United States is indeed fortunate in having him. As a lawyer he could be earning three times in civilian life what he earns in government service. "But it wouldn't give me the satisfaction," he says, "that I find in this job." Colby wears no flag pins in his lapel to demonstrate his patriotism. It goes much deeper than that.

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
9 August 1974

Kissinger Power May Increase As Ford Relies On His Expertise

By JOHN P. WALLACH
News American Bureau

WASHINGTON — Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who once asked Gerald R. Ford to participate in his Harvard seminar, is likely to emerge in the new administration with even more power and autonomy to shape the nation's foreign policy.

This assessment is based on several factors — President Nixon's unwavering confidence in Kissinger, the only member of his original inner circle to survive unscathed by Watergate, and the demonstrated successes of Kissinger's policies in Indochina, the Soviet Union and China.

But above all is Ford's candid recognition of his own foreign affairs shortcomings and of Kissinger's expertise. Kissinger was said to have been the first administration official asked to stay on by the new chief executive.

Kissinger was tentatively approached almost two months ago, sources here revealed, and readily accepted.

One example of Kissinger's new power is his current personal campaign to salvage U. S.-Greek relations from years of Nixon administration support of the military regime

there, now that a civilian democracy has been restored.

Kissinger also is expected to launch new initiatives towards Cuba, which were impossible as long as Nixon needed conservative congressional support in his impeachment fight.

Ford's foreign policy record, as a House member, was one of consistent support for Israel, for the United Nations and for administration initiatives to defuse tension with the Soviet Union and Communist China.

In fact, Kissinger made the arrangements for Ford to become one of the first members of Congress to visit Peking after Nixon went there in February, 1972.

But Ford was also very much his own man in foreign affairs. He vigorously supported the Cooper-Church Amendment in 1970 that would have cut off all funds to continue the war in Cambodia and subsequently voted to prevent the

Pentagon from transferring funds from other military programs to continue the bombing of Cambodia.

Apart from his appearance in 1959 as a lecturer at one of Kissinger's Harvard seminars, Ford has had little direct contact with the secretary. State Department officials disclosed that prior to the current crisis, Kissinger had only been asked to brief Ford once — about two weeks ago — on foreign policy matters.

The former vice president, of course, participated in White House breakfast meetings with congressional leaders that Kissinger regularly addressed and received daily briefings as vice president from the Central Intelligence Agency.

But in private conversations Ford frequently has been the first to concede his foreign policy inadequacy.

In fact, for just those rea-

sons, Kissinger reportedly tried to persuade Ford that former New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who was Kissinger's boss before he joined the Nixon administration, would be an excellent vice presidential choice.

Rockefeller is well-known by U. S. allies and Communist adversaries, Kissinger is said to have argued, and could provide valuable continuity in the foreign affairs field.

Nixon's strong reliance on Kissinger appeared confirmed by the disclosure that in the final days of his presidency the outgoing chief executive spent more time with his secretary of state than with any other official, including Vice President Ford.

State Department sources revealed that Kissinger had spent more than four hours with Nixon Thursday and that Nixon had asked Kissinger to thoroughly brief Ford on current foreign policy developments only a few hours before he announced his resignation.


Kissinger reportedly had urged Nixon after Monday's cabinet meeting to make a quick decision about resignation because any delay might contribute to the uneasiness among U. S. allies or might

spark a crisis in one of the world's many trouble spots.

Kissinger was said to have stressed at the Cabinet session that unity among administration officials was essential to present a picture of stability during the turbulent transition of power. Without such a display of unity, foreign powers might be tempted to exploit

America's passing weakness, Kissinger said.

To this end, Kissinger recommended that for the interim changeover period the cabinet be kept intact and all appointed officials overseas, including ambassadors, be allowed to remain at their posts despite the formality of resignation letters.



GENERALBALTIMORE SUN
9 August 1974**Allied Dispute over European Security Conference**

By DAVID FOUQUET

Brussels. After apparently patching up their differences over the Ottawa declaration on Atlantic principles, the United States and its European allies may be headed for a new dispute over the pace and progress of detente with Communist countries.

The problem revolves around soporific negotiations now under way in Geneva over European security and such diverse issues as the inviolability of frontiers, magazine subscriptions to Communist countries and people like Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

For the most part these topics have not fired public opinion on either side of the Atlantic. But they did threaten to ignite a new controversy when Henry Kissinger passed through Brussels on his return from the Moscow summit. Only some fast talking by the American Secretary of State defused a potential explosion by some of America's staunchest allies. But the underlying differences of opinion still exist and will have to be resolved in the coming months if another Atlantic shouting match is to be avoided.

The Europeans were extremely agitated over what they saw as a betrayal at the recent Nixon-Brezhnev summit over the deadlocked European Security Conference. In the summit communiqué they read in black and white what they had feared: that the American and Soviet desire for showcase achievements had converged to seek a quick wrapup

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21 August 1974

to the security conference. The United States and the Soviet Union "expressed themselves in favor of the final stage of the conference taking place at an early date." The statement also declared that "substantial progress" had already been made and that "documents of great international significance" would be produced at the talks.

This summit enthusiasm did not square with the "disappointment at the small progress" expressed by the European Community foreign ministers a few weeks earlier. Nor did it mirror the statement accepted in Ottawa just a few days earlier by all the NATO allies including the United States. That communiqué spoke of the "uneven" progress at the Geneva East-West talks and the "patience" needed to achieve results.

Secretary Kissinger was able to convince his European colleagues in Brussels and in his subsequent tour of capitals that he and President Nixon had not committed themselves to any date or setting for the windup of the European Security Conference. Nevertheless reports issuing from the private meeting indicate a major divergence of views between Kissinger and some Europeans.

Putting it diplomatically Belgian Foreign Minister Renaat Van Elstlande commented that the Moscow declaration indicated that "bilateral views may have progressed beyond the al-

liance views" on the Geneva conference.

Having been dragged reluctantly and skeptically after years of refusal into the Soviet-proposed gathering, the Europeans want some tangible results. The Warsaw Pact first proposed such a Pan-European conference in 1966 in order to, in Western eyes, seek confirmation of the status quo in Europe and split the United States from its European allies. Hesitant, the Western Europeans set a number of preconditions to be fulfilled before they would sit down to discuss European security. Largely through the West German Ostpolitik and U.S.-Soviet rapprochement, the preconditions were met and the talks started in Helsinki in 1972.

The subsequent negotiations have dealt with three major "baskets" or areas — political-military measures, economic and technical co-operation between East and West and "the free exchange of peoples and ideas." Every one of the 35 states involved has its pet issues. For instance West Germany, hoping to preserve the possibility of a German reunification, hopes to gain recognition for the doctrine of the peaceful change of frontiers. Romania, seeking to maintain its economic independence in the face of Soviet domination, is resisting East-West economic co-operation solely between the Common Market and Comecon.

But the Western European countries have been remarkably

unified and tenacious on obtaining a relaxation of the Communist controls on information and travel. They feel there will never be a real detente until there is a freer flow through the Iron Curtain. They want to open up the closed societies and hopefully avoid the type of repression typified by the Solzhenitsyn case.

This is anathema to the Soviet Union and some of its allies who believe the state has a right to control travel and information and who view the Western demands as opening the floodgates to a tide of pornography and subversion. In fact some observers in both camps have speculated that the West European intransigence is an attempt to sabotage the talks and detente in order to maintain U.S. troops in Europe. The few concessions on this issue made by the Communist countries have been meager ones like allowing Western magazine subscriptions into Eastern Europe.

This will not satisfy some European governments which find themselves in the unusual role of being hard-liners while the United States and the Soviet Union are urging a faster pace. While all countries are committed to producing some concrete results in this conference which has been called the most important since the Congress of Vienna, it is this difference in aims which the United States and its NATO partners say they will try to resolve in the coming months.

Mr. Fouquet is a freelance journalist, resident in Brussels.

Kennan warns about pressure on Soviet trade, alliance with China

Washington (AP) — George F. Kennan, one of the nation's long-time leading experts on the Soviet Union, said yesterday he sees little sense in using a trade bill to compel the U.S.S.R. to ease immigration restrictions on its Jewish citizens.

Mr. Kennan also told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that it is an illusion to believe that China can become "a suitable ally or associate of this country in world affairs."

On the problems of Soviet Jewry, Mr. Kennan said he has no sympathy for denying most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union "as a means of bringing pressure upon the Soviet government for an alteration of its policies with

respect to the emigration from Russia of its Jewish citizens."

He said he considers such tactics unsound because they call for the United States to interfere in the domestic activities of another nation to an extent which the U.S. would be unwilling to accept if the situation were reversed.

He said he is "bewildered" at the timing of the move, which is sponsored in the Senate principally by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.).

Actually, he said, the Soviet Union has become more liberal in its immigration policy in the recent past than at any time in the last 40 years.

"I am also troubled by the fact that the pressures we are urged to exert appear to relate

specifically to people of one, single ethnic religious background," Mr. Kennan said.

"Such pressures should be exerted on behalf of all those seen to suffer from the policies in question and not just those of given ethnic or religious identity," he said.

As for China, Mr. Kennan noted that in other eras of history, U.S. foreign policy in the Far East has been "seriously disbalanced" by what he called "our traditional predilection for the Chinese."

"Whatever else may be said of Communist China, she is not a suitable ally or associate of this country in world affairs," he said.

Mr. Kennan said the reasons for this incongruity lie in the differences between the Chi-

nese and American characters, the ideological commitment of the Chinese leaders, the nature of the Chinese military establishment and the differing characters of the two nations' interests and commitments.

On another subject Mr. Kennan said the enormous size of the American defense budget and the large role that defense plays in the national economy has distorted national policy.

"Our whole governmental system is militarily top-heavy," he said. "And this sets up forces in the midst of which it is hard to get a true picture of the national interests."

NEW YORK TIMES
4 August 1974

Torture, an Official Way of Life in 30 Countries

By JEAN-PIERRE CLAVEL

Torture has now become a state institution in more than 30 countries, a rule of pain carried out by technicians, scientists, paramilitary officials, judges and cabinet ministers.

Documentation comes from the respected human rights agency Amnesty International, a private London-based group that seeks freedom for political prisoners and has offices in 32 nations. As the 25th anniversary of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights approaches, Amnesty's London headquarters described in a 224-page report allegations and evidence of torture in 64 countries in the last 10 years.

Most of what the agency calls a "cancerous" growth of torture has occurred in Latin America, spreading to 22 nations there in the 10-year period. Portugal and Northern Ireland are among the 10 European countries named, as are 14 nations in Africa, 7 in Asia and 8 in the Middle East.

The vast number of victims in urban areas are members of legitimate political organizations, trade unions and youth movements, professors, women's leaders, religious figures, lawyers and journalists. In rural situations, it is unarmed peasants, villagers and even children who are caught in the torture net. Contends Amnesty International, "it is apparent today that much of state torture is carried out by the military forces, usually elite or special units, who displace the civil police in matters of political security. Their military training and their exposure to post-World War II theories about 'unconventional war' make them particularly apt for the practice and enable them to apply the concept of 'war' to any situation of civil conflict no matter how mild."

In Latin America, it is possible to pinpoint the arrival of torture in nations such as Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile and to demonstrate the pattern in which torture has spread across the continent. Niall MacDermot, Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, reported at the United Nations this June after a fact-finding mission that between 3,500 and 4,000 persons had been interrogated in Uruguay alone since July 1972, in an effort to stamp out the Tupamaros. Of these, at least 50 per cent are believed to have been tortured.

Secret steps were taken in Brazil in the early nineteen-sixties by a group of senior military and police officials to create a coordinated, autonomous torture and "death squad" network to crush political opposition. To train personnel, illustrated lectures and live demonstrations of torture were conducted, using political prisoners as guinea pigs, by Operacao Bandeirantes, once described as "a type of advanced school of torture." Subsequently, trained Brazilian torturers traveled to military academies in neighboring nations to conduct courses in what is euphemisti-

cally called "interrogation."

"Refinements" have resulted from technical and medical research designed to develop techniques of intensifying pain without causing death or irreversible damage. In Northern Ireland in 1971, security forces put "sensory deprivation" into action against Irish Republican Army suspects, using white noise, tactile obliteration, fatigue and starvation to force nervous systems to "torture themselves." Dr. Timothy Shallice of London's National Hospital has traced these methods to a clear line of private and government-sponsored research that began in the nineteen-fifties and intensified after the Korean War. "Torture which was once a craft," says Dr. Shallice, "has become a technology."

Further evidence of this trend was unearthed after the "liberation" of the DGS (political police) headquarters in Lisbon following the May coup in Portugal. Inside were found anatomy charts and films used to instruct novices in torture and detailed medical reports indicating that torture had become a medical science conducted under the supervision of doctors.

In the Soviet Union the abuse of psychiatry has led to the long-term incarceration of dissidents such as Grigorenko and Plyusch in execrable conditions inside special psychiatric hospitals on the ground that they had committed political offenses "while of unsound mind."

Amnesty has produced a unique portrait of a world which, like a Bosch phantasm, is panoramic, almost aloof, chronicling the ordeals and wasted lives of men and women trapped in the breakdown of the rule of law. It speaks for the countless victims sent to labor camps in the barren regions of the Soviet Union, for the fate of the 55,000 political detainees still held without charge or trial in the camps of Indonesia, for defendants sent to the torture cells beneath the courtrooms in central Lisbon, for the crippled Vietnamese inmates of the Tiger Cages of Con Son and their dead countrymen thrown from United States helicopters during the years of overt American military involvement in Indochina, for the unknown individuals who faced certain of the Red Guard factions in the violent street trials of the Cultural Revolution and for the personal victims of South Africa's Brigadier Swanepoel, Brazil's Sergio Fleury and Greece's Colonel Theophyloyannakos.

What distinguishes the present wave of torture from others is that where formerly it presented itself as a series of national crises (such as the unleashing of torture during the Algerian War beginning on Algerian patriots and eventually spreading to metropolitan France), today we confront an international network of Torture States exchanging expertise and equipment.

Jean-Pierre Clavel is a contributor to the recently published "Amnesty International Report on Torture."

THE ECONOMIST JULY 20, 1974

Kidnapping

Three-card trick

FROM OUR HONGKONG CORRESPONDENT

The latest details of the quiet release of two Soviet medical advisers kidnapped by Burmese opium-running terrorists in April last year reveal remarkable and unprecedented co-operation between the CIA and the Russians—with tacit Chinese endorsement. According to reliable sources in Rangoon and Bangkok, the American government discreetly approached the Soviet Union to ask if there would be any objection if the United States helped the kidnappers, who had slipped across the border into Thailand.

Burma had already rejected the kidnappers' demands for a \$2m ransom and the release of a former opium warlord of Chinese blood imprisoned since 1969. The Soviet ambassador in Rangoon had openly supported Burma's stand and so, indirectly, had the Chinese and American ambassadors.

The Russians gladly accepted America's offer. The kidnappers, led by a Manchurian named Chang Shu-chen, then suggested a compromise—1,000 M-16 rifles worth \$180 each for the release of the two Russians. The Americans brought Thai agents into the negotiations. The Thais, in an apparent con-

cession, said they would provide the rifles in two instalments. The first 500 were handed over and one Soviet hostage was released in March. The Thais then demanded payment for the next instalment and the kidnappers, perhaps feeling that it was all becoming too much for them, surrendered the second Russian without the second delivery.

It is being suggested that the 500 delivered rifles may be less reliable than the kidnappers expected. The opium chief remains in prison in redoubled security. So, at the end of it all, the tough south-east Asian front against the backing of that unlikely triumvirate, Russia, China and the United States.

Eastern Europe

WASHINGTON POST
11 August 1974

Million Soviets Repatriated, Jailed

Book Details '45 Pact On Postwar Return

By David Berliner

Special to The Washington Post

NEW YORK—A pact signed at the Yalta Conference and described recently by Alexander Solzhenitsyn as "the last secret of World War II" led to the forced repatriation of more than one million Soviet citizens held by the western Allies, a new book details for the first time.

Appropriately titled "The Last Secret"—a phrase used by Solzhenitsyn in a footnote to "The Gulag Archipelago"—the book by Nicholas Bethell traces step by step the events which resulted in the imprisonment and deaths of Russians liberated by American and British troops or captured while serving with the collapsing German army.

Lord Bethell's book is subtitled, "The Delivery to Stalin of Over Two Million Russians by Britain and the U.S.A.," but the figure includes those who returned voluntarily.

Citing many newly declassified papers and numerous personal interviews, the study offers a grim view of Soviet leaders out for wholesale revenge and of Western officials so concerned with the return of their own soldiers and with the appeasement of Stalin that normal humanitarian considerations were discarded.

"It was a long and tragic mistake," said Bethell, a 36-year-old English journalist and expert on Russian affairs, in a transatlantic telephone interview from London last week.

"The man I hold most responsible is Anthony Eden who was foreign secretary at the time, because the original decision was a British one and the American government later went along with it.

"We made the decision on the advice of Eden who pushed it through the Cabinet in spite of Winston Churchill's initial reluctance and in spite of the very strong protests from several ministers. He said it was essential for us to send these people back, by force if necessary, irrespective of their individual wishes."

The book (to be published in the United States by Basic Books Nov. 15) recounts in often-harrowing detail, the force that was used and the chaos and mass suicide that ensued when the full impact of the

settlement hit its victims.

At the heart of the action lay two bilateral agreements signed at Yalta on Feb. 11, 1945—one by Eden and Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, another by Maj. Gen. John D. Deane, military attache at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and a Soviet lieutenant general named Gryzlov.

"The Soviet government could not forgive any Soviet citizen who had in any way collaborated with the Nazi Germans, let alone actively fought for them," Lord Bethell writes.

"That so many ordinary citizens should spend a number of years in a foreign country was itself a mind-racking worry to the binkered, security-obsessed men who ran the country.

"To such 'policeman minds' they were all dangerous, every one of them, even those who had resisted the Nazi blandishments or threats and remained in prisoner of war camps on starvation rations. Stalin was resolved to isolate every one of them from the community, the innocent as well as the guilty, the loyal as well as the traitors...

"It would also take dozens of years to 'clear' every former prisoner of war. Also, the mere fact that a man has fallen into captivity was taken as evidence of a lukewarm attitude to Soviet Russia.

"Why he had not fought to the death? Perhaps because he wanted to be taken prisoner. The security men could, of course, examine every case in detail, take evidence, conduct interrogations, hold trials.

"By skilled painstaking work, they would be able to sort the sheep from the goats. But then, what if they made a mistake and allowed a foreign agent to slip through their fingers? Stalin and his men concluded that there was a simpler and more secure way of dealing with the problem—to imprison the lot."

Consequently, few differentiations were made, Bethell says, and Russian citizens who had been forced into some sort of service by the Germans or who had even actively resisted them, were lumped with

their countrymen who had willingly fought with the German army through loyalty to Nazism or hatred of Stalinism. Political refugees seeking asylum were treated as traitors to their homeland, regardless of the circumstances, he writes.

Even non-Soviet citizens, including many of the 50,000 Cossack men, women and children who surrendered to the British in southern Austria, were forced to return to Russia where half met their deaths in labor camps, according to Bethell.

While the gist of the pact and some details of surrounding events were released in the mid 1950s (author Julius Epstein subsequently documented some episodes of forced repatriation), the full dimensions of the complicity and initial lack of vision on the part of British officials and American leaders including President Roosevelt and General Eisenhower have remained concealed.

In a footnote to "The Gulag Archipelago," dissident writer Solzhenitsyn remarks: "It is surprising that in the West, where political secrets cannot be kept long, since they inevitably come out or are disclosed, the secret of this particular act of betrayal has been very well and carefully kept by the British and American governments.

"This is truly the last secret, or one of the last, of the Second World War. Having often encountered these people in camps, I was unable to believe for a whole quarter-century that the public in the West knew nothing of this action of the Western governments, this massive handling over of ordinary Russian people to retribution and death."

The comments drew an understanding but firm response last week from Lord Bethell, who noted that Solzhenitsyn had little if any access to archives and books on the subject at the time he wrote "Gulag."

"It was a terrible thing to send these people back to be slaughtered, but there were

certainly strong military and political reasons for doing so," said the British author who translated Solzhenitsyn's book, "Cancer Ward," and play, "The Love Girl and the Innocent," into English. "The main reason was that we feared that if we didn't send them back, Stalin would retaliate by keeping British and American prisoners of war in his own hands as hostages," Bethell said.

"There was also a general desire at Yalta to appease Stalin, or at the least to accommodate him in any way possible. He was, after all, bearing the brunt of the war at that time and, in February, 1945, we believed we would require his assistance to defeat Japan."

The firm adherence to the secret agreement loosened considerably by late 1945 but the repatriation procedure remained in effect until 1947, said Bethell. By then, as he notes in his book, relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated into the cold war.

"I doubt if this same thing could happen again," he said by telephone. "The same question did arise some 10 years later at the end of the Korean War regarding the repatriation by force of Chinese prisoners of war who had been in United Nations camps and didn't want to return. The cease-fire was held up for nearly a year because the Chinese insisted on having these people and the United Nations refused. Eventually, they weren't handed over.

"I anticipate people in England being very shocked by the degree of violence that was used (at the end of World War II) and by the fate of so many people," he predicted. "... most of the British soldiers, including those who took part in it, feel very badly now."

In what may prove an ironic footnote, there may be a reverse scenario to the smuggling to the West of "Gulag" and other Solzhenitsyn works. Lord Bethell said his expose will be printed in Russian and, he said, "these books do find their way into the Soviet Union."

Western Europe

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 August 1974

Greeks blame U.S. for weakness

Kissinger accused of deliberately seeking partition of Cyprus

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Athens
Some vocal Greek politicians are blaming the United States and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger for what they see as their position of extreme weakness against Turkey on the Cyprus question.

Former Greek minister John Zighdis, who belongs to the political center, charges that Dr. Kissinger has deliberately sought the partition of Cyprus, and used for this purpose two strong-arm men who now are discredited in Greece — Brig. Gen. Dimitri Ioannides, the man behind the junta which was removed from power in Athens last month, and Nicholas Sampson, the junta's choice to replace Archbishop Makarios as President of Cyprus.

Mr. Zighdis, who was imprisoned under the military dictatorship and has recently been living in Washington, says American foreign policy suffered a disaster in the Cyprus coup.

CIA accused of participation

The former minister also charges that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) helped keep the junta in power and in effect governed Greece, a feeling shared by many Greek opponents of the fallen junta. Newspapers here have asserted repeatedly that the CIA was either behind the abortive Cyprus coup, or was at least informed of it days in advance by

General Ioannides with the knowledge of U.S. Ambassador Henry J. Tasca. It appears reasonably certain, though embassy sources are uncommunicative on this point, that Ambassador Tasca in fact rejected contact with General Ioannides.

Mr. Zighdis further charges that the real American ambassador in Athens is not Mr. Tasca but Tom Pappas, a Greek-American magnate from Boston who heads the Esso Corporation here and represents many other U.S. business interests in Greece.

The Greek armed forces, in Mr. Zighdis's view, are allied to the American Military Mission (USMAAG, the U.S. Military Assistance Group in Greece). USMAAG does not perform a mission within the (NATO) alliance, but a mission of keeping the Greek forces tied to the strategic interests of the United States, he says.

No public protest

Mr. Pappas has never publicly contested the CIA role attributed to him. His Pappas foundation was identified in 1969 as one of the conduits of CIA funds channeled into Latin America.

Since then, Mr. Pappas, President Nixon's brother, Donald, former commerce secretary Maurice H. Stans, and former Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew, whose most recent business trip here happened to be at the height of the Cyprus crisis, were always viewed by Greeks as links between the U.S. administration and the for-

mer junta.

Beside had publicity for its role in Greece, the CIA has suffered another setback in losing one of its key monitoring stations at Karavas, in Cyprus.

Nearly 50 CIA personnel and employees manning the Karavas station on the Northern Cyprus Coast were evacuated after the Turkish invasion. The Turkish armed forces now control it.

The Cyprus fighting forced a second monitoring and radio-relay site near Nicosia to reduce operations. A third one was being phased down for closure before the crisis began.

Operated by service

Karavas was operated by the CIA's foreign broadcast information service (FBIS) which operates similar stations in Hong Kong, Panama, and Nigeria, among other places. It listens and watches worldwide radio and television broadcasts. It feeds the digested material, in unclassified but limited-distribution booklets, to U.S. government and some other users.

The United States paid the Makarios Government undisclosed rentals for the sites.

In their recent book, the CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, which the agency succeeded in censoring under a court order, Victor Marchetti and John Marks allude to what they call Archbishop Makarios's blackmail of U.S. Intelligence, but do not explain in the undeleted portions of the book what this blackmail was. Their use of this word, however, has helped to convince many persons that the CIA was on bad terms with the archbishop.

Monday, August 12, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

U.S. Envoy in Athens Denies Violating Orders on Cyprus

By Jonathan C. Randal
Washington Post Foreign Service

ATHENS, Aug. 11 — U.S. Ambassador Henry J. Tasca issued a statement today denying American press reports that he had failed to carry out State Department orders to deliver a message early in July to Brig. Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides, leader of the former ruling military govern-

ment in Greece, expressing Washington's strong opposition to any attempted coup in Cyprus.

The coup was carried out July 15 by the Greek-led Cypriot National Guard. It resulted in the overthrow of Cypriot President Makarios, the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, and the replacement of the military government of the island by a new government. The reports had suggested

that Tasca had balked at seeing Ioannides, then chief of the military police, because he was not officially part of the Greek government he dominated. The ambassador's statement left that point moot.

"Without addressing myself to the accuracy of these reports," the statement said, "I wish to state categorically that I and my embassy have faithfully and in accordance with established practice, in accordance with established practice, all instructions received from the State Department, and that all of my actions and activities have been based on decisions made by my superiors in Washington."

The ambassador also sought to refute the often-repeated charge that he and the U.S. government had been the junta's main prop and that Washington had prior knowledge of the July 15 coup, but had done nothing to warn Archbishop Makarios because the Central Intelligence agency wanted a more tractable leader in Cyprus.

"The restoration of democracy in Greece, toward which I have directed my endeavors in accordance with established policy, is a cause for rejoicing and I and the American people

ple join our Greek friends in celebrating this historic event in which I shall always be proud to have taken part," the statement said.

The tone of the statement suggested to Greek observers that Tasca, who has served here since January 1970, may be replaced soon.

The leading candidate to succeed him as ambassador is believed to be Montague Stearns, the 50-year-old deputy chief of mission who returned to Athens last week after an absence of more than a decade.

The changed mood of Greece was exhibited in Athens today when dozens of armored cars and tanks, so long the unloved symbol of the military dictatorship, were cheered and applauded as they moved through downtown streets. Their destination was not disclosed.

The movement of the armor

was decided on at a 90-minute meeting called by Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis to review Greece's weak defense posture.

If nothing else, the troop movements seemed to be aimed at persuading the Greek public that the new civilian government is determined to put on a show of force no matter how powerless the armed forces really are as the result of the dictatorship's meddling in Cyprus.

In addition, they constituted a message to the Turks, whose uncompromising behavior in Cyprus and at the Geneva conference has dampened hopes here of achieving a face-saving solution for the civilian government.

Perhaps the most positive note was the public's display of affection for the armored units, whose periodic appearances in Athens over the past

seven years had become synonymous with unpopular aspects of the dictatorship.

Their departure from Athens was seen as reducing chances that the disgraced military junta would try to remove the civilian government, as street rumors have suggested it might unless the Turks relented and adopted a more compromising attitude in Geneva.

For the first time since taking office July 24, Karamanlis Friday recognized the potential danger of such talk—encouraged by the extreme right-wing Athenian press—and pointedly blamed the junta's "reckless policy" in removing Archbishop Makarios as president of Cyprus for creating "frightful difficulties" for his government.

The morning meeting presided over by Karamanlis was attended by figurehead President Phaedon Gizikis, Defense

Minister Evangelos Averoff Gen. Gregory Bonanos, the chief of the general staff, and the leaders of the three armed services.

The discussion of Greek military preparedness will continue Monday, according to an official communique that said the shift of units stationed around Athens had been decided or to "strengthen other units" stationed elsewhere.

No details of the troop movements were provided, but observers noted that the armor was seen heading for the port of Piraeus. They assumed that the most likely final destination was the Third Army, stationed opposite Greece's land border with Turkey in Thrace, or perhaps even a Greek island which eventually could serve as a staging area for troop movements to Cyprus.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 August 1974

U.S. IS REPLACING ENVOY TO ATHENS

Tasca's Controversial Role
Spurs Recall—Post Goes
to a Kissinger Aide

By STEVEN V. ROBERTS
Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, Aug. 13—The White House announced today that Henry J. Tasca would be replaced as Washington's Ambassador to Athens.

Subject to Senate confirmation, the new ambassador will be Jack B. Kubisch, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Mr. Kubisch has never been an ambassador and has never dealt with this part of the world.

The news that Mr. Tasca would be replaced was widely expected. Many Greeks believe that the United States gave too much support to the military dictatorship that ruled this country for seven years, and they place part of the blame on Mr. Tasca, who has been Ambassador here for more than four years.

Since the dictatorship ceded power to a civilian Government three weeks ago, and censorship has been lifted, many Greek newspapers and politicians have been calling for Mr. Tasca's recall.

Mr. Tasca, who will be 62 years old next week is a

career Foreign Service officer who previously was Ambassador to Morocco. In reply to the criticisms of his performance, he has always maintained, as he did in a statement last weekend, "that all of my actions and activities have been based on decisions made by my superiors in Washington."

Attacks on those decisions have snowballed in recent weeks. A typical comment came from the conservative newspaper Vradyni, which wrote after President Nixon's resignation:

"Nixon and his accomplice troupe did everything possible to neutralize the honest voices in Congress and the voices of the men of letters in America who saw his dangerous flirting with the junta of Athens as a blot on America."

The paper said it would shed no "tears of sorrow" for Mr. Nixon and added: "Now that Nixon has fallen, let his most faithful Ambassador follow him. Mr. Tasca should go to Mr. Nixon's property so that he may keep him company there in his loneliness."

Even diplomatic colleagues, who are usually discreet in such matters, have openly favored Mr. Tasca's removal. As one put it a few days ago, "Henry Tasca has done a great deal of damage to American interests here."

Last February, a Congressional committee headed by Representative Donald M. Fraser of Minnesota urged the removal of Mr. Tasca as a sign that Washington was no longer supporting the military dictatorship here.

But the Ambassador reportedly enjoyed the strong support of President Nixon. One of Mr. Tasca's closest friends here is Thomas A. Pappas, a Greek-American industrialist who

contributed heavily to the President's political campaigns.

Some Greek politicians have described Mr. Pappas as the "real" American ambassador. According to a highly reliable source, Mr. Tasca would see Mr. Pappas "three or four times a week" when the industrialist, the man who brought Coca-Cola to Greece, was in Athens.

"During a party or something at the Ambassador's residence, Pappas would rush in after coming straight from the airport," the source said. "Often he would say something like 'Where's Henry? I was at the White House last night.' Sometimes the two of them would go into a small room and start making telephone calls."

Mr. Tasca, whose resignation has been announced in Washington, arrived here in 1970, the first American ambassador after a military coup overthrew the parliamentary Government in 1967. In the early years he maintained good relations with key military figures, and he frequently told visitors that Col. George Papadopoulos, the junta leader, sincerely wanted to hold elections and return the country to democracy.

Greece was visited by a steady procession of American officials, including Vice President Agnew and Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans, who paid public tribute to the junta.

According to his critics, Mr. Tasca paid little attention during those years to important opposition leaders, including Constantine Karamanlis, now the Premier, who was then living in Paris. In 1971 Mr. Karamanlis was quoted as saying that Mr. Tasca was "a small man" who met dissidents infrequently, and then mainly to curry favor with Congress.

Gradually, Mr. Tasca told associates, he became disillusioned. He never liked the military strongmen who unseated Mr. Papadopoulos last November, and at least in private, called them "Fascists" and "Tyrants." He began developing closer ties with the opposition movement here, and had dinner with George Mavros, now the Foreign Minister, only hours before Mr. Mavros was arrested last April for criticizing the dictatorship.

The Ambassador told the Embassy to maintain a "low profile" here, and the flow of visitors decreased. But his image as a supporter of the junta was already fixed in the public mind, both here and in Washington. Moreover, Mr. Tasca always insisted that Secretary of State Kissinger forbade ambassadors to comment on the internal affairs of other countries.

Mr. Tasca often pointed to his Fourth of July messages as evidence of his support for democracy. This year he took great pride in having written it himself.

Mr. Kubisch, 53 years old, started his career as a businessman and entered Government service in 1961. His first post was as Deputy Director of the Agency for International Development's mission in Ceylon, now Sri Lanka. He rose to director of the agency and then served as State Department desk officer for Brazil. Before being named Assistant Secretary last year, he was deputy chief of Mission in Mexico City and Paris.

The Embassy here indicated that the changeover would probably take place in mid-September.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 August 1974

The Family Fight and NATO

By IAN SMART

LONDON — Not for the first time, Cyprus has opened a rift in the NATO lute. What can be said of an alliance whose individual members step to the brink of war with each other and go on to pull their forces out of the alliance or divert them to fight a national battle? What collective defense is possible when particular countries, in pursuit of national goals, turn their military backs on a common adversary?

Recent Greek and Turkish actions have, of course, struck at the Atlantic Alliance, but reports of its imminent death on that account are exaggerated. They are, in fact, about as much exaggerated as persistent allegations of NATO's military impotence in the face of "the threat from the East."

Strictly speaking, NATO has no military forces of its own. What it has are members that "assign" or " earmark" some or all of their national forces to be used by NATO commanders in time of war. Especially since 1966, when France set a precedent for Greece by withdrawing her forces from NATO's integrated military structure, a finely graduated set of peacetime relationships has grown up between national units—"assigned," " earmarked" and the rest — and the alliance's joint commanders. Apart from administrative complexity, one effect is to make it much harder to measure sensibly either NATO's military strength or the "balance" between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

To take only one example, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, responsible for the whole Atlantic from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer, is currently assigned a total naval force of four destroyers — which gives no indication of the enormously powerful allied fleet he would certainly command in war. By the same token, any measurement of NATO's European strength that completely excludes French — and now Greek — forces, ignoring the stand they would clearly take against any Warsaw Pact attack, is of little practical interest.

All this is background to saying that apocalyptic warnings about NATO's over-all military weakness or about the particular damage caused by Greece or Turkey need to be looked at critically. NATO has its military problems in the European theater, and many are serious. Perennial manpower shortages, uneven and sometimes low standards of training, morale and efficiency are some, as well as militarily inappropriate deployment—especially of Italian ground forces or the United States 7th Army—and inflexible logistic

systems. Above all, perhaps, there is a deplorable lack of equipment standardization. But it is an illogical leap from such deficiencies to the simplistic conclusion that the alliance's conventional military capability is trivial. When all is said and done, NATO members have more men, more ships and more combat aircraft in their worldwide armed forces than the whole of the Warsaw Pact.

That is not to deny the extent to which Greco-Turkish conflict has disrupted NATO's local military situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. But it does help to put the disruption into a wider perspective. Nor should the focusing process end there. Turkey, for example, has used less than 10 per cent of her forces to invade Cyprus. Even when troops moved to the Greek frontier are taken into account, most Turkish units remain relatively unaffected. Even if Greek forces are permanently withdrawn from the NATO command structure, Greece would hardly want, or be able, to stand aside from an East-West military confrontation. (In any case, the utility of Greek units has been rated rather low by NATO experts over the last five years.) As to the effect on United States forces in the Mediterranean of their potential expulsion from Greek bases, the effect will be more on cost and convenience than on combat effectiveness. The Sixth Fleet did without a Greek base until a few years ago, and it can do without it again.

The military effects of the Cyprus crisis on NATO are not, of course, totally insignificant. But they do pale into insignificance beside the political damage done. While the serviceability of any military alliance depends on the strength of its political foundations, the North Atlantic Treaty is much more than a purely military alliance. It also expresses a sense of general community within the Western world. Moreover, it contains an undertaking to settle international disputes peacefully.

It is these aspects of the alliance, rather than its narrower military capacities, which are now being trampled underfoot. The current strength of anti-American feeling in Greece, linking left and right in the political spectrum, is a greater threat to Western security than any decision about Greece's military relationship to NATO. Bitterness in Turkey over the political attitudes of her allies to the Cyprus problem since 1960 is more serious than any military redeployment. The gaps that need to be plugged in NATO's defenses in the wake of this crisis will have to be filled by diplomats more than by soldiers.

Ian Smart is deputy director and director of studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 August 1974

NATO's southern flank collapses

By Richard Burt
Special to

The Christian Science Monitor

London

While military strategists are still attempting to assess the full implications of the Greek decision to withdraw its armed forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), one conclusion appears inescapable: For the time being at least, NATO's southern flank has collapsed.

Officials compare the move by the Athens government to former French President Charles de Gaulle's decision in 1966 to remove French forces from the alliance's military organization. The French decision was undoubtedly a more traumatic

event, but NATO's loss of 130,000 troops, according to one official, "tears a gaping hole in the defense of southern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean."

The reason given by the Greek Government for the pullout — that "crack units needed to be brought under direct control" — is not taken seriously by diplomats here, because troops assigned to NATO are always ultimately under national control.

Instead, the maneuver is thought to represent Greek displeasure over the inability or unwillingness of Greece's NATO allies, particularly the United States, to exert more pressure on Turkey to reach a diplomatic settlement over Cyprus at the Geneva peace talks earlier this week. "The NATO pullout came out of sheer frustration," said one official, who speculated that the Athens government wanted to punish Washington for "tilting toward Turkey."

It is also believed that the decision

had been taken partly for military reasons to prevent Turkey from learning too much about Greek troop and air movements. (At NATO command centers, all military movements are monitored and the information is made available to other NATO countries.)

Defending northern frontier

Greece joined NATO in 1952, and membership in the alliance has been a strong factor in the foreign policy of successive governments. Strategically positioned between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, during the 1950's Greece concentrated on defending its northern frontier against the traditional threat of attack from Macedonia and Thrace.

Greece's frontier with the Soviet bloc is one of the few areas in Europe where NATO manpower outnumbers that of the Warsaw pact. The Greek departure means the loss of an Army of 120,000, a 22,000-man Air Force, and

an 18,000-man Navy. The proportion of Greece's gross national product devoted to defense and the percentage of its manpower committed to military service are among the highest in the alliance.

During the 1980's, however, Greece took on additional strategic importance as a base for NATO naval activities engaged in countering the growing presence of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean. A large portion of the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet is "home-ported" at Piraeus, the port of Athens, and naval analysts say that if the Navy is asked to leave its Athens and Suda Bay (Crete) bases, it will be impossible to continue to man two carrier task forces in the region.

NEW YORK TIMES

19 August 1974

Kissinger's Role in Cyprus Crisis Criticized

By ALVIN SHUSTER

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Aug. 18 — The month-old Cyprus crisis has left the Turks satisfied, the Greeks dismayed and angry and European experts in bewilderment over whether Secretary of State Kissinger has lost his diplomatic touch.

The rhetoric in Athens and Ankara is predictably emotional. But more detached diplomats and independent analysts agree that American misjudgments and early indifference deprived Washington of credibility or leverage in both capitals.

This critical view of the American role was tempered by comments that there was probably little Washington could have done anyway to prevent the hostilities. But the question remains among many in Europe of why the United States did not appear to try harder and why it allowed itself to end up with an image of ineffectiveness?

U. S. Called Too Calm

"One of Washington's crucial mistakes came very early in the game, right after the July 15 coup," said one analyst here. "Kissinger's mind must have been elsewhere, perhaps on the Nixon crisis. But the United States was much too calm about it all, about the ouster of Makarios, and showed no sign of recognizing the potential trouble."

His assessment, shared by others, was that Washington at first took a line that supported the then Greek government, the junta ousted eight days after the coup as a direct result of the crisis. Indeed, Washington did give every impression of serenity over the ouster of President Makarios and even seemed willing to accept his anti-Turkish replacement, Nikos Georgiades Sampson, if only Cyprus would remain quiet.

Access to Mediterranean

Ironically, one of the chief arguments that was earlier used for retaining Greece's membership in the alliance was that otherwise Turkey would be left isolated and exposed. In fact, Turkey's strategic position is viewed by most analysts to be of greater importance than Greece's.

Possessing a common border with the Soviet Union and straddling the Dardanelles, Turkey controls the Soviet Black Sea Fleet's only access to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The importance of Western control of the Dardanelles was expressed in the 19th century by the British: "While

we're Britons true, the Russians shall not have Constantinople."

Some officials, though shocked by the Greek pullout, also indicate that Greece might soon want to reexamine its decision. Analysts point out that the Athens government has clearly said it wishes to maintain political membership in the alliance, and it is thought unlikely that Greece for too long will want Turkey to enjoy all the benefits of NATO membership — intelligence reports and military aid and training — while Greece goes it alone.

"In the long run," said one analyst, "Greece has nowhere else to turn but NATO."

"Despite that, Washington felt confident it could persuade the Turks from invading," another independent expert said. "Washington probably felt better without Makarios anyway. And then stories emerged from Washington suggesting that Kissinger viewed the Archbishop as the Fidel Castro of the eastern Mediterranean. The Americans just didn't seem too worried."

How Turkey Reacted

The impressions of that American approach, despite the post-coup shuttling between Ankara and Athens by Joseph J. Sisco, the Under Secretary of State, varied. But in Turkey it was seen as a pro-junta stance and officials there decided to go ahead with the invasion on July 20 after concluding that neither London nor Washington was interested in backing the search for a diplomatic solution.

Turkish officials, the experts agreed, also felt that Washington would not be too upset if they resorted to military rather than diplomatic means to insure the safety of the island's Turkish minority and attempt to settle the Cyprus problem once and for all.

"In the second phase of the crisis — after the invasion — Washington and Kissinger seemed to wake up and begin concentrating on Cyprus," a diplomat said. "The United States improved its position, asking the Greeks to accept what the Turks were offering, and asking the Turks to accept a cease-fire. But it became clear that Washington felt that Turkey was much more important to the Western alliance than Greece and adopted a line much more pro-Turkey. No wonder the Greeks got angry."

By now, the experts suggested, the United States was without leverage with both sides, even if it wanted to use any. The Turks, though applauding what they call Washington's "objectivity" and "correct ap-

proach," experienced little American pressure and proceeded to enlarge their hold on the island and to resume fighting last week after the breakdown of the Geneva peace conference mediated by Britain.

At it was, Turkey was in no mood to listen to Washington or anyone else. Ankara had already stood up to Washington on the resumption of the growth of opium poppies — a decision that led the United States to recall its ambassador.

Moreover, Turkish officials remain angry to this day over the 1964 letter from President Johnson, who headed off a Turkish invasion of Cyprus then by threatening to withdraw America's nuclear protection if the crisis led the Soviet Union to act.

Such threats were not forthcoming this time, presumably as a result of Mr. Kissinger's conclusion that they would have little effect and work only to anger a partner whose border with the Soviet Union and whose value to the alliance made continued friendship imperative.

"It is our information that Washington pulled its punches in Ankara," said one well-informed, non-Greek diplomat in Athens. "It was a hardheaded decision, taken by hardheaded people. America had to lose one friend or the other and they chose to lose Greece."

This is a view confirmed by Americans in Ankara and Athens. While the American naval bases in Greece are regarded as important to the United States, the installations in Turkey are regarded as even more vital to strategic interests of the alliance.

Ankara's Firmness Noted

Moreover, American diplomats in Ankara said there was no point in overdoing the pressure on Turkey. They stressed that nothing short of using the American Sixth Fleet between Turkey and Cyprus would have stopped Ankara from invading

Thus, there is general understanding in European capitals for the bitterness stirred in the new Greek Government over the American role. Greek leaders insisted in meetings with American officials; that Washington should "do more" to hold back the Turks and then pulled their troops out of the North Atlantic alliance out of frustration over what they saw as Mr. Kissinger's "aloofness" to the crisis and his "betrayal" of Greece.

For his part, Mr. Kissinger kept in constant touch with Ankara and Athens and with James Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary, who tried to bring the two sides together in Geneva. The American Secretary clearly decided to leave much of the detail work to Britain, one of the guarantors of the island's independence under a 1960 treaty.

"Kissinger is a man who understands power," said a diplomat at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization headquarters in Brussels. "And in this case Turkey had all the power."

Mr. Kissinger's decision last week to take a more active role in the negotiations and even to go to Cyprus, if asked, is widely regarded in Europe as acknowledgement by Washington that the United States erred in handling the crisis.

The comments today by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger that Turkish forces may have pushed too far on the island was also seen as another effort by Washington to compensate for past errors.

In any event, the mood of many in Europe was summed up today in The Sunday Telegraph, which said:

"It is really ironic that a Secretary of State should spend weeks in a personal-jet-shuttle between Middle East capitals to damp down the Arab-Israeli conflict and only now grudgingly offer to stir from Washington to mend a gaping hole in America's own global defenses."

NEW YORK TIMES
20 August 1974

The Greek's Turnaround on the U.S.

By STEVEN V. ROBERTS
Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, Aug. 19 — On a square in downtown Athens stands a statue of Harry Truman. It expresses Greece's gratitude to the United States for the Truman Doctrine, and the outpouring of aid in the nineteen-forties and fifties that helped Greece recover from the devastation of World War II and resist Communist subversion during the civil war that followed.

In another square, a few blocks away, young people have been gathering every night for a week. They call Secretary of State Kissinger a murderer, and they chant, "Americans, go home." Today, in Cyprus, ethnic Greeks went beyond words to violence, killing the American ambassador in a spasm of fury against Washington's policies.

How did the United States go from hero to villain? How did the country that Washington brought into the North Atlantic alliance 22 years ago turn its back on its allies last week, as virtually every Greek, including the military, cheered?

There are many reasons, but after conversations with analysts from both countries, three explanations stand out.

The first is that America is a victim of its own mythology. Many Greeks still believe that the United States is so rich and powerful that it can do virtually anything. The legend was ended in Vietnam, but was renewed by the successes of Mr. Kissinger. There is a pervasive belief that if the wonder-worker of the Middle East had wanted to stop the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, he could have.

The second reason given is that Athens does not need Washington or the Atlantic al-

liance so much anymore. This is a problem plaguing all members of the alliance. It is based on the threat of a common enemy, and as that threat appears to recede, the ties binding the allies together begin to weaken, more parochial interests assert themselves. Moreover, the economic aid of past years has worked; Greece's economy is basically sound.

This feeling is enhanced by another factor—the passage of time. The youths chanting in the streets and the soldiers mobilized in Thrace do not remember World War II, or the Greek civil war of 1946-49, or American aid. They are not grateful to America, and they are not afraid of civil strife—if only because they have never lived through it.

The third major factor is nationalism, the desire to show independence of the great powers, to stand on one's own feet. When Greece withdrew her forces from the Atlantic alliance and Premier Constantine Caramanlis rejected an invitation to see President Ford in Washington, the headlines here were revealing.

Headlines Are Quoted

Vranthyni, a conservative paper, wrote: "Not one step in retreat—Subjection out of one question." Athinaiki, a left-wing daily, said: "No more dependence." As an American diplomat put it:

"There's a feeling in Greece that at least we'll be masters in our own house, we haven't been men before, and now we're men. There's a lot of happy nationalist feeling around."

This feeling flows out of a long history. Greece has always been a client state, influenced

by one power or another. As a result, one diplomat said, "Greeks like to try to find other people to blame."

After the military coup toppled democracy in Greece in 1967, that blame fell largely on the United States. The basic American policy was to maintain good relations with the junta to preserve American military bases and keep Greece as a loyal and well-equipped ally.

American generals and cabinet officers visited Athens, meeting cordially with the junta and seeing their pictures published on the front pages of the controlled press. The conviction grew, as one paper put it last week, that the United States "had become an instrument of our repression." The people of Greece, the charge went, were being sacrificed to the interests of Washington and the Atlantic Alliance.

Here, too, in the view of most observers, the myth of American power played a central role. The cliché in Athens was that Washington could topple the junta "with a snap of its fingers." Therefore, Greeks reasoned, Washington was responsible for the dictatorship.

The belief was considerably strengthened recently when The New York Times published an article—widely reprinted here—detailing the close relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and Greek political leaders.

The facts in the article were interpreted by some readers as conclusive proof that the C.I.A. completely dominated Greece.

Every new fact is fitted into the basic conviction. When Archbishop Makarios was overthrown in Cyprus with the help

of the Athens junta, many Greeks again blamed Washington.

Often they advanced little proof. But they tend to assume that since Cyprus would make a good American base, and since Archbishop Makarios was an independent-minded politician who refused to align with the Atlantic alliance, Washington must have been involved. As one Greek newspaper editor put it, "The junta would not have dared stage the coup without a green light from Washington."

This feeling was reinforced by another article in The New York Times, also circulated here, reporting that the C.I.A. had received advance warning of the coup.

Again readers tended to exaggerate the article and often ignored its main point—that the State Department had tried to warn the junta that it disapproved of the Cyprus coup.

The most recent blow to America's reputation here was the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Again, the desire to find other people to blame was powerful.

When Washington announced that it favored more autonomy for the Turkish Cypriotes, Greeks interpreted the statement as confirmation of Washington's support for Turkey. The suspicion that Mr. Kissinger had condoned, if not planned, the Turkish invasion became gospel.

During the years of dictatorship, critics of American policy warned that support of the Junta would disillusion Greek democrats with the United States. This has now happened. Greece has withdrawn a military role in the Atlantic alliance and American bases are threatened.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 August 1974

GREECE EXPECTED TO CURB U.S. BASES

Aides Assume That Athens Will Act Amid Increasing Anti-American Feeling

By STEVEN V. ROBERTS
Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, Aug. 17—American and Greek officials are now assuming that the United States will eventually be asked to vacate or reorganize at least some of the seven major military installations it maintains in Greece.

No decisions are believed to have been made yet, but one informed source said of the Greek position: "They mean business, no question about it. Their intent is very serious."

The status of the American bases has been threatened by Greece's decision last week to withdraw her troops from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in protest against Turkey's military action in Cyprus. The bases were established by agreements between Athens and Washington, but they are authorized by the NATO treaty and linked to NATO strategy. Turkey is also a member of the alliance.

Greece prohibited all American military aircraft from landing or taking off anywhere in the country. Today the order was modified to allow operations only in Athens, and then only with six-hour notice.

Anti-Americanism Grows

Anti-Americanism is sweeping Greece. For seven years, many Greeks criticized Washington for supporting the military dictatorship, which fell last month. Now they are seeking a reason—some Americans would say a scapegoat—for the humiliating situation in Cyprus, and Washington is the target.

A typical comment was made by Christianiki, a religious weekly, which published an editorial titled "Americans, Pack Up." The editorial said: "The American establishment of Watergates and murderers infects the holy soils of Greece, and they must take their missiles and their boats and leave."

Americans here seemed nervous today after anti-American demonstrations last night and the huge welcome accorded Andreas Papandreou, a leading critic of the United States, who returned from six years in exile. At the American air base near Athens a special "rumor-control" center received more than 100 calls today from worried American servicemen and their families, and servicemen were advised not to wear their uniforms in public.

In attacking Washington, Greeks seemed to asserting their national pride and independence after weeks of frustrating inaction on the Cyprus issue. The newspaper Ta Nea published a huge one-word

headline today that said simply, "Oxi," or "No."

That is a famous word in Greek history, the reply that Gen. John Metaxas gave to Mussolini in 1940 when Italy asked for permission to send troops into Greece.

Today Greece was saying no to four things, Ta Nea said: President Ford's invitation to Premier Constantine Caramanlis to come to Washington for talks, Secretary of State Kissinger's suggestion that the Geneva talks resume, and NATO's request to send a representative here.

In the wake of her withdrawal from NATO military activities, Greece moved to improve relations with Yugoslavia and France. Milos Mincic, Yugoslavia's Deputy Premier, flew here with a message from President Tito. Greek officials have been implying that they might conclude defense treaties with such communist neighbors as Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

France, the only other nation to have withdrawn militarily

lly from NATO, announced that she would speed up delivery of 50 Mirage fighter-bombers previously purchased by Greece.

As war tension over Cyprus subsided, Greece issued a long statement of economic policy from the Minister of Coordination and Planning, Xenophon Zolotas. The statement had been delayed twice by the Cyprus crisis as the new civil

ian Government was unable to get on with the reforms it planned after seven years of military rule.

Mr. Zolotas expressed optimism about the economy and said that with the return of civilian rule "confidence and cooperation have been restored, both at home as well as abroad." Specifically, he said that Greece would now move toward full

association with the European Economic Community. Greece has been an associate member, but relations between Athens and the Common Market were frozen after the military coup of 1967.

The Minister promised an end to the "unsteady and spasmodic" economic policies followed by the military rulers and announced the lifting

of regulations that had severely restricted credit for Greek industry.

"The seven-year period has accomplished just one thing," said Mr. Zolotas, an economist and professor, "to confirm in a most dramatic way that without democracy, neither economic stability nor substantial progress can be achieved."

WASHINGTON POST

19 AUG 1974

Cyprus War Protested by 20,000 Here

By Charles A. Krause
Washington Post Staff Writer

Thousands of highly emotional but orderly Greek-Americans converged on the White House yesterday to protest the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

The demonstrators, estimated by U.S. Park Police at between 20,000 and 22,000, marched down Pennsylvania Avenue chanting "Turks out of Cyprus" and "Killer Kissinger!"

Despite the large crowd and charged atmosphere, only two arrests were reported by police.

The protesters, most of them foreign-born, naturalized U.S. citizens, demanded that President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger act decisively to rid Cyprus of the Turkish troops that have captured the northern third of the Mediterranean island.

The vast outpouring of demonstrators surprised even some of their leaders, who said that the protest was only organized in the last several days. The demonstration was originally scheduled for Lafayette Park, across from the White House, but was moved to the Ellipse behind the mansion yesterday afternoon when thousands more protesters arrived than had been expected.

Dr. A. J. Tousimis, a Rockville physician and one of the group's leaders, said he had expected about 2,000 demonstrators when he obtained a parade permit Saturday.

Tousimis called the demonstration "spontaneous" and said that 500,000 Greek-Americans would have come to Washington had there been more time for organization.

As it was, hundreds of buses came from New York, New Jersey, Boston and Philadelphia. Three chartered planes brought protesters from San Francisco.

The demonstration began about 2 p.m., when thousands of protesters gathered on the Ellipse. They brought with

them signs and banners that, in the main, stressed two themes: that the United States should remember its strong ties with Greece and that Kissinger is personally to blame for the present situation in Cyprus.

Other signs accused Turkish soldiers of brutality ("Turkish Pigs Leave Cyprus Women Alone") and the Turkish government of refusing to stop its farmers from growing poppies used to produce heroin.

Lukas Christodoulou, president of the Cyprus Federation of America, said many Greek-Americans feel betrayed by their own government's policy of official neutrality on the Cyprus question.

"The United States could have stopped this long before it started because the (Greek) junta government was under the CIA," Christodoulou said.

The latest crisis in Cyprus began last month when Archbishop Makarios, the elected president of Cyprus, was overthrown in a coup allegedly engineered by the Greek junta that had ruled Greece for seven years.

Many of the demonstrators said they agreed with Christodoulou that the CIA must have known—and approved of—the coup and, thus, could have prevented it.

"We want the U.S. to take the invaders out of Cyprus," Christodoulou said.

Alex Diatsintos, 29, a student at the University of Maryland, said that the Greek-American community feels that "the U.S. has betrayed the principles of democracy" by not acting to stop the Turkish army over the past two weeks as it seized more and more of the island.

As the demonstrators formed their parade lines on the Ellipse, Eleni Venetoulis, whose husband, Ted, is running in the Democratic primary for county executive of Baltimore County, said she was amazed by the number of demonstrators.

Greek-Americans, Mrs. Venetoulis said, are "basically conservative. Their social lives revolve around the church. This is the first time they have ever demonstrated in this country."

Asked why so many Greek-

Americans had turned out for the protest and why their emotions were so strong, Mrs. Venetoulis said: "Because underneath, we're all Greeks. You know, there has always been this thing between Turkey and the Greek people."

About 4 p.m., as thousands of the protesters marched 10 abreast down Pennsylvania Avenue, several young men climbed a statue in Lafayette

Park and burned an effigy of Kissinger. The crowds cheered but police made no effort to stop the burning or arrest those responsible.

However, police did make arrests later in the afternoon when several hundred of the protesters attempted to march around the White House again. Police officers warned the demonstrators that their parade permit was about to run out and ordered the demonstrators to remain on the Ellipse.

When the demonstrators attempted to surge through the police line at 15th and E Streets, N.W., D.C. police arrested two men and charged them with disorderly conduct. Police later identified the two as John Orfanos, 27, Montgomery, N.J., and John Psaras, 29, New York City. Each man posted \$10 collateral and was released, police said.

U.S. Park Police said they had between 250 and 300 men on duty for the demonstration while metropolitan police said they had 135 patrolmen near the White House.

As the demonstrators wound their way around the White House, four of their leaders met with J.W. Roberts, an assistant White House press aide.

According to Tousimis, one of those who met with Roberts, the assistant press secretary assured the Greek-Americans that their concerns about U.S. policy on Cyprus would be communicated to President Ford, who was playing golf yesterday and did not witness the demonstration.

Tousimis said the group emphasized to Roberts that the sooner the Turks are out of Cyprus the better for world peace. Tousimis said Roberts did not say what American policy toward the Cyprus crisis was or would be but "he

did say he was very impressed with the demonstration."

Virtually all of the demonstrators had departed the Ellipse area by 6 p.m., leaving only their signs and litter as reminders that they had been there.

Earlier in the day, Nikos G. Dimitriou, the Cypriot ambassador to the United States, charged that Turkey had "taken advantage" of the coup against Makarios "to launch a barbaric invasion of an essentially defenseless island."

Speaking from the altar of St. George Greek Orthodox church in Bethesda, Dimitriou said that Greek Cypriots "shall never surrender. There shall never be peace as long as one Turkish soldier remains on Cyprus."

Contributing to this story were Washington Post staff writers Alice Bonner and Barbara Bright-Sagner.

Near East

NEW YORK TIMES
3 August 1974

C.I.A. Chief Doubts Soviet Navy Plans Indian Ocean Build-up

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 2 — Pacific Fleet, except in the case of vessels from the western fleet en route to the Pacific. Mr. Colby said that Soviet growth in the Indian Ocean would be steady over the long term, in keeping with the growing Soviet presence in the area.

A Balance With U.S. Fleet

In a closed-door hearing of the Senate Armed Services on July 11, Mr. Colby also scoffed at the view often heard in Washington that the reopening of the Suez Canal would lead to a major transfer of Soviet warships from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and then to the Indian Ocean.

Mr. Colby said that the opening of the canal, expected by the end of this year or early next year, "will increase the over-all flexibility of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean, but not in itself cause a significant increase in the Soviet presence."

Canal Vulnerable to Closing

Because the canal could be easily closed in time of crisis, he said, the Russians were unlikely "to be caught with a substantial portion of available units on the wrong end of a blocked canal."

Mr. Colby said that Soviet priority would be to maintain the Mediterranean Fleet at top efficiency rather than risk having warships cut off in the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean was described by Mr. Colby as "relatively small and inactive."

"By mid-1973, the typical Soviet Indian Ocean force included five surface warships—one gun-armed cruiser or missile-equipped ship, two destroyers or destroyer escorts, a minesweeper and an amphibious ship," he said. "There was also usually a diesel submarine and six auxiliary support ships, one of which was a merchant tanker."

The number now is about the same, he said, except that the total of minesweepers has been increased to nine to aid in clearing the Suez Canal of war debris.

The Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean, he said, have usually been drawn from the

of vessels from the western fleet en route to the Pacific.

Mr. Colby said that Soviet growth in the Indian Ocean would be steady over the long term, in keeping with the growing Soviet presence in the area.

He said that the ultimate size of the Soviet force would depend on "the size of the investment and the forces that we arrange to be there."

"If we put in a permanent establishment of some size, why they would correspondingly increase to some substantial degree," he said. "If we had only sort of tentative connections there and some improvements, they might just continue their gradual increase."

He said that during the Middle East war last October, the United States moved a carrier task force into the Indian Ocean, provoking the Russians to increase their force, particularly in submarines.

Mr. Colby was testifying before the committee in relation to the Pentagon's request for \$29-million to expand port and air facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Defense Department witnesses have asked for the funds to counter Soviet presence in the area.

"Viewed from a global perspective, the Indian Ocean area—as distinct from the Middle East—has a lower priority than the United States, China or Europe in the U.S.S.R.'s diplomatic, economic and military initiatives," Mr. Colby said.

"Moscow's probable long-range strategic objectives in this area are to win influence at the expense of the West, and to limit the future role of China," he said. "Toward these goals, the Soviets use their naval presence as one element in a combined approach that utilizes political, economic, subversive and military-aid activity."

"We believe that the roles of military, and particularly naval forces, have been secondary to diplomatic efforts and aid programs in promoting Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean area," Mr. Colby said.

BALTIMORE SUN

3 August 1974

Arms race feared over Diego Garcia

By CHARLES W. CORDDRY

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — William E. Colby, the director of Central Intelligence, has given Congress an implicit warning that expansion of United States naval facilities on Diego Garcia Island could spark a naval arms race with the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean.

In testimony given secretly July 11 and published yesterday in the *Congressional Record*, Mr. Colby extensively described Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean since they began in 1968 and said temporary surges in strength customarily have taken place in response to U.S. naval activities.

The Defense Department and Navy leaders have described the situation the other way around in their efforts to win congressional approval for expansion of facilities on the mid-Indian Ocean island. They want, in addition to the present communications facilities, to be able to service ships and operate tankers and to accommodate anti-submarine and other aircraft from a lengthened runway.

Mr. Colby testified that the assessment of the Central Intelligence Agency is, "The Soviets would match any increase in our presence in that area."

Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), chairman of a military construction panel of the Senate Armed Services Committee, inserted Mr. Colby's testimony in the record, with deletions of secret data, so that members of Congress could have the evaluation of the agency "assigned the prime responsibility of gathering intelligence data on the Soviet Union."

Skeptical of proposals

Mr. Symington, skeptical of proposals to spend \$29 million on Britain's Diego Garcia Island this year and possibly \$75 million eventually, plainly wanted a different perspective from the Navy to be aired.

"You expect the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean to continue to grow," he inquired of Mr. Colby, "regardless of what we do, but that it will grow faster if we start developing Diego Garcia. Is that a fair interpretation?"

Mr. Colby replied: "I think that is true, yes, sir."

Describing Russia's naval units in the Indian Ocean as a sort of minimum force that can be enlarged from time to time for political purposes, Mr. Colby said that that part of the world ranks far behind the United States, Western Europe and China on the Russian scale of interests. He implied the Soviet Union would expand only reluctantly at a faster rate than the current increase of one or two combatant ships a year in the Indian Ocean.

The Russians would match any American expansion, he said, but to move faster than they do now would involve "reordering their priorities and shifting naval forces from other areas."

He described the "typical" Soviet naval force in the Indian Ocean as five surface warships, a diesel-powered submarine and six supporting ships.

The American Navy has operated three ships in the Persian Gulf area for many years and has recently been sending aircraft carrier task groups into the Indian Ocean on sorties from the Pacific. Diego Garcia is supposed to make the latter easier by cutting logistic ties to the Philippines 5,000 miles from the Indian Ocean island.

James R. Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense who headed the CIA before Mr. Colby, and Navy leaders contend the Navy must be able to operate routinely in the Indian Ocean because of Russia's "growing" air and naval presence, reopening of the Suez Canal which will ease Soviet entry into the ocean, and the concentration of oil routes over the ocean to Europe, Japan and the United States.

Mr. Colby said Russia's long-range aims in the area probably are to win influence at Western expense and to limit China's role, with the naval mission secondary to diplomatic efforts and aid programs.

While the Russians see the importance of Persian Gulf oil and the sea lanes to the West and Japan, he said, the normal makeup of the Soviet naval force "suggests that interdiction of Western commerce, particularly oil shipments from the Persian Gulf, has not been a major objective."

Ford's impact on India and Pakistan

By Razia Ismail

Special to

The Christian Science Monitor

New Delhi

The exit of Richard Nixon and the entrance of Gerald Ford is not expected to result in any dramatic foreign-policy changes concerning the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent.

Specifically, Mr. Ford's assumption of office is not seen as a deterrent to the current gradual return of Indo-American relations to cordial understanding.

But two Washington reports in Delhi papers reflect the dichotomy that persists in these ties. One report speaks of deepening Indo-American friendship and peace; the other revives the Diego Garcia controversy.

The first item reports Mr. Ford's desire to strengthen friendly ties with India and cites Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's reiteration of United States commitment to policy of peaceful relations abroad. Mr. Ford's messages to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and to Pakistani Premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto have both made front-page news, with his reaffirmation of close ties with both countries.

The other item reports congressional approval of funds for the expansion of American Navy installations in the Indian Ocean. American interest in the tiny island of Diego Garcia remains an irritant to nations like India, which oppose any form of armed one-upmanship in the ocean they want to retain as a "zone of peace."

The approval of \$32.3 million for expanding facilities on Diego Garcia was the only controversial feature of the United States annual military-construction bill. Its passage by the House of Representatives has coincided rather unhappily with Mr. Ford's initial expression of cordiality toward India, although no link is seen or imputed between the two.

India's anxiety to keep the Indian Ocean free of any big-power Navy games was recently restressed by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Jakarta. "India would never provide the Soviet Union or any country a naval base on the Nicobar Islands," he told newsmen there.

India and Indonesia have just signed a seabed boundary agreement covering about 90 miles between the northern tip of Sumatra and the Nicobar group in the Indian Ocean. Indonesia has similar pacts with Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand. India has a similar agreement with Sri Lanka. India and Indonesia urged the big powers on Aug. 8 to act with restraint and cooperate to preserve the ocean as a peaceful zone.

Passage of funds for Diego Garcia will revive India's fears, even though the general feeling here so far is that President Ford might show greater zeal than Mr. Nixon in improving ties with India.

However, on the strength of his meeting with Dr. Kissinger Aug. 10, Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub Khan has already declared that the sovereignty, integrity, and independence of Pakistan "will continue to be the cornerstone of American policy in south Asia." Pakistan radio has also broadcast the gist of Mr. Ford's message to Mr. Bhutto. The contents of his message to Prime Minister Gandhi have not yet been disclosed here. While it is expected that the Ford administration's main preoccupation over the coming weeks will be to provide a stable transition, Indians are hopeful that the thoughts of President Ford on south Asia will also take clearer shape before Dr. Kissinger embarks on his expected subcontinental journey in October.

Pakistanis uneasy

Qutubuddin Aziz reports from Karachi:

Pakistanis, who will celebrate the

27th anniversary of independence on Aug. 14, are harried by apprehensions over India's nuclear-weapons capability, and the change of presidents in the United States had made them a little uneasy. They now feel considerably reassured by President Ford's affirmation — in a message to Premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto — of his intention to honor American commitments to Pakistan.

In Washington last September President Nixon had told visiting Premier Bhutto that the United States considered the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan as a cornerstone of American foreign policy.

After the Indians' May 18 nuclear blast, Pakistan's solicitations for an American nuclear umbrella produced a reassuring response from the Nixon administration.

Commenting on President Ford's assurance to Pakistan, Karachi's semiofficial daily Morning News wrote in an editorial Aug. 12 that it had "encouraged hope that there is not going to be any let-up in the United States' stand in support of Pakistan's national independence and territorial integrity."

WASHINGTON STAR

11 AUG 1974

A Project Worth Pursuing

It is reassuring to have the director of central intelligence give an unworried assessment of Soviet activity in a sensitive part of the world. This is what William Colby did last month in testimony, since partially declassified, before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Undercutting expressions of concern by the Pentagon, he envisioned no significant buildup of Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean unless it is inspired by an expansion of the American presence there.

The Colby comments could be read as casting doubt on the wisdom or need of our improving the berthing and naval-supply facilities and airfield available to us at Diego Garcia, a remote British-held island. Colby took no specific stand on the project, for which the Pentagon has requested \$29 million.

It would be a mistake to drop the project, in the light of the present

power vacuum in the Indian Ocean area and its strategic importance to the West. The ocean is traversed by the supertanker routes from the Persian Gulf to Europe and Japan, and increasingly to North America as our oil imports grow. Beneath the water, Polaris submarines are on station with missiles trained on the Soviet Union and China. While the Soviet Navy presence typically amounts to about five surface warships, these require at least a minimal American counterpresence. Since at least a few American ships unquestionably will be operating in the Indian Ocean for the foreseeable future, it is sensible to improve their support facilities.

The Pentagon may have oversold the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean for the purpose of squeezing money out of Congress. But the Diego Garcia project seems in any event to be justifiable.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
4 August 1974

U.S. Army Aid Ruffles Some India Feathers

BY WILLIAM DRUMMOND
Times Staff Writer

NEW DELHI—The U.S. Army's grant of \$11,000 to India's leading ornithologist to study migratory birds on the subcontinent has caused a big flap in Parliament.

Several members last week called for a high level investigation into the collaboration between the Bombay Natural History Society and the U.S. Army's Migratory Animal Pathological Survey, which was the source of the money.

Anti-American sentiments, dormant in recent weeks, reawakened during one of Parliament's more emotional debates.

S. M. Banerjee, a Communist member, accused some Indian agencies of helping Americans "sabotage" the country.

The excitement was touched off by a report in the press recently that lumped the Army-funded bird survey together with experiments in mosquito control carried on here by the World Health Organization.

India, the headlines warned, was to be the guinea pig for foreign experiments in biological warfare.

However, the U.S. Army contends that the bird study had nothing to do with warfare, and on the contrary, might have some humanitarian benefits.

Walter Reed Army Hospital has long been seeking to advance knowledge about how migratory animals transmit diseases that affect man, an official American source said.

"The Army contributed the money here because we had an opportunity to work through Indian scientists to broaden an area that we had been working on already. We sent in no people. We gave no advice. We just gave the money," the source said.

The recipient was Salim Ali, author of the authoritative volume "The Birds of India." He has been stu-

NEW YORK TIMES
19 August 1974

India's Presidency: Pomp or Power?

By BERNARD WEINRAUB

Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, Aug. 18 — The two-decade debate over whether the President of India is an ornamental figure or a political power was renewed this weekend as Indian legislators voted for a new president.

President V. V. Giri, an amiable 80-year-old former labor leader who spent much of his time at ceremonial functions in Rashtrapati Bhavan, the red sandstone presidential palace, is stepping down after five years in office.

Although the results of the vote will not be announced until Tuesday, the new President of India will, by all accounts, be Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's candidate, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed. His only opponent is a little-known opposition candidate, Tridib Kumar Chaudhury.

Mr. Ahmed is a frail, 70-year-old former Food Minister whose recent performance, even according to associates, was dismal. He was chosen by Mrs. Gandhi to run for President because he is a Moslem—and the Government is struggling to calm this huge, restive minority—as well as a loyal follower of the Prime Minister. Perhaps the key reason for his selection is that he will probably heed the wishes of Mrs. Gandhi without question.

A Fuzzy Role

The role of the Indian President is one of the fuzziest elements of this democracy. By tradition, the Prime Minister is the dominant figure, while the President's functions are poorly defined and largely dependent on the personalities of the Prime Minister and the President. Mrs. Gandhi, and to a lesser degree her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister, sought out presidential candidates who were pliable. Otherwise, an independent or powerful President could jolt the powers of the Prime Minister.

Yesterday members of the

dying migratory birds since 1928.

In 1967, Salim Ali was in need of funds to carry on his work. One place to which he turned was the Smithsonian Institution, which responded with money. Another was the Walter Reed group, called the Migratory Animal Pathological Survey.

Because Walter Reed is an Army institution, Salim Ali's grant request had to be submitted to the U.S. Army's chief of research and development. This "bookkeeping" procedure made the project sound more military than it actually was, the official

Parliament and state assemblies secret ballots for President in an election that will probably favor Mr. Ahmed because the governing Congress party commands more than 67 per cent of the votes. The new president will take office next Saturday for a five-year term.

What makes the role of the Indian President interesting is that its powers have never really been tested. The nation's four presidents since independence in 1947 have labored under a ceremonial role—a role that clearly displeased the nation's first President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, as well as some legal authorities here.

Mr. Ahmed himself said recently that would not be a "rubber-stamp" president but added: I don't think there should be any scope for a confrontation between the President and the Prime Minister. The relationship should be based on cooperation and understanding of each other's functions. The point is, can you oppose a Prime Minister who is an elected representative? Then you would be a dictator."

The Potential Powers

The Indian Constitution gives the President potentially vast powers. As head of state, he can theoretically dissolve Parliament and the state assemblies, issue ordinances during parliamentary recesses, and serve as commander of the armed forces. Public-sector enterprises are under the President's control.

Perhaps the pivotal sentence of the Indian Constitution is: "there shall be a Council of Ministers (senior Cabinet officials) with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his function." The question that has been asked here is, what happens if the president should reject this aid and advice?

Moreover, the Constitution says that "the Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President." So far this has proved

a formality because the Congress party has won each of the national elections and the parliamentary leader became Prime Minister.

Perm Bhatia, a journalist and former government official, wrote recently: "But the President would have to exercise some discretion if the choice lies between rival claimants from different parties none of which commands a majority."

"What would happen if the President refuses to be aided and advised?" he asked. "Would it lead to the resignation of the Prime Minister or the impeachment of the head of state?"

A Chilly Relationship Shifted

India's first President, Dr. Prasad, had a chilly relationship with Prime Minister Nehru, who let it be known that India could not have two heads of government. Mr. Nehru yearned to have a figurehead President, an idea decried by Dr. Prasad, a Hindu nationalist.

The second President, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, a scholar and philosopher, played a muted role, although he was sometimes privately critical of Mr. Nehru. The third President, Zakir Husain, a Moslem, was appointed by Mrs. Gandhi and held office two years until his death in 1969.

A fierce fight was fought within the Congress party over his successor. The old-guard leaders overruled Mrs. Gandhi's objections and nominated the speaker of the lower house, Sanjiva Reddy. Mrs. Gandhi called for a "free conscience vote" within the party and nominated Mr. Giri, who became President in August, 1969.

This was the backdrop for the split in the Congress party. Mrs. Gandhi was initially "expelled" by the old guard but then gained the support of the majority of the party as well as the leftist opposition parties. In 1971 she won the parliamentary elections with an overwhelming majority.

but he also proposed to set up another station in northeastern India.

In five years, he caught 820,000 birds of 1,060 different species, took blood samples and collected parasites.

"The results are in no way classified," the official said. "This was medical research, pure and simple, and everybody benefits."

source said.

The Army agreed to supply the money in 1969 with the knowledge and concurrence of the Indian government.

What Salim Ali proposed to do was to catch and attach identification bands to migratory birds. His work was to be centered at the Keoladeo Ghana bird sanctuary in Rajasthan

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 August 1974



India's 'brain drain' to U.S.

By Henry S. Hayward

New Delhi

Not long ago a five-year-old youngster here in New Delhi formally applied for a U.S. student visa. "I've seen everything now," said a veteran consular officer. The youngster's overzealous parents even supplied a supporting letter from a U.S. kindergarten saying they were ready to accept the lad.

At the other extreme among applicants was a retired Indian colonel with a pension of 120 rupees, about \$15 a month. Unable to live on this without using his meager savings, he had decided to join his son in the States. He can gain entry as part of a family.

In all, 134,000 Indians, including first and second generations, were in the U.S. last year, and visa applications are running high again this year.

An average of 20 Indian nurses

apply each day at the American Embassy here. The reason: most of them can hope to earn between \$8,000 and \$10,000 a year in America. Here they get about 200 rupees a month, less than \$30.

Or take medical doctors. One hundred and twenty five students graduated from a medical college in Gujarat, north of Bombay, recently. Eighty-five of them promptly chartered a bus and arrived several days later at the U.S. consulate in Bombay to apply for visas.

Again, vastly higher financial rewards for doctors in the United States are the basic reason for the rush. Indeed some critics claim India is losing many of its best state-educated men and women to the U.S. in a new "brain drain."

Not so, say others. The doctors and nurses may depart, but they send back far more funds to their home folks in India than the Indian Government ever invested in their education. So there is a rupee gain, not a loss, involved.

Moreover, experts here question whether India actually is prepared to absorb all its own professional graduates. It already has a surplus of trained people in the cities.

Where India needs and wants them is in its 500,000 small villages. Yet the villages offer an educated professional man almost nothing in facilities or financial return.

The U.S. Government, meanwhile, feels it needs more doctors, nurses, dieticians, veterinarians, and public health experts than it now has. So it smiles at qualified applicants, here and elsewhere.

How many are coming? In India in 1973, Uncle Sam issued 8,000 immigration visas, plus 4,000 to visitors who adjusted their status after arrival. Total, 12,000.

Under present American regulations, the permitted ceiling is 20,000 a year from any one country in the Eastern Hemisphere, or 170,000 overall from the area, whichever figure is reached first.

In 1972 India sent 17,000 to the U.S. This year officials expect 17,000 again. But in 1973, U.S. officials tightened the requirements because of economic conditions in the states. One result was 5,000 fewer Indian doctors and nurses.

Britain and Canada are other favorite Indian destinations. They are regarded as easy places to make a living. But Canada now is difficult for Indian applicants. And Britain has closed its door. Both were being inundated by Indians as Commonwealth members.

Meanwhile, don't forget Indian students. In 1973 there were 11,000 in the United States, more than any other foreign nationality.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
14 August 1974

'Untouchables' in India Found Ready to Rebel

BY WILLIAM DRUMMOND
Times Staff Writer

NEW DELHI—The first nationwide public opinion poll among India's lowly untouchables shows a growing will to rebel "that carries explosive possibilities."

The landmark survey was carried out by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion here, an affiliate of the international Gallup group.

The poll described the treatment of untouchables prevailing today as "Indian apartheid."

"The high-handedness of dominant castes is creating what might be described as a psychological backlash among the Harijans (untouchables) said institute Director Eric P. W. De Costa. Harijans,

literally "children of God," is the name given to the untouchables by Mahatma Gandhi.

"Forty percent of those surveyed throughout the country would opt for organizing their community to fight against injustice committed by other castes," said De Costa, adding:

"A sizable segment of the Harijan community is thus in a ferment that carries explosive possibilities. A majority of those willing to organize themselves would not hesitate to resort to violence in self-defense.

"This militant section constitutes only one-fifth of the Harijan community. But this small but determined segment may eventually convert the silent and resentful majority to opt for violence when the chips are down."

The number of Harijans in India is estimated at 80 million, or about 15% of the total population.

They are eligible for special government quotas in gaining employment or

education.

Apart from constitutional guarantees for a number of individual rights, discrimination on grounds of untouchability is a crime punishable by law.

"A special act provides penalties for preventing a Harijan from using public facilities or subjecting him to social or occupational discrimination.

However, De Costa found that the legal guarantees had been ineffective.

The survey of 1,500 respondents found that 13% of Harijan youngsters were placed in segregated seating arrangements in schools, more than 50% of Harijans were made either to stand or to sit on the ground during visits to the home of caste Hindus and 40% of Harijans said they were forbidden to enter a caste Hindu temple to worship.

Economically, the Harijans are still downtrodden. De Costa said.

"A vast majority, notwithstanding the evidence of some improvement in economic condition, still have to wage a losing

struggle for making ends meet," he said.

"This is reflected in the feeling shared by a sizable segment (43%) that their lot is worse than their parents'."

De Costa drew attention to the recent formation of a group in Maharashtra state calling itself the Dalit Panthers (Black Panthers), a militant organization of untouchables that has borrowed a page from Eldridge Cleaver.

Earlier this year, the Dalit Panthers engaged in violent clashes in the streets of Bombay with caste Hindus and police in which dozens of persons were injured.

The possibility that the Dalit Panthers might become the leaders of Harijans seeking change "must surely call for some furious thinking on the part of India's privileged classes."

"The pace at which confrontation is proceeding and, even more, the pace at which confrontation leads to violence is a warning of graver problems to come," De Costa said.



ETUMBA, Brazzaville (Central Organ of the Congolese Workers Party)
9-16 March 1974

Les machinations de la CIA en Afrique

Nous reprenons pour nos lecteurs, un article (traduit) du Journal « Ghanaian Times » consacré aux activités de la C.I.A.

Aujourd'hui, dans le monde entier, la seule mention de la C.I.A. — Central Intelligence Agency — préoccupe et alarme les coeurs de tous ceux qui comprennent ou qui sont capables de comprendre les grands enjeux de la politique internationale.

La C.I.A. est considérée comme étant omniprésente. Car elle est généralement connue comme le bras long et fort du gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique à l'aide duquel elle manipule les situations dans les systèmes politiques et économiques d'autres pays.

Mais quels sont les objectifs et les méthodes de la C.I.A. ?

Nombre de journaux et de livres se sont consacrés aux activités de la C.I.A. D'une manière plus ou moins compréhensible ils ont exposé la nature et le mode de travail de ce service de renseignements des Etats-Unis opérant dans le monde entier.

Deux auteurs américains, D. Waisc et T. Ross, ont publié un livre intéressant sur ces activités révélatrices sous le titre « Le gouvernement invisible » (The invisible Government). D'après des informations officielles, la C.I.A. se trouve sous contrôle du Conseil de Sécurité Nationale (National Security Council). Ce dernier étant subordonné directement au Président des Etats-Unis.

La loi sur la Sécurité Nationale (National Security Act) du 18 septembre 1947 stipule ses fonctions comme suit :



La C.I.A. en action

La C.I.A., le serpent à sept têtes, déploie ses tentacules.

- 1 — donner des conseils au Conseil de Sécurité Nationale et au Président par rapport aux questions de renseignement concernant la sécurité nationale ;
- 2 — coordonner les activités de renseignement du gouvernement à l'étranger
- 3 — composer et distribuer des informations au sein du gouvernement
- 4 — mener des activités de renseignement d'une importance générale, c'est-à-dire des activités touchant tous les éléments des services de renseignement ;
- 5 — remplir d'autres devoirs concernant la sécurité nationale qui lui sont confiés de temps en temps.

C'est le cinquième point qui ne peut guère être dépassé « dans l'innocence » qui mérite l'attention particulière des pays africains luttant pour une indépendance authentique. Ce point donne à la C.I.A. le privilège de réaliser des actions et opérations secrètes dirigées contre n'importe quel Etat du monde.

Les objectifs et les méthodes de la C.I.A. ont été tellement déshonorants que déjà en été 1948 le Conseil de Sécurité Nationale devait donner l'instruction secrète NSC 10/2 permet-

tant des opérations spéciales pourvu que le gouvernement les estime suffisamment secrètes et « restreintes » pour pouvoir nier chaque liaison établie avec ce dernier à l'aide d'arguments plausibles. Actuellement c'est l'Office d'Opérations Spéciales (Office of Special Operations) qui réalise de telles actions secrètes.

Le devoir principal de la C.I.A. est le support pour le gouvernement des Etats-Unis dans la sauvegarde de ses intérêts « nationaux ». Les objectifs américains en direction de l'Afrique sont déterminés par les intérêts économiques, politiques et stratégiques des Etats-Unis en Afrique, et ils jouent un rôle important dans la politique globale de cette puissance agressive.

Du point de vue économique, les Etats-Unis aspirent à l'établissement des conditions les plus avantageuses pour l'investissement de leurs capitaux, à la réalisation de grands profits, à un approvisionnement durable de l'industrie américaine en matières premières d'importance stratégique et à l'expansion des marchés pour une vente profitable de leurs marchandises.

POLITIQUE

En plus de cela, les Etats-Unis s'efforcent de lier les pays
ETUMBA, Brazzaville
16-23 March 1974

LES DENTS DE LA C.I.A.

Voici le deuxième article de la série publiée par « Times » au sujet du rôle de la C.I.A. (Central Intelligence Agency) dans le monde en général et en Afrique en particulier.

« La C.I.A. qui ouvertement ou secrètement emploie les méthodes les plus différentes y compris l'écoute téléphonique et le truquage électoral ainsi que la destruction de ponts et les interventions armées, devient l'instrument le plus important de la mise en pratique de la politique américaine et un des organes les

africains en qualité de partenaires subordonnés sans droits égaux à la partie du marché mondial capitaliste qui est dominée par les américains.

Du point de vue politique les Etats-Unis visent à une influence dans les Etats africains, leur assurant sur la scène internationale le soutien de l'Afrique pour leur politique étrangère. En exerçant leur influence dans les Etats africains, les Etats-Unis entrent souvent en conflit avec les intérêts d'autres Etats occidentaux.

C'est pourquoi, les Etats-Unis se présentent, selon les exigences de la situation concrète respective, comme un ennemi du colonialisme (s'ils peuvent par ce moyen diminuer l'influence de l'ancienne puissance coloniale) ou bien comme son défenseur.

A côté de la livraison de matières premières pour leur industrie, les Etats-Unis ont des intérêts militaires et stratégiques en Afrique leur assurant le contrôle de l'Océan Atlantique, l'Océan Indien et la Mer Rouge.

Voilà la raison pour l'acquisition de bases aériennes et navales ainsi que d'autres types d'installations militaires dans les Etats Africains.

Dans l'ensemble, l'objectif

stratégique de Washington consiste en l'incorporation graduelle des pays africains dans l'appareil militaire des Etats-Unis et de l'OTAN.

En résultat du développement croissant de la technologie militaire, le nombre des pays étant d'un intérêt stratégique pour les Etats-Unis va augmenter de manière évidente.

Si l'on considère ces devoirs dans leur unité, il est évident qu'ils sont une partie des efforts faits par les Etats-Unis pour achever la domination du monde. Déjà en 1946, Harry Truman, le Président des Etats Unis, avait souligné cet objectif en déclarant :

« Les Etats-Unis sont un pays puissant. Il n'y a pas de pays plus puissant que les Etats-Unis. En possession d'une telle puissance, nous devons obtenir l'hégémonie dans le monde ».

L'ancien Secrétaire d'Etat américain Dean Acheson a exprimé d'une manière encore plus franche que les Etats-Unis ne poursuivent pas des objectifs philanthropiques, mais bien leurs propres intérêts dans leur programme d'aide aux pays sous-développés.

(A suivre)

plus importants du gouvernement américain », (New York Times, 26 avril 1966).

La transformation des pays africains en appendices économiques, politiques et stratégiques des Etats-Unis est une tâche très compliquée que même une super-puissance gigantesque comme les Etats-Unis ne peut pas accomplir par des moyens légaux exclusivement.

En plus de cela, cet objectif est très impopulaire aux yeux des populations africaines et de l'opinion mondiale, et il se trouve en

contradiction flagrante avec les déclarations officielles des Etats-Unis au sujet de leur support pour les idées de la liberté, de la justice et du respect des droits de l'homme, de sorte que les Etats-Unis sont forcés de le réaliser moyennant la guerre secrète.

Cela explique la transformation de la C.I.A. en un instrument de la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis et l'importance spéciale du rôle qui lui est assigné.

A la base des objectifs généraux internationaux des Etats-Unis en Afrique, on peut caracté-

tériser la tâche concrète de la C.I.A. sur le continent africain comme suit :

1° fournir des renseignements étendus sur la situation dans les pays africains, leurs objectifs politiques et autres, sur l'opposition, les sentiments des populations en général, sur des personnes étant d'un intérêt pour les Services de Renseignements et sur les activités des Représentations Officielles et des Services de Renseignements d'autres Etats dans ces pays ;

2° établir des réseaux d'agents nécessaires et réaliser d'autres « opérations secrètes » en vue d'exercer une pression sur les Gouvernements des pays africains ainsi que, s'il est nécessaire, préparer un coup d'Etat pour la liquidation de Gouvernements africains désagréables.

Le rôle de la C.I.A. a grandi avec la proclamation de la politique de la « nouvelle approche » des Etats-Unis vis-à-vis de l'Afrique. Ce fait est confirmé par les instructions du Secrétaire d'Etat américain W. ROGERS qui a souligné les devoirs spéciaux nommés ci-après de la diplomatie et des Services de Renseignements américains au cours d'une réunion des Chefs des Représentations Diplomatiques Américaines et des postes de la C.I.A. dans les pays de l'Afrique Orientale qui a eu lieu en février 1970 à Addis-Abeba :

1° sauvegarde des intérêts stratégiques des Etats-Unis et de l'O.T.A.N. ;

2° obstruction de la politique des pays communistes et de l'expansion de l'idéologie socialiste ;

3° lutte contre le Mouvement de Libération Nationale ;

4° pénétration dans les Représentations des pays socialistes ;

5° substitution prudente, mais continue de l'influence anglaise par l'influence américaine ;

6° garantie d'approvisionnement pour l'industrie de guerre des Etats-Unis.

On peut supposer que la di-

plomatie et le Service de Renseignements américains ont les mêmes devoirs dans d'autres Etats africains, avec la seule différence que dans les pays sous domination française le point 5 peut envisager la substitution de l'influence française.

Le travail de la C.I.A. en vue de sauvegarder les intérêts internationaux des Etats-Unis est accompli par les cadres et les agents faisant partie d'un grand département de cette organisation.

Ce département a été créé conformément à la loi sur la Sécurité Nationale de 1947.

Il est difficile de donner le chiffre exact de ces « Chevaliers du poignard et du poison ». D'après des estimations d'un ancien dirigeant de la C.I.A., L. KIRKPATRICK JVA, qui était également l'Inspecteur Général de la C.I.A. sous ALLAN DULLES, ce département comprend environ 100.000 membres et agents.

LES OFFICES

D. WEISE et T. ROSS l'estiment à 200.000. A peu près 20.000 d'entre eux travaillent aux Etats-Unis dans le quartier général de la C.I.A. et dans ses succursales se trouvant dans 20 villes américaines.

Le quartier général est situé à Langley, à dix milles de Washington à la rive du Potomac. C'est un bâtiment de huit étages nommé le « Mausolée d'Allan Dulles ».

D'après des chiffres donnés par STUART ALSOPS dans son livre « Le Centre » (*The Center*), le budget annuel de la C.I.A. pour 1968 était de 500 millions de dollars.

Une section du département de recherches et d'information de la C.I.A. où sont représentées toutes les régions géographiques, s'occupe directement des affaires africaines. Mais il y a encore d'autres départements de la C.I.A. s'occupant de l'Afrique :

Le « département d'opérations spéciales » où, comme les cadres de la C.I.A. disent, le « département des sales trucs » qui réalise des enlèvements, des assassinats

et d'autres actions « délicates » ; le « département de propagande » s'occupe de la propagande et de fausses informations ainsi que du soutien et de la formation de partis et organisations d'opposition à l'étranger ; le « département de science et de technologie » qui est pourvu d'équipements d'espionnage les plus récents allant des appareils d'écoute en miniature jusqu'aux installations de radar et aux avions U2 pour la reconnaissance aérienne.

A l'étranger, les agents de la C.I.A. sont concentrés dans des postes et dans des centres régionaux dirigés par les groupes régionaux. Ils mènent toutes sortes d'activités de renseignement. Les centres régionaux sont dirigés par des Directeurs régionaux. Leurs agents se déplacent dans les pays de leur rayon d'action.

AGENTS

Dans les grands pays principaux de l'Afrique, les postes de la C.I.A. ont jusqu'à 30 agents dirigeant les réseaux locaux.

En dehors de cela ils sont appuyés par des Américains recrutés à cette fin qui travaillent dans les pays respectifs.

Dans des pays comme le Maroc, la Tunisie, l'Ethiopie, le Zaïre et le Sénégal où il y a d'importants postes de la C.I.A., ils ont à leur disposition des spécialistes d'interception et d'autres techniques d'espionnage ainsi que des agents pour la reconnaissance à l'étranger.

A Mombasa (Kenya) et à la base militaire des Etats-Unis à Kénitra (Maroc), il y a aussi des écoles spéciales pour l'entraînement d'agents recrutés parmi la population indigène et parmi les étrangers.

Les Chefs des Institutions des Etats-Unis à l'étranger sont obligés de donner le soutien requis aux agents de la C.I.A. S'il est nécessaire, ces derniers utilisent pour la réalisation de leurs objectifs largement les offices des Ambassades, Missions et autres Représentations ainsi que les voitures des Diplomates américains

et d'autres personnalités officielles.

Les Chefs des Institutions américaines organisent largement des réceptions, des démonstrations de films, des meetings, des visites, des événements culturels et d'autres réunions convenables aux agents de la C.I.A. pour leurs activités en vue de nouer des contacts aux fins du renseignement et à d'autres fins de la C.I.A.

Souvent les agents de la C.I.A. emploient leurs femmes ou d'autres Américains pour établir des relations, organiser des rendez-vous et mener des enquêtes, parce qu'ils veulent égarer le Service de Sécurité local, etc.

COUVERT

A cette fin, les femmes des agents de la C.I.A. se soumettent

à un entraînement spécial avant de partir pour l'étranger. La femme du Chef du poste de la C.I.A. au Maroc, Mme WELLES, par exemple, dirige l'Association des Femmes Américaines servant de couvert au Service de Renseignements américain.

L'agent de la C.I.A. ALLAN LOGGAN qui en 1967 était deuxième Secrétaire de l'Ambassade des Etats-Unis à Conakry, entretenait la liaison avec les agents à l'aide de sa femme.

Formellement les Chefs des postes de la C.I.A. sont subordonnés aux Ambassadeurs et à d'autres diplomates d'un rang élevé représentant les Etats-Unis dans un pays donné. Mais en pratique, ce principe est souvent violé parce qu'ils travaillent de manière indépendante. Fréquemment les Chefs des Représentations Diplo-

matiques des Etats-Unis sont eux-mêmes les Chefs des postes de la C.I.A.

En 1966 par exemple, l'Ambassadeur Docteur WILLIAM LEONNART était le Chef du poste de la C.I.A. à Zanzibar. Plus tard il est devenu Conseiller du Président des Etats-Unis.

Francis A. RUSSEL qui de 1942 à 1944 était le Chef du département de renseignements économiques au département d'Etat américain, a été Ambassadeur et Chef du poste de la C.I.A. en Tunisie. A présent l'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis au Mali, Robert BLAKE, détient la même double fonction.

(Traduction d'un article paru dans « *Ghanian Times* » du 6 novembre 1973).

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
9 August 1974

Seeking Angolan independence

The leader of one of Angola's three liberation movements now is looking more to China and less to the U.S. for aid when the breakaway from Portugal comes.

Holden Roberto, operating from neighboring Kinshasa, Zaire, with the support of Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko, is president of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). He also heads the Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile (GRAE).

Born a Bakongo tribesman in the Dembos area of northern Angola, the son of a mission worker, Mr. Roberto was taken to Kinshasa as a young child and educated in mission schools there.

Although FNLA is not regarded as the first movement for the liberation of the Portuguese territory in southwestern Africa, it was the first to establish a government in exile, in 1962.

In 1959, Mr. Roberto visited the United States to present the case for

Angolan independence to the United Nations. During his stay, he made many American acquaintances and attracted unofficial U.S. sympathy.

Since that time he has been considered pro-Western in outlook, and allegations often are made that the FNLA received covert American financial and arms support from the Central Intelligence Agency.

Recently, however, he has begun to look to China for aid and military instructors.

Like other African liberation leaders, he realizes that China and the Soviet Union, in selected cases, are willing to give open support to guerrilla movements, whereas the United States is not. With supply routes to the Mideast a consideration, Washington has preferred maintaining good relations with Portugal to backing freedom groups in the Portuguese territories of Angola, Mozambique, or Portuguese Guinea (Guinea Bissau).

After his U.S. visit, he returned to Zaire (then the Congo) and started weekly broadcasts for Angolan independence and a party political magazine.

Since he has spent most of his life outside Angola, it sometimes is claimed that he has little support in his native land, except among Bakongos in the northern part of the country.

The severe 1961 riots in Angola, which resulted in the slaying of hundreds of whites and the subsequent massacre of thousands of blacks, are attributed to his followers, which suggests he and the FNLA were not unknown in Angola.

Efforts to unify FNLA and the other major group, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), have been under way since 1972.

Henry S. Hayward
Luanda, Angola

Far East

NEW YORK TIMES
18 August 1974

Saigon Police Fight Subversion But Also Curb Political Dissent

By DAVID K. SHIPLER

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Aug. 17—On the floor of a Saigon hospital ward a young seamstress named Dang Thi Hien lay handcuffed to an olive-drab stretcher. Her legs, covered with a blanket, were paralyzed—a result, she said of beatings and torture during police interrogation.

In a small office a student activist, Nguyen Xuan Ham, drew deeply on a cigarette while he described being forced to watch three friends tortured as policemen tried vainly to make him admit that he was a Communist.

A high-school philosophy teacher, Tran Tuan Nham, who was jailed after his unsuccessful run as an anti-Government candidate for the National Assembly, hunched over his drawing of the layout of cells in the Saigon municipal police headquarters to show where he saw the head of the Private Bank Workers Union, Phan Van Hi, meet death—not by suicide, as the Government reported, but after days of beatings.

Beyond the well-known war of tanks and planes and infantry there is another war in South Vietnam—a silent, hidden war that runs its course out of the public view. It is waged in interrogation rooms, in prisons, in courtrooms. It is fought in tiny print shops and large universities, in churches and pagodas, in the cramped offices of opposition politicians and the shabby headquarters of dissident union leaders.

Far From Public View

Some portray the struggle as a monumental clash between free ideas and governmental suppression; others see it as the Saigon Government's rightful battle for survival against a potent campaign of Communist subversion.

In fact it is both, for its major roots are in the civil war that has consumed South Vietnam for two decades, taking some two million Vietnamese lives, touching virtually every family, seeping into every crevice of society.

The Government, to defend itself against Communist attempts to seduce and convert

the civilian population, and to combat infiltration, sabotage and assassination by the Vietcong, has assembled—with American financial and advisory help—an extensive police apparatus and a military judicial system that are waging this second, simultaneous war.

But those caught in the web of arrest, torture and imprisonment include not only Communists who pose as dissidents but non-Communist dissidents as well: not only sophisticated Vietcong officials but apolitical peasants suspected of Communist sympathies; not just Communist labor organizers but tough, aggressive union leaders; not only Vietcong propagandists but poets and writers who have simply opposed United States policy and called for peace.

In recent months a picture of the Government's police and judicial systems has emerged through interviews with former prisoners and their families, student activists, labor officials, teachers, journalists, authors, opposition politicians, Roman Catholic priests, Buddhist monks, lawyers and police officials.

Such inquiries by foreign correspondents are possible in Government-held areas, where outsiders have relative freedom. The Vietcong, in contrast, have permitted only strictly guided tours by newsmen, so little is known of the actual workings of their security and judicial systems. The sketchy outlines provided in captured documents and the interrogation of defectors indicate that recalcitrant civilians in Vietcong areas are subjected to arrest, trial, "re-education" and even execution.

As a result of the police activity on both sides, no neutralist sentiment has been allowed to gain momentum. The Government machinery designed to fight the Communists has actually eaten away the middle ground between the two warring camps.

No Place to Turn

Those politically active South Vietnamese who dislike both sides find themselves with no place to go. Some who were anti-Government dissidents have turned reluctantly to the Communists. Others hate and fear the Communists so much that they have grudgingly accepted President Nguyen Van Thieu although they do not like him either.

Yet the Government's system is not a massive, ever-present police operation comparable to that of the Soviet Union, nor does it suppress dissent so thoroughly that the country can present a public image of unity

as does North Vietnam.

It creates, instead, a mosaic of free expression and fear, of political opposition and political conformity, of gentle interference and harsh punishment. Within this mosaic the heavily censored South Vietnamese press often displays a streak of irreverence. And a few vitriolic politicians can berate President Thieu and have their views reported—not domestically, indeed, but by the foreign press.

On the other hand, dissidents who are free to speak out often contend that they are mere ornaments, that whenever they begin to accrue political power the police arrest the lesser figures around them, break up their meetings and leave them isolated.

By the same token the police rarely make mass arrests of student dissidents, some students report, but prefer to infiltrate quietly and then choose carefully those leaders whose imprisonment will sap an opposition movement of its vigor.

Distinctions Often Ignored

The distinctions between Communists and non-Communists are not always apparent to the police, some of whose principal officers insist that all dissidents are really Communists. In any given case the military judicial system—whose judgments rely chiefly on police dossiers—does little to establish the truth, which may be known only to the accused.

Those expressing antiwar sentiments have long been targets of police scrutiny, both because such views are regarded as Communist views and for fear that they will spread among a war-weary population. Consequently, many people put themselves in considerable danger by opposing United States involvement in the war.

Mr. Nham, the teacher, was arrested shortly after his unsuccessful 1971 campaign for a National Assembly seat, run on the theme "Fight the Americans and save the country,"—a slogan also used by North Vietnam. He was released in March after nearly two years in prison.

"At the beginning of the campaign, my election pamphlets were confiscated right at the print shop," he said in an interview four days after his release. "And on the first day of the campaign, in the morning, I began putting up my posters. By six o'clock that night the police were tearing them down."

Every day, he recalled, five or six of his campaign workers were arrested, held for a few

that after the election—he finished eighth in a field of 87 candidates running for six seats—about 20 of his workers were put in jail, where some remain.

Anti-U.S. Articles Cited

A journalist who asked not to be identified related that he had been arrested, beaten and tortured with electrical shock by policemen who cited several of his anti-American articles as evidence that he was a Communist.

He had translated American antiwar writing and had written a newspaper series about the My Lai massacre, the effects of defoliants and the use of antipersonnel bombs against North Vietnam, all based on books and articles published in the United States. He was released several months ago after about a year and a half.

A well-known author, Nguyen Buc Dung, who uses the pen name Vu Hanh, was arrested in 1967 and held for three years after he had written newspaper and magazine articles arguing that Vietnam's national culture must be preserved against Americanization. He advocated the establishment of a political movement with that aim.

During interrogation, he said, policemen beat him, forced soapy water into his mouth and tortured him by applying electrodes to his body.

In 1969, when his 18-year-old son, Nguyen Anh Tuan, protested the imprisonment, he was arrested and is still in prison. In January 1973, Mr. Dung's 15-year-old daughter, Nguyen Thi Phuong Thao, was arrested and held for six months for allegedly possessing antiwar music. The police said she was a Communist.

Now Mr. Dung's small house, tucked away in a compact garden off a back alley in Saigon, is stripped of his books and writings, all seized by the police. He has written two novels since his release, both so heavily censored that he does not think it worth trying again.

On Jan. 1, 1974, the police surrounded a Saigon cafe and, it is reported, arrested three young people connected with the clandestine publication of a small book of short stories entitled "Pink Hearts."

The stories are intensely antiwar, portraying the Government as the prime cause of a conflict that separates lovers and shatters families. One of those said to have been arrested, Tran The Hung, a student at Van Hanh University in Saigon, wrote of a peasant named Sao Do, who fought the French and was now opposed to both sides in this war.

Sao Do reflects happily on the forthcoming marriage of his daughter, but worries that his two sons might kill each other.

Suddenly Government planes "thousands of

fragments of bombs and bullets surrounding and swooping down on Sao Do's hiding place, where his neighbors also try to save some fragment of life amid the net of death."

"After the careless terrorization," the story goes on, "the planes flew away, leaving behind a scene of destruction, torn houses, rows of bamboo with their heads bowed low to the ground, smoke rising up from burning houses. The smoke rose and disappeared like the incomplete dream of Sao Do."

'I Don't Like This Flag'

Another author reportedly arrested was Hoang Thoi Chau, who wrote a bitter story about a Saigon taxi driver's happiness upon hearing of the cease-fire. He expected his three sons to return from the army, but when he entered his house he found that only one son had come home, in a coffin draped with the South Vietnamese flag.

"Why don't you bring home something different from this flag?" the man asks his dead son. "I don't like this flag."

Many former prisoners, although by no means all, describe being subjected to torture, usually for one of two purposes: to force them to provide intelligence information or to force confessions, to which the military judicial system attaches great value.

A number who have been imprisoned in the Saigon municipal police headquarters, including a student leader, Ha Dink Nguyen, report seeing a slogan on the walls and on signs on desks: "If he is not guilty, beat him until he renounces. If he does not renounce, beat him to death."

Mr. Nham, the teacher and opposition candidate, said he was never tortured, but in the first week in March, when he was in a cell at the Saigon municipal police headquarters, he recalled, he saw many people from the countryside, mostly women, who had been beaten so badly that they could no longer walk and had to be carried from cell to interrogation room.

Links to the Other Sides

"I had a chance to talk with some of them," he reported, "and it seems they were people who had husbands or relatives on the other side, and so they had been brought here. Other people were suspected of trading with the other side."

He recognized among the prisoners a former student, Thuy Dung, a frail woman in her early twenties who leaned weakly against the wall of the corridor as she walked to and from interrogation. Through a student who was serving as a sweeper in the cellblock, she conveyed to Mr. Nham her concern that she was suffering from an injury caused when an eel was put in her underpants.

When Mr. Nham was first arrested, he went on, students in his cell had painfully swollen fingers because policemen had inserted pins under their fingernails, then run rulers

back and forth across the ends of the pins during questioning.

One of those in the cell, a law student named Trinh Dinh Ban, had been beaten so badly that he could not sit upright, Mr. Nham related, adding, "He screamed all the time because he was in pain all over his body."

Other people have described similar situations. An American physician who works in a provincial hospital reported that prisoners were often brought into the wards with bruises that they attributed to police beatings. The doctor, who asked not to be identified, told of a woman who was near death, having been severely beaten on the stomach: "She had internal injuries, bleeding, she couldn't eat. I thought she was going to die, but she survived."

Just Routine Questioning

Dr. Tom Hoskins, an American who works in Quang Ngai, on the central coast, reported that one of his clinic's regular patients, a 45-year-old woman, came in suffering from bruises. "She had been picked up for routine questioning," he said, "and was severely beaten around the arms, chest, legs."

The patterns of arrest envelop certain aggressive labor unions as well—those that threaten to translate serious economic concerns into sharp political issues.

In April, 1973, a number of prominent union officers were arrested and accused of being Communist agents, among them Mr. Hi, head of the bank union; Dang Tam Si, secretary general of the bank union; Nguyen Thua Nghiep, president of the Petroleum and Chemical Factory Workers Union, and Hoang Xuan Dong, secretary general of the Railway Workers Union.

Mr. Dong was among 27 union members arrested in April, 1973, after an illegal two-hour strike by clerical and repair workers seeking a wage increase. During interrogation, according to a source close to the case, he was blindfolded and his wrists were handcuffed behind his back and water was forced into his nose and mouth until he could not breathe. The police asked: "Who gave the order for this strike? Do you have contacts with Mr. Nghiep or Mr. Hi?"

He Died in Prison

Mr. Hi, arrested at about the same time, was accused of being a Communist agent for 25 years. Five days after his arrest he died in prison; the Government said he had hanged himself.

Mr. Nham, the teacher, whose cell was across the corridor, has a different version.

"I could see him carried out for interrogation and carried back," Mr. Nham recalled. "The person who brought rice to the cells said he was being beaten really severely and he didn't know whether he would be able to bear it much longer."

On the night of April 22, Mr. Nham continued, he heard a noise from Mr. Hi's cell.

"A guard came over and

opened his door and pulled him out head first so his legs were still in the cell and his body outside," Mr. Nham said. "He had no clothes on. One arm was across his chest. His arm was swollen and it was black like a piece of putrid meat. On his chest was a little bit of blood, his side along his ribs was just beaten into hamburger." Mr. Hi was dead.

Last March, Mr. Nham said, he shared a cell with a union man named Trang.

Torture of Students Described

"He had been there seven or eight months," Mr. Nham continued. "He was being strung up by his arms daily and beaten on his legs, his back, his chest. When I left there he was unable to walk because of the beatings on his legs, and his knees were so swollen."

"He was arrested for having known a Liberation Front official who had responsibility for having lent him his pickup truck to go around in."

According to Mr. Nguyen, the student leader and a former student chairman at the Saigon university, torture was a common aspect of the wave of arrests in which he and about 250 student leaders were caught early in 1972. They had assembled a "peace movement" to oppose the American presence in South Vietnam and President Thieu's one-man election in 1971. One activity was burning American vehicles.

Mr. Nguyen described himself as one of three students tortured in front of Mr. Ham, the activist leader, who was chairman of an association of Catholic students at the University.

Mr. Ham said the others were Huynh Tan Mam, head of the South Vietnam Student Union, who is still imprisoned, and Phan Nguyet Quon, who has which he insists he is not. The police began by torturing him alone.

"Sometimes they tied me to the chair," Mr. Ham recalled. "Sometimes they blindfolded me. During the first week I was beaten every day." He also reported being shocked by means of an old hand-cranked telephone generator connected to his nipples with clips.

This failing to elicit a confession, the police brought in his friends one at a time, he said, adding:

"It terrorized me. I was very angry that they beat a girl in front of me. They tied her ankles to a chair, tied a rope around her stomach and blindfolded her. They had a long rubber baton and they beat her knee caps. Then they thrust their hands in under her ribs and pulled them out. They had her lie down and forced soapy water into her mouth."

"They attached one wire to an earlobe and one to her breast or to her genital area and then they would crank. When the crank was turned and produced a burst of electricity, she would strain at the chair and slump back."

The policemen took turns, Mr. Ham recalled. Some were in uniform, and he could see that they were high-ranking

officers—majors and lieutenant colonels—while others were in civilian clothes or bare-chested.

'Ordinary Job, No Emotion'

"It was like an ordinary job with no emotion," Mr. Ham commented. "They had many Coca-Cola bottles and cigarettes. They would beat a little, drink a little Coca-Cola, smoke a cigarette, speak to each other in quiet voices—no emotion, very professional. Most were not angry or hateful but were just doing it very coolly."

There were times, he said, when he considered "saying anything to relieve the suffering," but he thought that they would have asked him for details he could not provide, "so it just would have prolonged the torture."

Miss Quon never begged him to confess, he said, "but she did shout at them, asking them why they were so savage."

Scars Are Often Buried

It is hard to see the scars of torture. Sometimes they are in the eyes, but not always. Often they are hidden far beneath the steady gaze and self-control learned, perhaps, in the interrogation rooms. For some, curiously, it is not the thought of the torture itself but the recollection of that dreadful time of waiting to be summoned that stirs the old taste of fear.

Nguyen Viet Tuan can still taste it, and he was never tortured. The president of a group called the Young Catholic Workers, he was arrested for helping workers striking at a Saigon factory. He was treated gently, he said, but his cell was full of those tortured.

The tension is still real—the extreme fear of the long, silent "After 10 P.M.," he said, "we would wait for a sound, a bell. Then the guard gets up, climbs upstairs—then the sound of the key. The interrogators in the daytime were not severe, but the interrogators at night were hard."

NEW YORK TIMES
20 August 1974

To Saigon, All Dissenters Are Foes, All Foes Reds

By DAVID K. SHIPLER
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam —

After two decades of fratricidal warfare the Government of South Vietnam has been left with a legacy of corrosive suspicions directed in large measure against its own citizens.

The chief instrument and repository of these suspicions is the police apparatus. In a war in which the enemy cannot always be seen, the police structure tends to see him everywhere, attributing to him immense, almost superhuman powers of deviousness and persuasion.

This attitude, which has fueled the system of arrest, torture and imprisonment in South Vietnam, was defined recently by a high-ranking officer of the Special Branch of the National Police, which is responsible for coping with Vietcong infiltrators in the civilian population.

The Communists, he explained during a conversation, scheme to get one family member after another on their side. They woo them one by one, using those who have come over to send first a letter, then perhaps a little money to lure the rest of the family across the ideological line.

Students are very vulnerable, he observed, gesturing with his cigarette. We have caught students having secret meetings. They organize sports clubs and they hold weekend retreats "where they sing forbidden songs — North Vietnamese songs!"

He portrayed the Communists as masters of infiltration who penetrate the ranks of dissidents and even of the police. Officers, he said, have to watch their own men very carefully.

Asked if he thought there were any opponents of President Nguyen Van Thieu who were not Communists, he replied with an emphatic no. They are all Communists, he said, and as for their assertions that they are merely neutralists opposed to this Government, "it's just a cover."

So there is not much room for other voices in South Vietnam now. President Thieu said as much April 14 when he declared in a speech that "the 19.5 million South Vietnamese people should be welded into a monolithic bloc, motivated by a single anti-Communist ideal."

'Only a Bunch of Traitors'

Contending that the supposedly neutralist "third force" was a creation of the National Liberation Front, he told his

audience: "The so-called third force is only a bunch of traitors to the motherland and henchmen of the Communists and colonialists."

A group of 301 Roman Catholic priests replied to this in a statement planned for a June news conference that the police sealed off and prevented from taking place. "The anti-Communist cause has become a padlock to shut the mouth of the people," the priests declared, "because every helpless citizen may be accused of connivance with or assistance to Communists."

To many former prisoners who have undergone police interrogation, Mr. Thieu's view of dissent seems genuine, not manufactured to excuse arrest. The interrogators, they say appear to believe quite sincerely that the student or the writer in question wrote as he did or spoke as he did only to help the Communists.

For example, a journalist who was arrested after he wrote newspaper articles about the My Lai massacre, the use of defoliants and the antipersonnel bombs dropped by the United States in North Vietnam gave this account of his interrogation by the police:

"They asked me, 'What Communist organization are you working under?' I said that I'm not in any Communist organization, that I'm not acquainted with Communists. I only wrote these articles that oppose the war. They said that they did not believe me and started applying electrodes to the lobes of my ears."

"Certainly I must be in a Communist organization, they said. 'Why would you have written such articles if you were not in a Communist organization?'"

Opportunists, an Officer Says

A young officer who works in a provincial reconnaissance unit — part of the Special Branch — said that he was convinced that most dissidents sought Communist support not necessarily out of ideology but out of opportunism. "They want to elevate themselves in case some day there is a coalition government," he said.

He went on to talk fearfully of a recent North Vietnamese program to send civilians into the South to farm abandoned land in Vietcong-controlled areas. The danger, he explained, is intermarriage. The Communists would try to intermarry with pro-Communists and the pro-Communists with non-Communists, so Communism would spread relentlessly, he said, speaking as if it was a hereditary disease or a dreaded racial defect.

Families of Communists thus become targets of suspicion. They are arrested frequently, not just for their supposed pro-Communist sympathies but also

for the intelligence information they are believed to have about Vietcong activities.

A middle-aged woman from Hue, the mother of seven, described being arrested three times, beaten, interrogated and held for three or four months each time in the years after her husband, a professor of literature at Hue University, left in 1968 to go with the Vietcong.

The last time, in April, 1972, she said, she was forced to sign a promise to gather intelligence. "I signed," she said. "I was afraid of being beaten. I was very fearful. They said, 'If you do not report with intelligence you can be arrested again.'" This haunted her, she explained because she had no intelligence to provide. She is required to report to the police monthly.

Unable to Get a Job

"The whole thing is such a preoccupation with me that I can't do anything," she said. "I can't work. Even private agencies are afraid to give me work—afraid they might be implicated, afraid they might be arrested."

For another family the trouble began when the father, Prof. Ton That Duong Ky, who had been arrested by the French colonial rulers and then again under the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem, signed an anti-war petition in 1965. He was imprisoned and then, with several other intellectuals who had signed the petition, was forced across the demilitarized zone into exile in the North. He now heads a Communist organization.

Since his exile, his wife said, five of his nine children—most are in their twenties, and one is a 14-year-old girl — have been arrested, some more than once. A son, Nguyen Phuoc Quynh Tien, 18, was beaten to death in prison, his mother said. And, she added, Nguyen Thi Que Lang, 25, a daughter-in-law, was arrested, beaten, suspended by her arms from the ceiling and tortured with electric shock, then left in prison for five years.

In the prisons themselves the obsession of defining South Vietnamese citizens as pro-Government or pro-Vietcong focuses on one symbol: the three thin red stripes on the yellow field that form the flag of the Republic of South Vietnam.

"Will you salute the flag?" The question is asked when the prisoner arrives in Chi Hoa Prison in Saigon. The answer is of great importance. To the prison officials it represents loyalty or disloyalty, patriotism or treason, although students say their refusal to salute is a protest against the injustice of their arrest and imprisonment.

In the 'Movie Room'

Every person interviewed who had served time in Chi Hoa told the same story: Upon refusing to salute the flag, he was placed for periods of a day or two to a week or two in the Movie Room, a cell about 18 by 24 feet, lit dimly by a single bulb.

"It was very dirty," Nguyen Viet Tuan, president of a student group called the Young Catholic Workers, said. "There were urine and excrement on the floor; you couldn't breathe. It was full of mosquitoes."

Most prisoners had one leg shackled to an iron bar that ran the length of the cell a few inches above the floor. Sometimes, former prisoners said, the Movie Room contained a dozen or more people, sometimes only three or four.

"If we were shackled by the legs and we protested," said Nguyen Xuan Ham, another student leader "then they would shackle our hands as well, or cross the legs and then shackle them or shackle you face down — that was the worst." The shackled prisoners passed around a wooden box used as a toilet. "If you were lucky it would be fairly clean," Mr. Ham said, "but if it was old, urine would leak out all over where you were lying."

For many the refusal to salute was a matter not of ideology but of principle that their captors could not comprehend. The journalist who was arrested for his anti-American articles recalled his conversation with a prison official several days after the signing of the Paris cease-fire agreement in 1973.

"You do not agree to salute the flag," the official declared. "You must be a Communist."

"No, I am not a Communist," was the reply. "I was a journalist and I engaged in no illegal activities. This Government arrested me, and that flag is a symbol of the Government that illegally arrested me, so how can I salute that flag? If they want me to salute the flag they must release me—then I will salute it."

Has he saluted it since his release last October? "From the time I was small," he answered slowly, "I lived in Saigon, and all that time I saluted the flag. All that time I was not a Communist. Now I do not know. Now no one asks me."

Some South Vietnamese see a self-fulfilling prophecy in the Government's compulsion to label opponents as Communists. A prominent civilian judge, for instance, declared in a recent interview that no matter what the national emergency, martial law "can reach too many innocents and transform these innocents into Communists because they are angry against the unjust measures taken against them."

Some student dissidents have gone over to the Communist side, friends say, usually out of fear of arrest or re-arrest. It is not an easy decision. It means leaving a family and accepting a political label with which few seem comfortable. Many stay behind, living in a kind of underground world, sleeping each night in the home of a different friend, hoping to keep one step ahead of the police.

"Yes, I may go to the other side," said a young man recently released from prison who,

is living underground. A friend, arrested at the same time, has gone. If I lose my morale, perhaps I will go. But I'm not a Communist. There are certain parts of Communist policy that I don't accept. We are pacifists. We are against the fighting."

A Confluence of Views

He is a militant Buddhist and a former student leader who helped organize campaigns in the late nineteen-sixties in which American vehicles were burned in Saigon as a protest against the American military presence. Now he wants to see President Thieu out of office. Only then, he says, can the Paris agreement's guarantee of democratic liberties and general elections be realized.

On these two issues — the Americans and the Paris agreement—he and many other opponents of Mr. Thieu share a coincidence of views with the Communists. But it was with some disgust that he recalled being locked in the same cell with a dozen Vietcong political cadremes at Tan Hiep Prison.

"They were inferior cadres," he said with disdain. "I didn't discuss serious things with them. The Buddhists do not like foreigners. The Buddhists do not accept foreign ideas, Marxist or capitalist." Thus he, like many of his colleagues, is left suspended between two sides, practicing his politics clandestinely and with little success.

The Government does not seem perturbed to have such opponents going physically to the Communists. During the prisoner exchanges that ended in March the Government released to the Vietcong a number of prisoners who denied that they were Communists. Some refused to go. These included two prominent opponents of the Government—Tran Ngoc Chau, a former parliamentary deputy and a friend of many American advisers, and Huynh Tan Mam, former president of the South Vietnam Student Union.

"They were offered freedom on the Saigon side if they would agree to go through the Open Arms program, which was designed for Communists defectors. But they refused on the ground that this would be tantamount to making the confessions that they had resisted for so long. Mr. Mam remains in jail; Mr. Chau was released on June 5 on the condition that he engage in no political activities. Another, Nguyen Long, an aging antiwar lawyer who has defended many dissidents, was forced to the

Vietcong side despite his objections.

Isolation as a Tactic

Those who remain in Government areas find their political activities sharply curtailed and undermined by what they call skillful police action. Where a movement depends on a few leaders, they say, the leaders will be taken. But where the arrest of the leaders is likely to provoke deeper protest, an attempt is made to isolate them by threatening or arresting lesser figures around them.

That is the situation of Ho Ngoc Nhuan, a Roman Catholic opposition deputy in the National Assembly. He is free to denounce the Government, but he says he has great trouble holding meetings with political allies or constituents.

With regularity the police surround his office and refuse to let anyone in for a scheduled meeting, he complained; on other occasions, the police have used the intimidating tactic of photographing those who visit his office.

"Every Tet," Mr. Nhuan said, referring to the Lunar New Year, "I make a calendar. I send them to my constituents in Saigon, and when I go to visit them they invite me into their bedrooms to show me that they do hang my calendar on the wall, but in the bedroom."

After his visits, he said, his constituents are in turn visited by the police, who ask about their tax payments, their jobs and the like. "They invite them to the police station several times," he says, "making it difficult for them to carry on their daily lives."

The police also have the power to keep any candidate off the ballot by filing a negative report on him with the Election Commission.

According to documents obtained by The New York Times, two incumbents on the Bac Lieu Province Council were denied permission to run for reelection in July on the basis of a police report that accused them of belonging "to a group opposed to the administration."

The two—one is named Ta Van Bo, the other requested anonymity—were also reported to have "contacted the An Quang Buddhist bloc to participate in a secret meeting." Also from the police report:

"They both contacted the office of former Lieut. Gen. Duong Van Minh and received

documents criticizing the course of the Government. The general is an opponent of President Thieu."

There are other effective police tactics short of arrest. For example, writers in disfavor rarely find publishers willing to take risks. Ky Ninh, once the managing editor of a Saigon newspaper now out of business, did find a willing publisher, one of the few who have hired him in the four years Mr. Ninh has been out of prison.

"He asked me to help him organize the editorial staff," Mr. Ninh said. "I warned him that the Government doesn't want me to direct any editorial staff, but the publisher insisted on hiring me. I worked 13 days. On 10 of those 13 days the paper was confiscated by the Government."

Now, to earn money, his wife sells kerosene and fish sauce in the market place, and as for Mr. Ninh—"I'm ashamed to say this but it's true—I carry passengers on my bike."

Police Techniques Described

Students also describe sophisticated police methods by which antiwar and anti-Thieu movements have been driven underground, fragmented, intimidated and—the most candid concede—rendered virtually impotent.

"The police take off their uniforms and register as students, and who can tell the difference?" said Nguyen Van Ngoc, a lanky young student leader on the run from the police.

He and others said that the police routinely influenced student elections by arresting anti-Government candidates and making sure that pro-Government students filled faculty councils and university-wide executive councils, bodies that can take positions on national issues and command wide audiences.

Before the election this spring at the University of Can Tho, the police jailed some of the candidates and the rest, about 25, went into hiding, according to Nguyen Duc Dung, student chairman of the university's Committee of Representatives.

One apparent reason for the police interest, Mr. Dung said, was that the students had begun discussing two dangerous topics—the country's severe economic difficulties and the amendment to the Constitution that allows President Thieu to run for a third term.

However, Mr. Nhuan, the Catholic opposition Deputy ob-

served that the Government had also been conciliatory on occasion, especially when a student demand enjoys broad public support. Such was the case some months ago when a nationwide organization of private university students made an appeal for a change in the law covering student draft deferments. This came shortly after student uprisings had taken place in Thailand and South Korea. Mr. Nhuan said, and the Government agreed to the change within a week.

The Unending War

Many opponents of the Government who have been arrested like to think that without the police President Thieu would fall from power. But there are factors beside the police that stabilize the present Government. One is the war itself, which still polarizes the population, feeding the tension in the country and giving those who hate and fear the Communists only one place to go.

Some politicians who count themselves among the opposition but are nevertheless strongly anti-Communist say they have tempered their criticism of Mr. Thieu because they do not want to weaken the non-Communist side further at a time when the American withdrawal has made it more vulnerable to the Vietcong and North Vietnamese.

In addition, the dissidents do not have access to the electoral process. The control of the press; the absence of any strong public figure to pose a neutralist alternative; the difficulty of assembling a political party with enough members, chapters and votes to meet the Government's strict requirements—all of these frustrate the dissidents' desire for change, as surely as the threat of arrest, torture and imprisonment does.

Many of those who oppose President Thieu lapse into embarrassed silence when asked to name an alternative. Then they insist that another man would emerge if the country had a truly free political life. Perhaps, but there is no Gallup Poll in South Vietnam, no way of scientifically testing the assumption of the dissidents that Mr. Thieu is unpopular.

Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a change in government would bring political freedom. The Communists—and even the dissidents who clamor for a fully open society—would not surprise many South Vietnamese if, after gaining power, they merely put different people in jail.

BALTIMORE SUN
20 August 1974

U.S. pullout, rising costs besiege Viet economy

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Sun Staff Correspondent

Saigon — Along with the continuing misery of war, South Vietnam is suffering a grave economic crisis.

Living costs have nearly doubled in the last year and a

half. There are almost one million unemployed, about one-third of them workers who formerly earned their livings, directly or indirectly, from the American presence.

Living standards

With wage increases lagging far behind the inflation rate, living standards are falling. A recent survey showed the average soldier or government worker with a family in Saigon no longer earns enough even for the bare necessities of food, fuel, clothes and housing. To survive he must moonlight, steal or have another wage earner in his family.

South Vietnamese officials

are hoping against hope for a substantial increase in American economic aid, but they are aware their cause is not popular in the United States Congress.

Trying to ease American resistance to a never-ending commitment, Saigon officials argue that if aid is increased now, it can be ended sooner.

"Our goal is to reach self-sufficiency by the end of the decade," said Nguyen Tien Hung, commissioner of state

for planning. "If American aid is at a high level in the next two or three years, it can be substantially reduced later."

Advancing the same argument, another Cabinet officer said: "If we don't have substantial aid, we can never get out of the morass. We will be bogged down, with no resources to pull ourselves out."

Before President Nixon left office, his administration had proposed \$750 million economic aid program for this fiscal year — nearly doubling the \$399 million level of last year. The proposal faces strong opposition in Congress, however.

The South Vietnamese are not at all ignorant of the political difficulties they face in Washington, but they hope to stave off aid cuts for a while longer.

"America has helped many countries reconstruct after war," Mr. Hung said in an interview, "and we believe we are a good candidate for such aid. I think Americans would like to help us recover. Not endlessly, not forever, but for a few more years."

His emphasis on postwar reconstruction evokes a somewhat unreal image, since full-scale war still is raging despite the Paris peace agreement. However, South Vietnamese officials concerned with economic aid prefer to speak in such terms, which might sound more palatable to American legislators than support for a continuing war.

Officials like Mr. Hung are also anxious to discuss the economy in terms that will not frighten potential investors from abroad.

The result is that government spokesmen on the civilian economy sometimes sound as if they are from a different country from that described by military officers, who are

more concerned about cuts in military aid and tend to stress the continuing warfare.

There is a similar air of unreality about the projected timetable for South Vietnam's self-sufficiency.

Economists in the still-large American aid mission in Saigon have prepared brightly colored flip-charts showing projections for a phase-out of American economic aid after 1980. (The charts do not mention military aid.)

One American acknowledged, however, that the projections "are more an expression of hope than anything else."

"Security situation"

Prepared to answer congressional queries on how long American aid must go on, the projections are based on some highly optimistic assumptions.

They show, for example, a sixfold-increase in South Vietnam's export earnings by 1980. They also project a ninefold increase in aid from non-American sources. And they are based on American aid at the requested \$750 million level for this year and next.

Such goals would be difficult enough to meet even if the war truly were ended or greatly reduced—and there is no sign of that. With the war going on, the chances for such dramatic increases in exports or "third-country aid" are even slimmer.

"The main problem is the security situation," one aid expert said. "Nothing is more important than that."

Vietnam's economic crisis is particularly grave because it is really two crises—one international and one domestic.

Like every other developing nation dependent on imports, Vietnam has been hard hit by soaring world food and fuel

prices. Its import bill this year is expected to hit \$850 million—more than eight times its export earnings and about \$150 million higher than it was two years ago.

But the actual volume of imports will be less than two-thirds of the 1972 level. The government has let the price rise, hoping to lower consumption—although it reluctantly has begun to subsidize petroleum-based fertilizer—and the resulting inflation has sharply eroded real incomes.

Shrinking revenue

This "imported inflation" battered an economy that already was suffering the effects of the American withdrawal.

Three years ago, South Vietnam earned about \$400 million a year from the American presence. This represented wages paid to Vietnamese employees, purchases for American installations and spending by individual American soldiers and civilians.

This income—"our tourist revenue," one economist wryly called it—has shrunk to \$100 million a year.

In addition, the Vietnamese estimate, and American officials acknowledge, that the U.S. withdrawal wiped out about 350,000 jobs.

This combination of circumstances has produced both significant slowdown in economic activity and a raging inflation. Living costs rose about 40 per cent in 1972, and 65 per cent last year. They already have gone up 27 per cent this year, and government officials at their most optimistic predict that the rate for the year as a whole will not be under 50 per cent.

Growth questions

Meanwhile, with fewer jobs,

civilians are less and less able to make ends meet. Soldiers and civil servants, who in South Vietnam's war-mobilized economy make up a very large proportion of the labor force, have received pay increases offsetting less than one-quarter of the rise in their cost of living.

The government, has made some progress in the export field—scoring huge percentage gains, although the dollar amounts are still low. Promotion of seafood, lumber, rubber and scrap metal have pushed exports up from \$12 million three years ago to \$60 million last year, and this year's earnings are expected to reach close to \$100 million.

However, there are question marks over future export growth. Timber and seafood prices might be softening, and high fuel prices are slowing down the fishing industry, according to experts in Saigon. Lumbering, always affected by the military situation, might have reached its limits of expansion because the war continues to affect the forested regions of the country.

This year, South Vietnam earned a windfall of \$55 million from American oil companies for rights to explore off the Vietnamese coast. The first test holes are already being drilled. Even if oil in commercial quantities is discovered, however, it will produce no more revenues for at least another four years.

Because of the failure of the Paris agreement, neither third-country aid nor foreign investment has reached levels Vietnamese officials once hoped for. Businessmen have remained cautious: Potential aid donors seem reluctant to commit large sums if there is no genuine reconstruction taking place.

BALTIMORE SUN
18 August 1974

Saigon lays casualty rise to U.S. cut

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Sun Staff Correspondent

Saigon—The impact of diminishing American military aid is already being felt on South Vietnam's battlefields.

Field commanders, who are shocked and dismayed at the prospect of still deeper aid cuts, say their casualties already have risen as the result of restrictions on military supplies.

The item causing the most immediate concern is artillery ammunition. The South Vietnamese Army, which had grown accustomed over the years to the American style of spending firepower rather than lives, is under strict

save stocks by using as little ammunition as possible.

"Our fire support is much more limited now," said one division commander. "If we get into a big battle we can ask for artillery and we get it, but normally we don't have the authority to use it as we did before. . . . This is the main reason for our casualties."

Maj. Gen. Iran Ba Di, deputy commander of the vital Mekong Delta region, said that because of restrictions on the use of artillery, "our ground forces are not supported as well, and the number of casualties is higher."

The cutback on artillery

and other supplies has been imposed partly because shipments from the United States already have been reduced, and partly because South Vietnam, worried about future aid levels, is carefully husbanding the supplies it receives.

Concern about supplies was suddenly heightened with the U.S. House of Representatives vote to slash military aid to Vietnam to \$700 million—half the amount originally requested by the Nixon administration and \$300 million under the level approved by Congress in the defense authorization bill only a few weeks earlier.

The House vote came as an unpleasant surprise not only to the Americans in the 900-

man defense attaché's office, which administers the military aid program. "It was a total, devastating shock," one American official admitted.

The alarm in the ranks of ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) over military aid is in some ways reminiscent of the fears that have accompanied every stage of the American disengagement.

The South Vietnamese underwent similar spasms of nervousness when the American withdrawals began in 1969, when the last American ground combat units left the field a couple of years later and when American air sup-

agreement last year.

Some Americans predict the South Vietnamese eventually will adjust, without too much difficulty, to the loss of expensive firepower and supplies.

Others, however, regard the aid level as having fallen below a critical minimum. "They can't live with \$700 million," said one high-ranking American officer in the defense attache's office. "They'll die with it."

Asked if he agreed that more South Vietnamese soldiers are already dying because of the supply cutback, the American said flatly: "Of course they are. There is absolutely no doubt about it."

The South Vietnamese react with angry impatience to the argument advanced by some American congressmen who saw the aid cuts as a means to force President Nguyen Van Thieu to make political concessions in order to revive the Paris peace agreement.

"That is irrelevant and unrealistic," says one Vietnamese Cabinet minister. "They're putting pressure in the wrong place. . . . They should put pressure on the North Vietnamese."

Dead letter

After a year and a half of full-scale war, most Vietnamese officials regard the Paris agreement as a dead period. In the last two months the South Vietnamese have

been losing as many as 500 men killed in some weeks, a rate comparable to all but the worst weeks of the big 1972 offensive.

Altogether, according to South Vietnamese figures, battle deaths on both sides have reached nearly 100,000 since the cease-fire.

None of the political arrangements outlined in the agreement has even begun to take shape. Among officials, diplomats and journalists in Saigon, even those few who still believe there might be a chance for an ultimate compromise peace think it cannot come until after one more all-out military test.

In dozens of conversations, a reporter found no one who believed that cuts in American aid would in fact prod Mr. Thieu into offering concessions.

Despite the falling aid levels, the South Vietnamese still have more arms and firepower than the Communists.

In large main-force battles, such as those being fought in the current wave of heavy fighting near the northern coast, South Vietnamese sources say the government still has plenty of ammunition.

The effects of the aid decline are being felt in the less publicized but equally bloody day-to-day war of smaller battles.

On the whole, Vietnamese commanders insist, the government's battlefield positions have not been seriously weak-

ened with the even tighter supply restrictions—but they say that a higher price is being paid in soldiers killed or wounded.

But Vietnamese and American sources say the Communists have improved their weaponry since the cease-fire, bringing in 150 additional heavy artillery pieces, more than 1,000 lighter field guns and antiaircraft weapons, and enough munitions, according to one high-level American source, to sustain heavy combat for more than a year.

Citing infiltration statistics, General Di, the deputy commander in the Mekong Delta, said: "In certain places, the use of arms and ammunition is now inferior on our side. . . . We can't say they are stronger than we are, but when they concentrate their forces they can achieve local superiority in arms and firepower."

A source in the Delta, speaking specifically of artillery, said the Delta command, known as IV corps, is allotted 40,000 rounds a month for its 105-mm. howitzers—the basic fire-support weapon of the South Vietnamese Army—compares to 140,000 rounds a month in the period shortly after the Paris agreement was signed in January, 1973.

No comparable figures could be obtained for the other three corps commands, or military regions, into which Vietnam is divided. the reduction has

clearly been very sharp, however. In areas where outgoing artillery used to be heard day and night, a traveler now hears only an occasional round.

A district chief in a traditionally contested region where the howitzers used to fire almost hourly says he is now rationed to three rounds a day.

All supplies affected

Though it is artillery munitions that commanders speak of first and with the most emotions, the aid cutbacks have affected all categories of supplies.

Along Highway 1 on the central coast, and on the innumerable byways of the Delta, it is not unusual to see outposts with fresh-cut bamboo stakes instead of barbed wire defenses. Soldiers have begun stringing hand grenades in place of the more expensive claymore mines outside their positions.

Because of the high price of gasoline and strict limits on its use, military sources say mobility has been affected. "We have some difficulties in shifting troops now," one high-ranking officer acknowledged.

The volume of military supplies have been affected even more sharply than the dollar amounts, because like everything else, weapons, munitions and other supplies have become more expensive in the last year.

BALTIMORE SUN
16 August 1974

The Attempt on Park's Life

The death of Mrs. Park Chung Hee, wife for 24 years of the man who has ruled South Korea for 13, is a bitter tragedy for him and their three children. She died from the bullet of a lone assassin who was trying to kill her husband while the dictator was making an Independence Day address. There are no grounds here for a new crackdown and weeding out of dissidents. Park himself is to blame for the assassination. He has made the mildest forms of political dissidence, tolerable not only in all democracies but in many authoritarian states, punishable by death. His Central Intelligence Agency has been scooping up and imprisoning those who would speak against him or demonstrate for freedoms. The Park repressions have not insured his life but imperiled it, by denying his people more moderate forms of expression.

One of Park's officials told *The Sun's* Matthew J. Seiden last May that there is a Korean saying to the effect that "sometimes a benevolent dictator is necessary." A student dissident told the reporter that "We are not Communists or Socialists,

most of us are not even interested in politics. All we want is the basic freedoms. All we want is the liberty to speak what we think."

At times in his dictatorship and presidency, Park has seemed indeed to be benevolent, and at other times to be heading toward the introduction of democracy, at least until he saw that it threatened his continued rule. All claims to benevolence have vanished since last winter. Park is ruling now with a paranoid tyranny. There is nothing remotely anti-Communist about it. The arguably un-Korean doctrines that the onetime lieutenant in the Japanese Imperial Army, onetime court-martialed Communist sympathizer, is stamping out are American style civil liberties, Christianity, and Western learning. It was not for this that 34,000 Americans died in Korea two decades ago, that 44,000 troops and Pentagon civilians serve there now, that American military aid pours in. The first thing President Park can do, both to counteract attempts on his person and to redeem the immense American investment in his rule is to let the Korean people speak their minds.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 August 1974

Korean Tragedy

United States support for an unpopular and repressive regime in South Korea is in danger of undermining the collective security interests which such support is intended to insure. Yesterday's assassination attempt against President Park Chung Hee and the subsequent death of his wife are tragedies which only underline the plight of the Korean dictator.

President Park's problem is not just one of an ugly international "image"; it is the problem of survival which any dictator faces when the only viable means of rule left to him are repression and decree. As successive United States Administrations have had painful occasion to observe around the world, American interests are not well served by endless efforts to prop up regimes devoid of popular support.

There is continuing validity to the close ties and

interests which the United States has maintained in Korea since the war there a quarter-century ago; political stability and economic development in South Korea are important features of the over-all Asian security system. But these valid interests are ill-protected by the refusal of United States policymakers to confront the question of whether the Park regime is any longer capable of providing either stability or development.

As the months of repression go on, it is increasingly evident that the South Korean Government's policies are promoting exactly the kind of internal unrest which makes the country vulnerable to exploitation by the Communist North. Just as the United States cannot dictate the internal policies of another country, so President Park must realize that the United States is entitled to determine for itself whether it is worth continuing military aid that no longer serves its intended purpose.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 August 1974

The tragedy of Korea

By Elizabeth Pond

Tokyo

The Koreans are a warm, emotional, and quietly proud people. They have an inborn sense of justice — and an inborn political instinct. They are direct and frank. They have a persistent innocence.

But because they are individualistic in a way neither the Japanese nor the Chinese are, some of the best of the Koreans are now in jail. They believed in the self-evident truths of the American Declaration of Independence. They dared to voice these truths, and they were silenced by a government that believes only in the self-evident "truth" of force.

Maybe the tragedy isn't as obvious to Westerners as was iron military rule in Greece, the birthplace of democracy. But it is just as real. South Korea is the one country among the developing nations of Asia that could best maintain and benefit from participatory government.

It's an odd phenomenon for a once rigidly Confucian country. Yet a century of Christian teaching of the worth of the individual — even a peasant, even the poor, even a woman — has taken strong root in Korea. And 20 years of American-style education has indoctrinated young Koreans with the assumption that men should be free and equal.

It is true that some of the most cruel atrocities in World War II were perpetrated by Koreans in the Japanese military forces. It is true that Korean troops in Vietnam had a reputation for killing Vietnamese villagers without making any fine distinction between guerrillas and civilians. It is true that maltreatment of political prisoners in the decade since the Korean CIA (secret police) was created has included bestial torture methods.

But the men who performed such brutalities are not the people a foreign

reporter comes to know and admire over years of close contact with Koreans. The Koreans one gets to know have done volunteer work for Vietnamese orphans in Saigon. They have lived in Seoul slums for years on end to help poor rural immigrants get a fair shake in a harsh city.

They have impetuously donated money out of their own pockets — with no reference to their ability to pay — to set up exchange programs between small American and Korean colleges. They have sold clothes off their backs to support legal aid for poor women.

The Koreans I know are proud of the close-to-100-percent literacy of their people. They are proud of their compatriots' matter-of-fact collection of Harvard and Princeton PhDs in economics and political science. They are proud of their Hangul script, devised with phonetic exactitude five centuries ago, proud of their invention of movable type at a date prior to the Gutenberg press.

For these people authoritarianism is no longer the natural pattern for Korea. Indeed, President Park Chung Hee's current dictatorship is looked upon as archaic, unintelligible, "Mongolian."

This is the tragedy of South Korea today: that such innate believers in democracy and the right of free speech should be so deprived of participation in their government — and subjected to death penalties for protesting this loss.

The further tragedy of South Korea is that the government repression and resulting public hostility toward the government are so unnecessary. President Park provided strong leadership for South Korea after his coup in 1961. He defended the country against North Korea. He stopped factionalism in the South. He — along with the nation's very competent

bureaucracy, imaginative entrepreneurs, and hard-working skilled and unskilled labor — led South Korea into a remarkable "economic miracle" of fast, sound growth. He reopened civil contact with North Korea after the two enemies had been hermetically sealed off from each other for a quarter century.

By the summer of 1972, when the first North Korean delegates visited Seoul, South Koreans were demonstrably united behind their government. They were proud of the relative freedom that they had and the North didn't. They were proud of their responsibility and restraint in exercising this freedom.

Within months, however, President Park squandered this voluntary support — or "90 percent control," as one foreign diplomat termed it — by trying to grasp a 100 percent monopoly of power — regardless of the cost. His repressive acts, far from stifling what little opposition there was, fanned it into real opposition. In particular, by making martyrs of prominent Christians who declared their conscience about human rights, President Park alienated even Korea's conservative Christians — an important 13 percent of the population.

The result, diplomatically, is a serious strain in South Korea's relations with its closest ally, Japan. The result domestically is a widespread revulsion of South Korean citizens toward their government.

All this is a travesty of South Koreans' sensibilities and capabilities. President Park and the Korean people both deserve better.

Miss Pond is the Monitor's Tokyo correspondent.

Western Hemisphere

WASHINGTON POST
3 August 1974

'Justice' in Chile

THE "JUSTICE" of the victors is being relentlessly administered in Chile by the officers who overthrew the Allende government last fall. Given the chaos of his last days, it is conceivable that some of Allende's supporters sensed that a coup was coming and hoped to forestall it by creating a power center of their own within the Chilean armed forces. At any rate, the coup came, destroying any such hopes, and the would-be hunters became the prey. The officers who had seized power looked about them for a dramatic way to legitimize their authority, to convince others inside and outside Chile that they had indeed saved the country by their own intervention. For Chileans are, despite their recent trauma, a law-minded people, and even the new leaders appreciate the benefits of winning their countrymen's respect. To fulfill this vital legitimizing purpose, they decided on a mass trial of Allende supporters, who were accused of trying to take over a substantial part of the Chilean air force. Sentences were handed down in that trial the other day.

Now, only in a country as politically riven as Salvador Allende's Chile could a group of 54 air force men (and 10 civilians) have contemplated a kind of coup within one branch of the armed forces in order to assure military support to keep the elected government in power. That is a fair measure of how things were in Santiago at that time. But only in a country as politically restrictive as General Augusto Pinochet's Chile would these defendants have been tried with so little sense on the government's part of its own basic illogic.

Note that, despite government promises of a prompt public trial, a considerable number of Allende's civilian officials have remained in prison or otherwise under detention for almost a year, untried and uncharged. But apparently the military was offended by the

thought that some of its own—air force men—supported Allende. The military perhaps also wanted to intimidate would-be dissenters still within its ranks. These seem to be the particular reasons why the 60-odd defendants were brought to trial before an air force court martial. That court sentenced four of them—a former Socialist Party leader, and a colonel, captain and sergeant—to be shot, while 56 others received prison terms. Carrying out those sentences is a virtually certain way to build more hate and bitterness into Chilean society, which is desperately in need of a turn toward domestic peace.

In a trial where the crime charged is essentially loyalty to the previous government, there can be no question whether the trial is political: It is. Nonetheless, the Pinochet leadership permitted foreign observers to attend the sessions that were open—presumably to bear witness to the correctness of the proceedings or, at the least, to attest to the good faith of the Santiago junta. Whether the observers, simply by going, sanctioned the purpose of the trial would seem to be a fair question. Anyway, the reports of the several American observers, made to the Kennedy and Fraser congressional subcommittees, hardly gave the junta the clean bill of health it desired. The torture of political prisoners still goes on, the observers reported. Due process is an occasional thing. The exodus of political refugees runs high.

Official American interest in how the Chilean government lives up to international standards of human rights is hard to perceive. American military aid is high and getting higher. And in respect to Chile there is not even the excuse, offered most recently, for instance, in respect to police excesses in South Korea, that the United States has strategic interests requiring it to look the other way.

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Fall of Nixon said to be good omen for extending olive branch to Cuba

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Rio de Janeiro — Observers here and elsewhere in Latin America agree that the resignation of Richard M. Nixon, has removed the final obstacle to Cuba's re-entry into the normal flow of hemispheric affairs.

Mr. Nixon's departure from the White House also is expected to hasten the reopening of diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana.

These expectations were encouraged by President Ford's address Monday night, in which he promised to continue the dialogue established among the nations of the hemisphere by the Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger.

To many political observers in Latin America, Dr. Kissinger's initiative in attempting to improve relations between the

United States and its neighbors in the hemisphere ran counter to Mr. Nixon's continued hard line against Cuba.

Time and again diplomats in the Latin capitals have commented on the discrepancy between President Nixon's friendliness toward the large Communist countries, the Soviet Union and China, and his enduring hostility toward Cuba.

No adequate explanation for that hostility has yet been offered. One of the most commonly suggested was that Mr. Nixon had a personal dislike for Fidel Castro and his government. Another was that Mr. Nixon just did not care or consider Cuba important enough to American interests to warrant a change in policy.

Not indifferent

The latter explanation has lost much credibility in recent

months. Pressure had begun to mount against the President's policy, both at home and abroad. Had he been indifferent to Cuba, there would have been no justification for maintaining the hard line against the Communist island.

By doing so, he saddled his secretary of state with a contradiction and alienated needlessly those Latin American countries willing to let bygones be bygones as far as Cuba is concerned.

The pressure against the ex-president's Cuba policy had manifested itself in a number of ways. Most recently the Senate Foreign Relations Committee received and published a report from one of its top staff members urging an end to the economic blockade.

The report was made by Pat Holt, after an investigatory visit to Cuba. The Holt visit received wide newspaper cov-

erage in Latin America, attesting, many believe, to the continuing interest in the Cuba issue there.

Earlier this year the ban on trade between the U.S. and Cuba was violated, in spirit at least, by the subsidiaries of three American automobile companies—Ford, General Motors and Chrysler—based in Argentina. Vehicles made by these companies are entering the Cuban market.

More important, perhaps, has been the attitude developing among other Latin countries toward Cuba. The trend now is toward detente. Even Venezuela, the most offended by Cuba during the earlier and more feisty years of its revolution, is re-examining its policy. Currently, Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago maintain formal diplomatic relations with Cuba. If Venezuela changes, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica and Panama are expected to follow suit.

The United States along with Brazil and Chile has been the most tenacious defenders of the status quo.